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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the last analysis every philosophical system or doctrine rests
on assumptions, i.e., on principles which must be accepted as self-
evident if they are to be accepted at all. The very laws of thought are
assumptions in this sense. They cannot be proved—they must be accepted
as self-evident. But the laws of thought are not a sufficient basis for
a system of thought. There must be 3ome kind of data to which they
are to a :ply. Thinking cannot go on in a vacuum. And our test of data
as data is, again, self-evidence. But self-evidence does not end here.
We require a criterion of truth. How are we to select such a criterion?
Once again the answer is self-evidence. Eut suppose the pragmatist, for
example, protests: I choose the criterion that works best? Then the
reply is that he has employed his criterion in order to choose his cri-
terion, and if he is not to argue in circles, he must eventually appeal
to the self-evidence of the principle that truth can be measured in terms
of success.
In the same way, even the coherence-criterion of truth is origi-
nally dependent on self-evidence for its adoption. In this sense the
criterion of intuition is the basic criterion of truth. In view of its
——
2frequent absence in tine of need, and its misleading pronouncements in
many cases where the "immediate " data are such only in the sense of
being now thought about, and which really involve a reference beyond the
individual consciousness, it is indeed fortunate that the criterion of
intuition is sufficiently impartial to provide us with other criteria of
truth, criteria which are sometimes ungrateful enough to deny their
parent. From among these derivative criteria of truth, we have chosen
the criterion of coherence. Once adopt the criterion of coherence and it
will prove its own worth by other means than self-evidence alone, for
considerations of consistency, adequacy, and harmony testify in its
behalf.
The virtues of the coherence-criterion of truth, however, involve
one defect. That is, in so far as coherence insists on taking all the
data into account, there can be no completely satisfactory starting-
point from which to build a philosophical system, for every part of the
system will involve some ibther part. The more coherent the system, the
less isolable will be the individual parts. For this reason we are
forced to maintain, without attempt at proof, at least one important
philosophical position, viz., the position that there are such entities
as persons, i.e., 3elf-conscious units capable of reason and ideal
value, ^ and that persons have some degree of reality as such. This po-
sition is net to be interpreted as excluding the possibility of absolut-
ism or of any -ism which recognizes that persons are to be explained
rather than denied.
1. Of. Edgar 3. Erightman's definition, Brightman, FOI
,
5.
..
3The raison d'etre of this presupposition consists largely in the
fact that just in so far as human minds are explained out of existence,
just so far does the admitted presence in the universe of human knowl-
edge become mysterious and somewhat incongruous, if not impossible. For
the more insignificant the position assigned to mind in one's interpreta-
tion of the universe, the less comprehensible the existence of true
knowledge becomes. To my mind the existence of knowledge must be re-
garded either a3 a fortunate miracle or as furnishing a clue to the na-
ture of the universe, and I am not partial to miracles.
Be that as it may, I have striven to keep this idealistic presuppo-
sition as much in abeyance as possible, so that those who reject it
might still, perhaps, find something of value in the following study.
Certain distinctions must be made in the use of the concept "truth".
The most important of these distinctions is that between the criterion
of truth and the nature or definition of truth, for the failure to make
this distinction between the ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi of
truth has resulted in considerable confusion and ambiguity. It is not
uncommon for a writer to insist on the need for this distinction and
2
then to proceed to neglect it in the heat of the ensuing controversy.
There is no reason, of course, why the nature of the criterion of
truth and the nature or definition of truth might not be qualitatively
identical. Thus the upholders of the coherence theory of truth cannot
be refuted or impugned merely because they hold that the criterion of
truth is coherence and that the definition of truth is coherence. But
2. For example, cf. Russell, AM, 262, 266.
.
4they can fairly be criticized in so far as they assume, without attempt
at proof, that the nature of the criterion is identical with the nature
of truth. ^ This same criticism is sometimes directed against the pragma-
tist theory of truth, but in this connection it is not valid, for the
simple reason that the pragmatists do not merely assume tne identifica-
tion. Rather, they attempt to prove it Nevertheless, the blind assump-
tion of such an identification is deplorably rife in current discussions
regarding truth.
Another distinction, which is needed more in the interest of preci-
sion than of intelligibility, concerns the two-fold meaning involved in
the concept "nature of truth". In one sense the concept indicates the
ontological status of truth. In another sense the concept indicates the
quality, or relation to reality, by virtue of which truth ijs truth. We
propose to reserve the term "nature of truth" henceforward for the
former sense, and the term "nature of trueness" for the latter sense.
The term "trueness " as distinguished from "truth" seems to have
been first employed by James Bissett Pratt in his discussion on "Truth
and Ideas", ° published in 1908, and in his book What Is Pragmatism ?,
published in 1909. Arthur Kenyon Rogers, in "The Case against Dualism",
published in 1920, also insists on the need for the distinction. 7 In
Of. infra, 148 ,
4. Of. infra, 47.
5. A rather bald instance can be found in Lenzen, Art. 2, 99ff*
6. Pratt, Art. 4.
7. Art. 1, 59.
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What Is Truth?, published in 1925, he makes further use of the term, as
Q
does William Swabey in Being and Being Known , published about 1957*"'
Pratt says:
The three different ways in which the word truth is commonly
used are, then, the following: (1) as a synonym for 'reality 1 ;
(2) as a synonym for known 'fact' or verified and accepted
belief; ( 5 ) as the relation or quality belonging to an 'idea'
which makes it ' true—its trueness » y
Regarding Fratt's first definition (1), in so far as the identification
of truth and reality is merely the preliminary verbal definition of two
terms as synonyms, I think that such identification is unwarranted and
unnecessarily confusing. In so far as the identification of truth and
reality is the reasoned conclusion of a metaphysical system or doctrine,
I think that it can better be treated under the second definition of
truth (2), if this be expanded sufficiently to avoid prejudicing any
controversial issues. A combination of Swabey 's and George Santayana's
definitions of truth, to the effect that truth is that ideal and stan-
dard opinion or description which would be accepted by omniscience,^
would do here. Such an identification would be a metaphysics of truth,
the assignment to this ideal opinion of an ontological status equivalent
to reality itself. In so far as the identification of truth and reality
i3 meant to signify that any belief or statement is true just in so far
fi. Rogers and Swabey apparently developed the distinction independently,
for they do not mention any indebtedness to Pratt. Of. Swabey, BBK, 85;
Rogers, Art. 1, 59; Rogers, WIT, 55. Occasional employment of the term,
without insistence on the need for it, is not uncommon. Of., for example,
Prall, Art. 1, 229*
9. Pratt, WIP, 51-52.
10. Swabey, BBK, 85; Santayana, SAF, 266-268; 00U3, 155*
,'
.
,
. t- t . .
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6as it involves a merging of thought and thing in the real, I think
that such an identification is best expressed by the statement that
trueness consists in identity with reality.
Swabey makes the two-fold distinction we are desirous of making.
He says
:
It is necessary to distinguish between the Truth, the perfect
and unwritten history of the past, present, and future of the
universe, and trueness
,
which is the property or relation of
being true and which belongs to all the propositions making
up the Truth. 11
Lest it be thought that all this is merely hair splitting, we
offer the following quotation from Santayana as an instance of the con-
fusion that can result from a failure to make such a distinction between
"truth” and "trueness".
The truth, however nobly it may loom before the scientific
intellect, is ontologically something secondary. Its eternity
is but the wake of the ship of time, a furrow which matter
must plough upon the face of essence. Truth must have a sub-
ject-matter, it must be the truth about something: and it is
the character of this moving object, lending truth and defi-
nition to the truth itself, that is substantial and funda-
mental in the universe. ^
How anything can lend truth to truth, when truth is defined as a date-
13less, standard description of objects in all their relations, or, again,
as "the whole ideal system of qualities and relations which the world
has exemplified or will exemplify
",
1
‘^is exceedingly difficult to imagine.
11. Swabey, BBK, 85.
12. Santayana, SAP, 227-228.
13. Ibid, 266-268.
14. Santayana, COUS, 153.
.,
„
.
unless we introduce a distinction of uses of the term "truth" . Santa-
yana himself protests the use of the term "truth" to mean "the quality
which all correct judgments have in common. .. Much confusion can be
avoided by the use of the term "trueness" to indicate the quality pos-
sessed in common by all true judgments as such.
V. F. Lenzen also takes note of this ambiguity in the word "truth"
He says
:
The term ’ truth, ’.. .is employed in two senses. In the first
place truth is conceived of as a relation between a true propo-
sition and reality. For example, the true proposition may corre-
spond to reality. But the term ’truth* is also applied to true
propositions. One expresses through true propositions the truth
about the nature of the world. Thus the concept of truth may
indicate the content of a proposition or its relation to
reality.^ 0
It might well be asked, YJhy cannot such a quality of trueness be
described simply as the nature or definition of truth? If the preceding
discussion has not met such a possible objection, we point to the un-
usually high degree of ambiguity in the terms "nature" or "definition"
as applied to truth. The terms "truth" and "reality" both seem to defy
the customary differentiation of connotation and denotation. The conno-
tation of the terms "truth" and "reality" is commonly accepted to be
identical with their denotation. That is, if we wish to define "reality
or "truth", we do it in some such way as. Reality is that which is, and
Truth is the system of propositions acceptable to omniscience. But we
may go on to state. Reality is an absolute self, and. Truth is corre-
15. Santayana, SAF, 267-268
16. Lenzen, Art. 2, 91-92.
,,
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8spondence with reality. We might call these latter statements descrip-
tions of the nature of reality and the nature of truth, meaning by
"nature" kind, sort, or quality. But -it seems to me that our view of
the nature of both reality and truth is so colored by the uniqueness of
the denotation involved, that even the term "nature" does not suffice
to narrow down the meaning to the quality of realness and the quality
of trueness. There is nothing inaccurate in the statement that the
nature of truth consists in being an ideal system of propositions?
and yet this is not what is meant by trueness.
It is so evident when we are speaking of trueness that we mean the
essential quality xvhich makes truth true, that we frequently feel free
to substitute for the expression "the essential quality of trueness",
the simpler expression of "trueness" alone. Such a substitution would be
impossible if we were employing the expression "the essential quality of
truth". Accordingly the use of the term "trueness" seems less awkward
than the term "the nature of truth".
But if considerations of awkwardness be regarded as of minor impor-
tance, and it be urged that the expression "the essential nature of
truth" would do as well as "trueness", it is to be noted that the essen-
tial quality of truth might conceivably be coherence, or entertainment
in a supreme mind, and yet trueness consist in correspondence.
Let us suppose we understand truth to be the correspondence of
thought or idea and reality. Then truth could not very well be that
17 . Webster* s Collegiate Dictionary .

9which corresponds.-^ It seems clearer to employ different terms where
different meanings are involved. The need for the term "trueness" will
be especially evident in the case of pragmatism, where truth a3 an ideal
system of beliefs is denied reality, -where finite truths are indeed ad-
mitted, but where it is asked that we distinguish between truth as
" fait accompli " and truth in the making. ^9
One other advantage of the use of the term "trueness" consists in
its relative dissociation from problems such as, .Vhat is truth apart
from its being true for someone? and. What is the present status of fu-
ture truth? We are not concerned so much with truth at large, as with
tameness
.
However, in order to facilitate a later understanding of pragma-
tism's doctrine of trueness, it is well to differentiate "Truth", re-
garded a3 a complete, ideal system of beliefs or judgments acceptable to
omniscience, from "truths", particular beliefs accepted as true. Such a
differentiation will also be valuable in indicating the relations of
truth (understood as including both Truth and truths) and trueness to
knowledge
.
There is no necessary implication by the concept Truth of a mind
which now entertains it. One might logically agree that there is Truth
and disagree that there is omniscience . That is, the system of beliefs
or judgments which would be acceptable to an omniscient mind need not
be now accepted by, or entertained in, an omniscient mind. If it be
18. Or that which is corresponded to.
19* Dewey, EEL, JlQ, Of. infra, 52.
r< 4
,
-
urged that "beliefs” and "judgments" imply a mind which holds them, the
term "propositions" 1^ which involves no such implication can be substi-
tuted in the definition.
The case is otherwise with truths, however. For these by definition
are accented as true. Consequently we may identify knowledge, in so far
as it is knowledge, with truths. That quality or relation which makes
knowledge correct, i.e., which yiakes truths true, is what we intend to
investigate. Of course, inasmuch as truths participate in, or are com-
prised in. Truth, the quality which makes truths true will be the same
as that which makes Truth true. Consequently, although our treatment is
necessarily largely confined to what we know as true, i.e. to truths, its
conclusions are to be interpreted as applicable to trueness as such, viz.,
the quality which makes truth true.
Our problem may therefore be formulated in the words of S. Alexan-
der as "What makes truth true?"^ This treatment of the essential nature
of trueness attempts to profit by the errors as well as by the successes
of others. Employing the coherence-criterion throughout, it seizes what
appears of value in each doctrine, and tries to fit these residual
truths together, at the same time avoiding the pitfalls into which its
predecessors have fallen.
Unless otherwise stated, by "proposition" will be meant a judgment
20. Cf. infra, 10.
21. Cf. supra, 9, where truth is said to include both Truth and truths.
22. Alexander, STD, II, 251-252 .
,.
,
.
.
.•
.
expressed in words .
^
Although there is some agitation today against
holding that expression in words or symbols is essential to propositions,
the point is not an important one for our purposes. Indeed, we need
some term to indicate an expressed judgment-content apart from its ac-
tually being judged. As Lalande 1 s Vocabulaire technique et critique de
la philosophic^ puts it, a proposition is "l'enonce d'un jugement, t
ioins virtuel ". Moreover, if we are to make intelligible use of propo-
sitions they must be expressed in words. Consequently we adopt this
customary definition of "proposition” with a clear conscience.
For our purposes the terms "judgment" and "belief” are interchange-
able. That is, they both represent "l'acte^le pensee qui peut etre dit
vrai ou faux", ° and their expression in words comprises a proposition
or statement.
The meaning of the term "idea" is a moot point. Here again the
more general interpretation seems most practicable. By defining "idea"
as "tout object de pensee en tant que pense", ' we shall be able to agree
with conflicting schools of thought in calling their more specialized
interpretations "ideas", while at the same time taking note of the
differentiation.
The term "fact" would be very useful in our study were it not
25 . This definition is given in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and
_sychology .
24. Lalande, VP.
25. Italics mine.
26. Lalande, VP.
27 * Loc cit .
.,
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employed in two very different senses, viz. as a commonly accepted be-
pO
lief and as a real thing. ° This two-fold usage makes avoidance of the
term the test procedure under the circumstances, inasmuch as the dis-
tinction which is here slurred over is a distinction which occupies a
very important place in a discussion of the nature of trueness.
As R.F.A.Hoernle points out, 2' "reality" is frequently used as a
synonym for being, existence, or subsistence, separately or ail together
John Dewey regards this as a deplorable situation. He says:
...The careless tradition of philosophy .. .uses 'reality' both
as a term of indifferent reference, equivalent to everything
taken together or referred to en masse as over against some
discrimination, and also as a discriminative term with a highly
eulogistic flavor: as real money in distinction from counterfeit
money. Then, although every inquiry in daily life, whether tech-
nological or scientific, asks 'Whether a thing is seal only in
the sense of asking what thing is real, philosophy concludes
to a wholesale distinction between the real and the unreal, the
real and the apparent, and so creates a wholly artificial prob-
lem. 5^
F.H. Bradley is perhaps one of the most conspicuous offenders in this
respect, 51 but probably a case could be made in his defense on the
strength of his doctrine of degrees of reality. At any rate, the eulo-
gistic employment of the term "reality" will be needed in so far as
trueness is understood in relation to reality. Otherwise, no place
would be allowed for error or falseness.
28. Of. e.g. Swabey, BBK, 87; and Montague, Art. 5, 565-564.
29. Hoernle, art. 1, 261.
50 . Dewey, EEL, 9n.
51* Bradley, AR, 1, and Bradley, ETR, 5^”55.
.• •
.
C •.
...
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Three main types of contemporary theory regarding the essential na-
©
ture of trueness are her^.n expounded and criticized. J. Loewenberg gives
an interesting classification of contemporary theories of trueness in
terms of four prepositions. He says:
...Truth is entertained 'by' minds, it is expressed 'through 1
assertions, it is immersed 'in' experience, and it is 'about'
the real nature of things. 52
He characterizes pragmatism as over-emphasizing the originative prepo-
sition, 55 rationalism as over-emphasizing the vehicular preposition, 5‘
‘
nysticism as over-emphasizing the pivotal preposition, 5-' and Montague
(apparently constituting an -ism in himself) as over-emphasizing the
terminal preposition. 5^
While this is a very interesting and significant analysis, we pre-
fer to classify contemporary doctrines into three types, in terms of
correspondence, identity, and coherence. That is, trueness ccnsi3t3 in
correspondence with reality; trueness consists in identity with reality;
and trueness consists in coherence or comparative degrees of reality.
Nowhere are the lines of demarcation absolute, but doctrines are classi-
fied in respect to their strongest or most distinctive emphasis, in the
hope that they will have some contribution to make toward an under stand-
52. Loewenberg, Art. 1, 5.
55. Ibid, 14-16.
54. Ibid, 16-lp.
55. Ibid, 19-21
56. Ibid, 21-24.
..
.
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ing and solution of the various problems involved, if only by the impli-
cations of their failings. Under correspondence are listed James Bissett
Fratt, Bertrand Russell, and William James, with some attention to John
Dewey. James's right to this label consists partly in his own avowal of
its accuracy, and partly in his attempts to improve on the traditional
formulation of the correspondence-theory of trueness. As outstanding ex-
ponents of the identity-theory we have presented Josiah Royce, Henri
Bergson, and William Fepperell hontague
,
trueness being characterized by
these men respectively as a state of identification with the reality of
an absolute, intuitive consciousness, with the reality of sympathetically
grasped duration, and with the reality of existence and its implications.
The coherence-theory of trueness is quite ably defended by F.H. Eradley
and Harold Joachim.
The University of California has published two volumes of its Pub -
lications in Philosophy on the subject of truth. The first of these vol-
umes is on "The Problem of Truth", and the second on "Studies in the na-
ture of Truth". 57 To my mind the value of this contribution is vitiated
to a large extent by the failure to discriminate carefully between the cri-
terion of truth and the nature of truth, and also by the failure to iso-
late the problem of the nature of truth from the problem of the nature
of trueness. The result is a rather conspicuous lack of coordination and
directedness in the work as a whole. A certain amount of incoherence is,
of course, unavoidable where many authors, holding different views, are
57 • These are volumes 10 to 11, which appeared in 1928 and 1929 } respec-
tively .
.-
.
-
’
involved. But a greater achievement in this direction would probably
have resulted if the problems had been more narrowly soecified and
classified.
The only author of any considerable amount of literature^ on the
subject of trueness who has been neglected in this study is F.C.S.
Schiller, and he has not really been neglected, for in treating the
39
view of William James we are also treating that of Schiller.'" George
Santayana is apparently, but only apparently, slighted because he is
interested in the nature of truth rather than the nature of trueness.
Nevertheless, the aim. of this dissertation is not an historical
survey of trueness as treated anywhere and everywhere
,
but rather the
development of a more satisfactory solution of the various difficulties
involved. In the last chapter, where this development is directly
attempted, extensive use has been made of C.I. Lewis’s Kind and the
World Order, and less extensive use of Borden Parker Bowne’s Person-
alism .
John H. Muirhead says of the problem of truth, "...No nroblem goes
deeper or lies nearer the root of the differences that divide the lead-
ing types of philosophy in our time”.-0 It is, then, rather strange that
thorough investigations of the subject are not more common. The most
likely reason is that thinkers are too busy trying to find the truth
38. That is, who has written more than one or two articles, or more
than one or two chanters on the subject.
39. Cf. James, MT, 169, and Schiller, HUM, xx-xxi.
40. Muirhead, Art. 1, 14.
..
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about reality, to spend much time investigating the truth about truth.
That is, in their efforts to arrive attruths about reality, they do
not give much thought to truths about truths. Truth, or trueness.
The problem of trueness is perhaps the most neglected of all the
aspects of the problem of truth. It has been so neglected that students
of philosophy have some difficulty understanding .just what the rroblem
is, even when it has been explained to them. Consequently, the author
will be more than satisfied if this investigation should stimulate
interest in the problem of trueness, even though the proferred solu-
tion be rejected.
.
17
CHAPTER II
TRUENESS AS CORRESPONDENCE WITH REALITY
James Bis sett Pratt
James Eissett Pratt maintains that trueness is "the relation or
quality belonging to an 'idea' which makes it ' true ' . . But whereas
pragmatism, according to Pratt, would employ the term "idea" as signi-
fying a plan of action, Pratt employs the term here to signify a judg-
ment. In just what does this relation or quality of a judgment consist?
Fratt says it consists in correspondence. But the inadequacy of this def-
inition if indicated by the fact that Pratt's most ardent opponent on
the question of the nature of trueness, William James, is quite willing
to agree that trueness consists in correspondence .5 And Pratt himself
argues that, "when we are dealing solely with the realm of logic, mathe-
matics, essence," the coherence theory of the nature of trueness involves
1. Pratt, WIP, 52.
2. Ibid, 109-110. 112; Pratt PR, 75. Pratt describes judgments as
"actual psychological processes in the mind of an individual". Fratt,
PR, 44-45 .
5. Infra, 45.
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a merely verbal difference from the theory which is commonly known as
the correspondence theory Consequently, we must ask: Just what i_s_ this
correspondence? Pratt's answer is given in the folio-wing pithy state-
ment, "...One's judgment corresponds with its object if the object is as
one thinks it".-1
For the object to be as one thinks it, however, we do not require
that the object be imaged or copied in the mind. Pratt says:
Nor i3 the correspondence theory a theory of copying . It does not
mean that I have pictures in ny head which are like external
things. The figures in the ledger of a railroad company do not
copy or resemble the tracks, rolling stock, arid buildings, the
traffic and its mass and value, to which they refer. Yet they
maja correspond with these things: and they do so when the judg-
ments which they express conceive of the property, traffic, and
value as they really are.
6
This tells us what the correspondence in question is not . Nevertheless,
it fails to tell us just what this correspondence is. William James
seems justified in demanding further explanation of this relationship be-
tween the referens and referend . James says:
Let the object be as much 'as' the idea thinks it, as it is
possible for one thing to be 'as' another. I now formally ask
of Professor Pratt to tell what this 'a3-ness' in itself con-
sists—for it seems to me that it ought to consist in some-
thing assignable and describable, and not remain a pure mystery...
^
Pratt's reply to this challenge i3 that the relationship in question is
ultimate, and therefore irreducible to simpler terms. He says:
In short, it is the very simplicity of the relation between
4. Pratt, PR, 79*
5. Ibid, 76.
6. Loc
.
pit.
7 * Jame s , NT , 168
.
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our thought and the thing of which we are thinking that makes
it incapable of reduction to simpler terms. It may be a 'pure
mystery 1 no doubt; but if so, then I ask in turn that some-
thing be named me which is not a nystery. 0
Perhaps the most famous aspect of Pratt's treatment of the nature
of trueness consists in his discussion of "Peter's Tocth-A.che" .9 If
Peter actually has the experience known as a toothache, then John's
judgment that Peter has a toothache is true, because it corresponds with
its object, and for no other reason. That is, jshe trueness of John's
judgment does not consist in coherence or in identity or in the exist-
ence of mediating links of experience between John's idea and Peter's
toothache, but simply and solely in the fact that Peter's sensation is
as John thinks it to be.
Pratt is of the opinion that only two of the objections commonly
brought against the correspondence theory are of any value. ^ The first
is to the effect that the correspondence of a judgment to its object can-
12
not be verified. Fcatt points out that this involves a confusion of jshe
v/ord "truth", a truth, in the sense of a judgment accepted as true, must
be verified before it can be so accepted. But the quality of trueness
exists independently of its being recognized. That is trueness does net
need proving in order to be, though it needs proving in order to be known.
8. Pratt. WIF, 69-
9. Ibid, 117-122; Pratt, PR, 76; Art. 5 .
10. James, infra, 65.
11. Pratt, Pr, SO.
12. Loc . cit.
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The validity of the further assertion to the effect that the fact that
trueness is correspondence, cannot be verified, seems to Pratt to depend
on what one means by "verification". Eut in any case, with the corres-
pondence theory stand or fall all judgments "scientific, historical, prac-
tical that have to do with any other existence save one's own private and
immediate experience" . -*-3
The second objection to which Pratt devotes his attention is the
supposedly unanswerable question: To what does the correspondence theory
correspond, in order that it may achieve the quality of trueness Pratt
considers that this objection can be net once the correspondence theory
is analyzed into its essential parts, consisting of the three following
assertions
:
...(1) The judgment of an individual mind may refer to objects
outside of itself... (2) It is conceivable that such a judgment
may correspond to its referend in the sense that the referend
may be as the judgment asserts it to be. (5) In case a judg-
ment does correspond in the sense indicated, it may properly
be characterized by the adjective true .
Pratt asserts that a denial of the third proposition is a purely verbal
affair, but that the denial of the first two propositions would involve
the denial of the possibility of transcendence, and consequently the de-
nial of "the possibility of common meanings between two minds, and with
it the possibility of science and philosophy and ordinary conversation"^
15. Pratt, PR, 80-81.
14. Ibid, 81-82.
15. Ibid, 82.
16. Loc. cit.
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Accordingly, these two propositions are correctly said to describe actu-
al situations, and therefore are true in the correspondence sense of
true .^-7
Although the relation of correspondence is ultimate, we can distin-
guish two varieties of it, viz. the correspondence of a judgment to its
object when the object i3 in the realm of existence, and the correspond-
ence of a judgment to its object when the object is in the realm of ess-
ence. In other words, a type of correspondence obtains in the case of a
description of an existential situation which differs from the type of
correspondence obtaining in the case of a description of a logical situ-
ation.'^
Fratt speaks of propositions as being "eternally true in the realm
of logic".^ Propositions are "potential forms of assertion or descrip-
tion" ,2^ and they can be called true "in the sense that if any one should
consciously entertain them he would be thinking truly". 1"' Thus, true
propositions are merely potential true judgments" .22 Judgments are always
about something. Pratt is precluded from ever holding that trueness in-
17. Fratt, PR, 82.
18. Ibid, 77.
19. Ibid, 45.
20. Ibid, 44.
21. Loc. cit.
22.
Loc. cit.
,>
.
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volves the identity of judgment and its object2^ by his thorough-going
epistemological dualism. He says:
22
In fact the first thesis of 'Critical Realism 1 is the insist-
ence upon an existential difference between the content of the
mind and its object—be the physical things in the materialis-
tic sense, physical things in the pan-psychic sense, other
’
’ ir ideas and experiences,
It is this ineradicable "aboutness" in the relation of trueness as
conceived by Pratt that also prevent his identifying trueness with co-
herence, even in the realm of logic. He says that in such cases "the re-
lation intended is mutual coherence and the test is mutual coherence
essential point here is found in the words statement of . The object of
the true judgment must be coherent, the test of the true judgment must
be coherence, but its trueness. will not consist in coherence but in
correspondence with a coherent object. Judgments in the field of non-
Euclidean geometry are commonly admitted to possess coherence with other
such judgments, and likewise with the concepts or logical entities of
Euclidean geometry. Eut non-Euclidean judgments fail to be true of Eu-
clidean concepts. Why? For no other reason than that correspondence is
lacking between the judgment and its object. 3o long as Pratt insists
25 • It must be borne in mind here that for Pratt judgment is a mental
content. PR, 44-45.
25
and the judgment is simply a statement of this coherence". Eut the
24. rratt, PR, 192. Italics mine.
25. Ibid, PR, 79 .
»<
«
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that the judgment and its object are two distinct existential entities,
so long will trueness have to consist, for him, in some type of corres-
pondence and not in the quality of coherence. Eoth the judgment and the
logical entity can possess coherence, but the one is true of the other,
only so long as it corresponds to it.

Criticism of Pratt *3 Theory
Pratt is not alone in asserting the ultimacy and indefinability of
the relation of correspondence constituting trueness. James McTaggart
says
:
. . .When we ask what sort of correspondence it is which consti-
tutes truth—for not all sorts of correspondence would do so
—
we find that we cannot define the particular kind of correspon-
dence.
William Swabey attempts to refine the notion of correspondence further
by describing it as logical correspondence. Defining knowledge as "an
apprehension of relations", 27 Swabey 's treatment vaguely suggests the
possible development of a view such as Russell’s. Eut it is Russell alone
who really attempts to explain or describe the correspondence which is
saidf to constitute trueness; because Swabey nullifies this very promising
beginning by falling back on the appeal to "uniqueness". He says:
The 'correspondence' is of an absolutely unique character,
for it is not strange that the relation of truth and reality
should be unlike any other relation. 28
26. McTaggart, NS, I, 11. Quoted by Loewenberg, Art. 2, 228. Also cf.
Mivart, OT, 240.
27. Swabey, BEK,' 90.
28. Ibid, 89.
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It seems to me that the notion of reality is as ultimate and as
unique a notion as can be found in popular or technical discourse any-
where. Yet many and imposing have been the minds which have concerned
themselves with describing and explaining the meaning of this notion. It
is one thing to despair of a P/hy? in philosophy. It is another thing to
despair of a What? Consequently, an appeal to the ultimacy or uniqueness
of the relation of trueness does not seem to me to constitute an adequate
excuse for failing to make a real attempt at description and explanation.
Ultimacy is indefinability only if "definition" be restricted to the
Aristotelian differentiation of a species within its genus. And even if
the term "definition" be so restricted, we still can ask for descrip-
tion, explanation, elaboration. It seems to me that something more than
the ultimacy of the thing connotated and more than the uniqueness of the
thing denotated is required before we can fairly be expected to stop
asking for further information on the matter. At least enough explana-
tion or description should be given to show why the matter does not admit
of further elaboration. In other words, Pratt seems remiss in not attempt-
ing to prove his point that the nature of the correspondence or "as-ness"
constituting trueness is further inexplicable. That elaboration is not
impossible is shown by the example of Russell and of James; and that
such an attempt at elaboration is not foredoomed to failure is shown by
the at least partial success of these two thinkers, as indicated by the
significance of their conclusions therefrom.
However, both Russell and James differ from Pratt in at least one
important respect, viz., in the kind and degree of distinctiveness
.
26
assigned to the belief or judgment or idea in relation to its object. Al-
though James claims to be an epistemological dualist, his idea is sepa-
rated from its object by time and degree of development, rather than by
the so-called “epistemological chasm". Russell does not even claim to
be a dualist in epistemology .50
For Pratt the idea and the object are two distinct entities. Our
minds possess the power of referring to objects which are entirely out-
side of, beyond, themselves. Pratt describes this power as the ability of
mind to transcend itself. But we must not be misled into thinking that
only those who believe in the so-called "epistemological chasm" are free
to maintain the self-transcendence of finite mind. 3o far as I am aware,
all thinkers who are not solipsists assert this self-transcendence in
some form. The question at issue needs to be narrowed down to the more
specific question of whether or not a particular judgment which I am now
making can correspond to, while yet being distinctively other than, a
reality the characteristics of which are largely independent of my judg-
ment regarding it. If the object of a true judgment is to be as I con-
ceive it to be, must not the so-called secondary qualities be said to
belong to the object apart from iry experiencing it? That is, the greater
the extent to which correspondence can be regarded as constituting true-
ness, the greater seems to be the necessity for similarity in quality as
well as in relational structure between the ofaject and the idea, at
29- Infra, 47.
50. Gf. Russell, ML, 251, 219-220, 222.
.’
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least in the realm of 3ense-experience . Either we must deny that experi-
encing makes any difference to the facts, or there w ill be real aspects
of our knowledge, significant judgments, which fail to possess either
trueness or falseness, for lack of having anything to which to corres-
pond .
One solution of this difficulty might lie in an appeal to a supreme
mind. That is, one might maintain that whereas finite experiencing makes
no difference to the facts, the supreme mind's experiencing constitutes
the nature of those facts, and our experiences need only conform or
correspond in order to be true,-^ But Pratt does not proffer such a solu-
tion. In his strong desire to preserve the objectivity of knowledge, he
fails to distinguish between extra-mental objectivity and extra-individu-
al objectivity .52
Somewhat the same criticism is voiced by Howard Knox. He says:
Our real objection to the correspondence-theory in the form
in which it is held by Mr. Pratt, is that the 'theory' is
essentially a confusion between the immanent 'reality' which is
known, but is not absolute for knowledge nor rigidly indifferent
to our purposes, and the 'absolute reality' whose transcendence
is only another name for unknowableness, and whose stability is
only another name for irrelevance to human problems. 55
Miss Woolley also voices this obiection:o %J
Although most of the problems which Professor Pratt discusses
hinge upon one's view of the relation of the idea to reality,
he appraaches them, nevertheless, with a preconceived convic-
tion that reality, in order to be anything more than mere sub-
51. Of. Royce's doctrine, infra, 79.
52. Of. for example Fratt, WIP, 121-122.
55. Knox, art. 1, 605 . Of. Fratt, Art. 2, 521; WIP, 121-122.
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jective experience, must have its existence independent of the
thought which knows it. The contention of pragmatism is that
we may regard reality as constructed in the knowledge process,
and yet may distinguish it sharply from the mere subjective ex-
perience which is the instrument of its construction. h'4
This point will be considered at greater length when we discuess prag-
matism's view of trueness .55
Another difficulty we find with Pratt's doctrine concerns his treat-
ment of the trueness of judgments in the realm of logic and mathematics.
Eefore stating this difficulty we must first consider Pratt's usage of
several relevant terms. Pratt distinguishes two uses of the term "con-
cept”, first to indicate a psychic entity or content, 56 and second as
"the actual or possible object of such awareness—the class, the defin-
able nature of essence, the conceived individual " .^ Pratt doubts the
existence of "concepts" in the first sense of the term, and accordingly
confines himself to the second usage. Now Pratt says that he I 3 here
using the terms universals, natures, and essences as "practically syn-
onymous n .39 Accordingly we may group together universals, natures, essen-
ces, and concepts into a single ontological realm. All will have the
same metaphysical status, for Fratt. But we find Pratt asserting, "Uni-
34. Woolley, Art. 1, 5OO-5OI
.
55. Gf. infra, 45 ff.
56 . Pratt, PR, 45.
57. Ibid, 44.
58. Ibid, 45.
59. Ibid, 42.
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versals are not individuals and cannot rightly be said to have any inde-
pendent existence. They are possible objects of thought".^ Again, Pratt
says, "Universals are real only as definable natures, as logical enti-
ties, as possible objects of thought".^ But if this be the case, what
reality does a judgment about a logical situation correspond to? Pratt
says
:
Certain concepts have certain interrelations, in the sense that
whoever denies these interrelations can ultimately be shown to
have contradicted himself. The true judgment states these unde-
niable interrelations. ^
Our discussion should make it clear that for Pratt the trueness of a
judgment about such interrelations in the realm of logic or mathematics
must consist in correspondence with interrelations between objects which
are real only as possible objects of thought! Surely it would be far
simpler and less fantastic to eliminate correspondence here in favor of
a coherence theory of trueness. Interrelations between objects which are
real only as possible objects of thought do not need to be corresponded
to so much as they require coherent formulation. It seems to me that
Fratt's "merely verbal difference if even that .,45 from the coherence
theory on this point should be renounced in favor of the coherence
40. Pratt, PR, 42.
41 . Ibid, 45 . If "practical" synonymity be distinguished from actual
synonymity in the above treatment, we need only relate Fratt's defini-
tion of "concepts" as "definable natures" to this quotation in odder to
prove our point. Cf. Fratt, PR, 44.
-±
42.
Pratt, FR, 77.
45. Ibid, 79.
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theory
.
Pratt's assertion that, "...The correspondence theory applies to
both realms, the coherence theory to only one n ,^r is correct in implying
the inadequacy of the coherence theory to the realm of existence, but I
do not think Pratt realizes that the realm to which both theories apply,
properly belongs to the coherence theory and not to a merely verbally
differing correspondence theory. V/e shall see the concreteness, signi-
ficance, and helpfulness of the coherence theory on this point . 4 Ey con
trast the correspondence theory has nothing to offer but "a merely ver-
bal difference, if even that".
Russell thinks that a theory of correspondence such as Pratt's does
not adequately take care of the problem of falsehood. In effect, Russell
asks, If the trueness of a true judgment consists in its correspondence
to its object, to what does a false judgnient correspond? ,/e shall now
consider at some length Russell's treatment of this problem, and his
attempt to develop and refine the correspondence theory of the nature of
trueness
.
44. Pratt, PR, 79.
45. Infra, 157-158
.

Bertrand Russell
Bertrand Russell's earlier view of the nature of trueness was an
identity view, i.e., trueness was the quality of being real. "...Truth
and falsehood apply not to beliefs, but to their objects..."- But Russell
later repudiated this view,^ in favor of a correspondence theory of true-
5 4
ness, except in so far as knowledge by acquaintance is concerned. No
longer are real things true, and unreal things false. Row it is only be-
liefs or judgments,^* that are true or false. The trueness of statements
or propositions^ is derivative from the trueness of beliefs or judgments.
Says Russell, "a statement is true when a person who believes it believes
truly, and false 'when a person who believes it believes falsely". 1
1. Russell, Art. 2, 204. For Russell the objects of belief are real
things. Of. Russell, FE, 177
•
2. Russell, AM
,
272.
5.
Russell, PP, 195; 201-202; AM, 277-278, et al
.
4. In this case we apparently have the trueness of identity. Russell,
PP, 186.
5. Russell ,uses these terms as synonyms; Russell, PE, 172.
6. Russell, AM, 240-24 1 . Russell says, "A proposition is a series of
words (or sometimes a single word) expressing the kind of thing that can
be asserted or denied". Loc . cit.
7.
Russell, PE, 172.
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What does it mean to believe truly or falsely? Russell says, "...a
belief is true when it corresponds to a certain associated complex, and
false when it does not”.'" Again, nA belief is rendered true or false by
relation to a fact, which may lie outside the experience of the person
» 9
entertaining the belief".'
But why must the belief or judgment be said to correspond to a com-
plex ? Is it not sufficiently accurate and adequate to say that a true be-
lief must correspond to its object? Russell feels that the necessity of
allowing for falsehood entails the abandonment of the position that a be-
lief is related to a single object.
A
true belief corresponds with its
object, a false belief does not. Well and goodi Eut what, then, does a
false belief correspond to? Every judgment has an objective,-- for every
judgment is about something. Are we then to say that the objective of a
false judgment is a false objective? Russell says:
This is in itself almost incredible: we feel that there could
be no falsehood if there were no minds to make mistakes. But it
has the further drawback that it leaves the difference between
truth and falsehood quite inexplicable. We feel that when vie
judge truly some entity ’corresponding 1 in some way to our
judgment is to be found outside our judgment, while when we
judge falsely, there i3 no such ’corresponding’ entity. 12
8. Russell, PF, 202.
9. Russell, AM, 25j5.
10. Russell, FP, 195.
11. Russell, FS, 174, 177; AM, 255
.
from Meining. Of. Russell, PE, 17^.
a judgment.
Russell adopts the term "objective"
He employs it to mean the object of
12.
Russell, PE, 176
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7Jell, then, whall we simply say that while a true judgment has an
objective, a false judgment has not? Russell maintains that so long as we
regard a true judgment as a relation of the mind to an objective, false
judgments must likewise have an objective, for so to discriminate between
true and false judgments, would cause an
...intrinsic difference between true and false judgments,
and enable us (what is obviously impossible) to discover the
truth or falsehood of a judgment merely by examining the in-
trinsic nature of the judgment. ^5
Russell feel 3 that the way out of this difficulty with regard to false
beliefs is to roaintain that whenever we judge, either truly or falsely,
14
"...there is no one thing that we are judging". There are several terms
to which the mind is related in a judgment. But the mind is not re-
lated to them as &o a single object. For example, suppose I believe that
A loves B. The objective of rry belief is not "A's love for E”, for there
may be no such thing.^ Rather is my belief related to A and love and B;
not separately, however, but in one, interpenetrating, "multiple" rela-
tion.^ Of course, in addition to this multiple relation, there is also
the relation of consciousness between the mind and each of these consti-
tuents taken singly, but this does not give the essence of judgment,
according to Russell.
^
15. Russell, PE, 177*
14. Loc. cit.
15. Ibid, 180.
16. Ibid, 178-180.
17* Russell, FE, 178.
'’
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For Russell a judgment is not made u.p of mental constituents called
"ideas ". To say that a judgment is composed of ideas seems to Russell
to be putting a veil between the mind and outside things in such a way
that we would never "attain to the things we are supposed to be knowing
about , .. .only to the ideas of those things " .
^
But if a judgment is not
composed of ideas, what, then, are its constituents? The constituents in
question are a mind^O and "the actual objects concerning which we judge"21
In terms of our judgment of A's love for B, Russell says, ".../hen I
judge, there is a certain complex whose terms are myself and a and love
.1 22
and B, and whose relating relation is judging "
.
But it is only knowledge by acquaintance as distinguished from
knowledge by description "that brings the object itself before t..e nind"r/ :
Accordingly we find Russell maintaining:
When a judgment is rightly analysed, the objects which are con-
stituents of it must all be objects with which the mind which
is a constituent of it is acquainted .24
18. Russell, ML, 221-222, 2pl.
19. Ibid, 222.
20. Russell explains that he is using the term "mind" here "merely to de-
note the something psychological which enters into judgment". Russell,
ML, 251, n. 1.
21. Russell, ML, 222.
22. Ibid, 220.
25. Ibid, 251.
24. Loc . cit. Russell maintains that we are "acquainted" with both sense
data and concepts. Of. ibid, 212. This introduces the necessity of
breaking up descriptive phrases appearing in judgments, into proposition-
al functions. Ibid, 25I-252. But this carries us beyond our topic.

3?
These objects are real whether my belief is true cr false. 2° i.ly belief is
true if the complex object "a's love for E" exists.-"" In Russell's words:
The 'corresponding 1 complex object which is required to make
our judgment true consists of A related to B by the relation
which ’was before us in our judgment. 27
Again,
Thus in this view judgment is a relation of the mind to several
other terms: when these other terms have inter se a 'correspond-
ing relation, the judgment is true; when not, it is false.- 0
Of course, the relation must have the same "sense" or direction in both
cases. 29 Our judgment as to A's love for B would not be rendered true by
the existence of the complex object "B's love for A n .
If my belief in A's love for B is false, the belief will neverthe-
less have an objective, viz., the complex A and love and B, only in this
case the relation of love will fail to unite the other two terms as my
belief conceives it to do.
Every judgment is a relation of a mind to several objects one
of which is a relation; the judgment is true when the relation
which is one of the objects relates the other objects, other-
wise it is false. 99
Inasmuch as all judgments have objectives, 9- what sort of objective
25. Russell
,
PS, 177.
26. Russell PF, 201.
27. Russell, PE, IS?.
28. Ibid, 178.
29. Russell, PS, 185-184.
50. Ibid, 181.
51. Supra, 32.
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will a negative judgment have? Russell believes that there must be nega-
tive facts in the world, v/hich function as the objectives of negative
judgments. Otherwise, for example, what would be the objective of the
proposition-^ ’’Socrates is not alive”? If you deny negative facts and
urge with Raphael Demos55 that not-p (the negation of any proposition p)
means, "There is a proposition q which is true and is incompatible with
p", then, Russell points out, you must make incompatibility an objective
fact, thus substituting molecular facts for negative facts. 54 Russell re-
gards such a procedure as a greater evil than the one it was designed to
cure. He says:
. . .Sven if incompatibility is to be taken as a sort of funda-
mental expression of fact, incompatibility is not between facts
but between propositions .... It is clear that no two facts are
incompatibile
. The incompatibility holds between the proposi-
tions, between the p and the q, and therefore if you are going
to take incompatibility as a fundamental fact, you have got,
in explaining negatives, to take as your fundamental fact some-
thing involving propositions as opposed to facts.
Russell says that since propositions "do not have being independently
"
,
to take their incompatibility "as an ultimate fact of the real world" is
not a successful way of avoiding negative facts ".5 C
52. Throughout Art. 5 Russell treats of the trueness of "propositions"
rather than of judgments or beliefs. On the former cf. supra, 3l, n. 6 .
55* Demos, Art. 1.
54. Russell, Art. 44-45.
55. Ibid, 45.
56 . Ibid, 45-46.
'*
.
’
Russell argues that unless you admit the existence of negative
facts, you will find it extremely difficult to explain a positive asser-
tion that is false. So long as you adhere to the correspondence theory of
trueness, a proposition can be false only because of a fact. What then is
the fact that makes the proposition "Socrates exists" false? What else
can it be but the negative fact "Socrates is not alive"?^^
Russell maintains that negative facts are yltimate and consequently
incapable of a general definition. 5- Furthermore, there is no formal test
to determine whether a certain proposition is positive or negative.^-'
Russell also brings in the notion of "pointing" He says that a
true belief points towards its objective, a false belief away from it.
The belief or proposition "Today is Tuesday" points towards the fact "To-
day is Tuesday" if that is a fact, or away from the fact "Today is not
Tuesday if that is a fact. The proposition "Today is not Tuesday" points
towards the fact "Today is not Tuesday", if that is a fact, or away from
the fact "Today is Tuesday" if this is a fact.^l Russell says, "This is
the reason v/hy two beliefs which are each other's contradictories have
the 3ame objective" .^2
57 • Russell, Art. 5> 46.
58. Ibid, 47.
59. Loc. cit.
40. He says he adopted this notion from Ludwig Wittgenstein. Russell,
AM, 272, n. . 1
.
41 . Russell, AM, 272-275*
42. Ibid, 272.
«*
*
-
.
.
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Russell attempts to differentiate further between true and false
propositions. He says that true propositions have a quality which false
propositions do not have, viz., the quality of being "asserted”. He does
not, however, intend that such assertion be taken in a psychological
sense, for he considers this differentiating quality to be genuinely log-
ical. He says:
Yet there are grave difficulties in forming a consistent
theory on this point, for if assertion in any way changed a
proposition, no proposition which can possibly in any context
be unasserted could be true, since when asserted it would be-
come a different proposition. But this is plainly false; for
in 'p implies q 1 , p and q are not asserted, and yet they may
be true. Leaving this puzzle to logic, however, we must in-
sist that there is a difference of some kind between an asser-
ted and an uhasserted proposition. 4 5
Since Russell does not develop this notion of logical assertion, concern-
ing which he wrote in the year 1905 but does subsequently develop a
theory of the nature of trueness (which we have just been expounding),
and since, further, the notion is an exceedingly occult one as it stands^
it seems wise to disregard this aspect of Russell '
3
thought.
45 . Russell, PM, $5. Referred to by Joachim, NT, 58 . Also cf. Russell,
PM, 48-49, 505-504 .
44. Russell states in the second edition of this work, PM(1958 )j that he
has not thought it worth while to alter those parts of the book with
which he is no longer in agreement. Russell, PM, v.
45. On this point cf. Joachim, NT, J8 ,
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Criticism of Russell's Theory
Perhaps the most novel feature of Russell's development of the
correspondence theory of trueness is his insistence that inasmuch as neg-
ative propositions are admittedly a real feature of our epistemological
world, the correspondence constituting their trueness—or falseness—re-
quires the existence of negative facts. To my mind, thus to people real-
ity with negative facts is a case of "vicious abstractionism". That is,
it is to abstract mental phenomena from their source in mind, and func-
tion for mind, and hypostatize them in an extra-mental reality. Russell
argues that negative propositions require 3uch negative facts in order
that they may have a reality to correspond to. It seems to me that such
a requirement would constitute a condemnation of the correspondence theory
of trueness, rather than a proof of the existence of negative facts.
Of course, if we encountered negative facts in experience, we
should have to "put up with them", no matter how unsatisfactory we fcund
Lf.
them. Eut as Ralph Demos argues, we do not find them in experience, ilie
find only positive facts. Demos says:
...Unless the verdict of experience is to be flouted, the con-
ception of negative gacts must be rejected, or at least not
adopted before the resources at the command of the conception
46. Demos, Art. 1, 189.
..
,
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of positive facts and propositions are given a fair chance to
account fot the situation. 1
Let us consider Demos's analysis of negative propositions. He points
out that practically all present-day thinkers have abandoned the attempt
to explain the positive or negative character of propositions in terms of
the attitude of the cognitive subject, and that consequently negative
48
propositions must be admitted to be objectively negative. In also re-
jecting the view that the "not" in a negative proposition is to be inter-
preted as qualifying the predicate, Demos points out that:
a large number of propositions, and specifically relational nega-
tive propositions like 'X is not to the right of Y', cannot be
said to have any predicate at all. °
He concludes that "not" qualifies the whole proposition, which is posi-
tive apart from its "not", and that consequently a negative proposition
is a negative function of a positive proposition. Quoting Demos once
more
:
Thus the statement, 'X is not dead', is really of the form 'not
(X is dead)', and any negative proposition is of the form 'not-
p' where p is the entire content of the proposition apart from
'not', and 'not-p' is a function of p in terms of 'not'. Inas-
much as thi3 content of the negative proposition is positive,
any negative may be regarded as a negative function of some
particular positive proposition.^
We have seen^ that Russell rejects this interpretation of negative
47. Demos, Art, 1, 189.
48. Ibid, 188.
49. Ibid, 190.
50. Loc.cit.
51.
Supra, 36.
,.
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propositions on the ground that it substitutes the objective fact of
incompatibility between propositions for negative facts. Russell objects
to such a substitution partly on the ground that propositions "do not
have being independently". 52 Such an objection is cogent only if it be
admitted that every true proposition (except those about mind, itself"^
must correspond to some extra -mental fact. The fact of incompatibility
between propositions seems to me to have a much more stable ontological
footing than the fact that Socrates is not alive, and consequently to
provide a firmer basis for correspondence than would such negative facts.
But for the sake of the argument, let us assume that Russell has
proved his point, and that negative facts do exist. It would seem that
some positive facts must entail an infinite number of correlative nega-
tive facts. Thus, that Mary is twenty-four years old would seem to de-
mand the existence of such negative facts as: Mary is not one year old,
Mary is not two years old, Mary is not three years old, etc., ad infini -
tum. 5 ^ Moreover, when Mary reached her twenty-fifth birthday, the anni-
hilation of both a positive fact and a negative fact would seem necess-
ary on that day. That is, the positive fact Mary is twenty-four years
old, and the negative fact Mary is not twenty-five years old, would both
cease to be at the time; and there would be created two new facts, viz.,
the positive fact Mary is twenty -five years old, and the negative fact
52. Russell, Art. 3, 45-4S.
53. Also consider how many negative facts would be demanded by Mary’s
eating only spinach for a meal, viz., the not-eating of every other
object in the universe.
.-
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Man'- is not twenty-four years old.
When you add to these considerations the further consideration that
Russell confesses that negative facts are incapable of a general defini-
tion and that there is no formal test for differentiating positive and
negative propositions'1^ (and such a test seems requisite for knowing
when positive and when negative facts are being referred to)
,
it seems
as though Occam's razor might well be applied here. Negative facts
really seem to cause more trouble than they are worth.
However, negative facts are not the whole of Russell's doctrine of
the nature of trueness. Let us consider the notion of "pointing" in
connection with the trueness and falseness of propositions. To return to
my judgment that A loves B, we have here my mind. A, love, and B, held
together in one multiple relation. 00 The judgment is true if A and B
have inter se the relation of love (with the proper sense or direction),
false if it does not. But Russell explicitly states that the objective
of my belief or judgment 1^® ± s not A’s love for B, for there may be no
such thing. 7 The objective of my belief is rather A, love, and B. But
in view of Russell's position that the actual objects are present in a
judgment, 0 ® how can he intelligibly describe true beliefs as "pointing
54. Cf. supra, 37.
55. Cf. supra, 34.
B6
. It should be recalled that Russell uses "beliefs" and "judgments" as
synonymous terms, at least in PR. Cf. supra, 31; also Russell, PR, 172.
57. Cf. supra, 33; Russell, PR, 180.
58. Cf. supra, 34; Russell, ML, 222.
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toward" their objectives, false beliefs as "pointing away" from them?
Such a description demands some sort of dualism in the belief or
judgment and its objective. The truth seems to be that Russell, after
further thought on the matter, abandoned the position that the objective
of a belief consists merely in the relevant objects, in favor of the
view that the objective of a belief is the positive or negative fact
referred to.°'^ But such a view seems to come perilously close to an aban-
donment of another doctrine of Russell’s, vis., that the mind grasps
reality without the intervention of ideas.'
At any rate, it should now be evident that Russell’s treatment of
correspondence is not very satisfactory, even to himself. In order to
maintain the correspondence theory of trueness, Russell has felt obliged
to people the universe with both positive and negative facts, and with
"two propositions corresponding to every fact, one true and one false".
^
But propositions "do not have being independently" for Russell.^ Their
status thus becomes a real problem when we recall that Russell rejects
the veil of ideas between the mind and reality. Moreover, just what is
involved in the correspondence of "pointing toward" as compared or con-
59.
Cf. his treatment of pointing, supra, 37. Also cf. especially Russell,
AM, 271-272. It must be remembered that the Analysis of Mind
,
in which
he discusses the notion of pointing, •'"mis pub 1 i shedin 1921
,
whe rea s
Philosophical Essays
,
which contains the former interpretation of ob-
jectives, was published in 1910.
60. Cf. Russell, ML, 221-222, 231.
61. Russell, Art. 3, 39.
62. Ibid, 45-46
.
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trasted with the correspondence of "pointing away" from, is not made
clear by Russell. The legitimacy of describing the latter as "corre-
spondence" at all, might well be questioned. To describe the falseness
of a belief, proposition, or .judgment as consisting in the "pointing
away" from its objective, does not represent much advance over describing
falseness as a failure to correspond.
Russell deserves praise for attempting to develop the correspondence
theory of trueness, but I do not believe that his attempt has vindicated
itself
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William James
William James, following John Grote, distinguishes knowledge by
acquaintance from knowledge by description. ^ The trueness of knowledge
by acquaintance consists in identity, for James. ^ However, James's most
important contribution to our study is his treatment of the trueness of
"knowledge-about " . We shall accordingly confine our attention to this
aspect of his thought.
James maintains that trueness is a property of a certain of our
ideas, the property of agreeing5 or corresponding"1- with reality. But for
James this is merely to state the problem, not to solve it. Says James,
wWe correspond in some way with anything with which we enter into any re-
lations at all."^1 In what does this agreement or correspondence consist?
James says:
1. James, MT, 11, 59*
2. Ibid, 47-50. James also speaks of our knowledge of relations among
purely mental ideas as involving a type of trueness (James, PRa, 209),
but he is not clear as to just what type this is. Also cf. James in
Perry, TGJ, II, 547.
5. James, PRA, 198.
4. Ibid, 69.
5. James, MT, 67*
.' "
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. . .The links of experience sequent upon an idea, which mediate
between it and a reality, form and for the pragmatist indeed are,
the concrete relation of truth that may obtain between the idea
and that reality. 6 ...Such mediating events make the idea
1 true 1 .7
Thus, trueness of my idea that a particular object is an apple con-
sists in uy being able to feel the object and find it smooth and round,
in my being able to eat the object, in ny being able to identify the
taste, in ny being able to get other people to agree that it is an
apple, etc. All this is not merely the way in which I ascertain the
truenes3 of my idea; rather it constitutes the trueness of uiy idea.
These mediatory experiences compose the agreement of my idea with
reality
.
Such a conception of trueness involves anything but a static re-
lationship betv/een ideas and reality. James says that his doctrine:
. . .converts the absolutely empty notion of a static relation of
1 correspondence 1 ... between our minds and reality, into that of
a rich and active commerce .. .between particular thoughts of ours,
and the great universe of other experiences in which they play
their parts and have their uses. 6
This notion of the active vs. static relationship of an idea to reality
forms the crux of James's theory of trueness. He, himself, borrowing
Professor Strong's terminology, 0 describes the distinction as being one
6. Jame s
,
IvjT, 201
7. Ibid, 202.
8. Jame s FRA
,
69
9. Jame s MT, 158
u r. i ...
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.
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between "ambulatory” and "saltatory” relations.^"' In the case of salta-
tory relations, one needs must jump from one term to another. In the case
of ambulatory relations, one ambulates from one term to another through
an intervening medium which is homogeneous with the terms being mediated.
The medium intervening between a true idea and reality consists in "def-
i. 11initely experienceable workings".
James maintains-^ that it is only by abstracting from these con-
crete workings which compose the actual, ambulatory relationship between
an idea and reality, that we obtain the conception of an idea bridging
the epistemological gulf in the instantaneous leap in order to re ort
reality. Although he is a self-avowed epistemological dualist,"^ he de-
nies our ability thus to leap the epistemological chasm.^ For James the
conception of a saltatory relationship is a useful abstraction, but con-
tains "nothing of any essentially other or higher nature, which the con-
15
crete descriptions can be justly accused of leaving behind".
James insists that he is not blindly confusing the way in which we
go about achieving truth, with the nature of this truth when we have it,
or, in our terminology, that he is not confusing the employment of the
10. James, Iv'T, 1^8
11. Ibid, 22, n.
12. Ibid, 149.
15. Ibid, 217; PP, I y 218-219.
14. Ibid. 106-108, 4l, n.
15. Ibid, 149.
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criterion of truth with the nature of trueness . He says that those who
defend the abstract description against the concrete description, some-
times attempt to impugn the latter by contending that it involves a con-
fusion of logic and psychology. That is, when asked to give the meaning
of truth, the proponents of the concrete account are said to reply by
telling how truth is attained. But inasmuch as a meaning is a static,
timeless relation, how can it po33ibly be identified with the fluctuat-
ing, temporal character of human experience ?
^
James replies in this
manner
:
I defy any one to show any difference between logic and psy-
chology here. The logical relation stands to the psychological
telation between idea and object only as a saltatory abstract-
ness stands to ambulatory concreteness. Both relations need a
psychological vehicle; and the 'logical' one is simply the
'psychological' one disemboweled of its fulness, and reduced
to bare abstract ional scheme. lb
Consistent with his usage of the term "true" in connection with
descriptive knowledge ( though not consistent with his treatment of
19 \the trueness of knowledge by acquaintance, ' ) James asserts that in-
asmuch as trueness consists in mediatory links of experience, it is no
longer present when the mediatory links are removed. Ke says:
Should we ever reach absolutely terminal experiences, experi-
ences in which we all agreed, which were superseded by no re-
vised continuations, these would not be true
,
they would be
real
,
they would simply be, and be indeed the angles, corners.
16. James, MT, 152. Also cf. James, FRa, 64, "The reasons why we call
things true is the reason why they are true."
17- James, LT, 152.
18. Ibid, 152-155.
19. Ibid, 157, 47-50.
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and linchpins of all reality, on which the truth of everything
else would me stayed. Only such other things as led to these
by satisfactory conjunctions would be true. Satisfactory connec-
tion of 3ome sort with such termini is all that the word 'truth'
means .20
The word "satisfactory" is very important here. Thus, to return
to my idea that a particular object is an apple, my idea might reach a
satisfactory terminus in realizing the experience of redness, round-
ness, and smoothness, without the experience of taste, if I had, and
were to have, no desire to eat the apple* Sven if the object had the
flavor of a lemon, on James's principles there seems to be no objection
to calling such an object an apple for me, and consequently my idea a
true idea for me,^ so long as I am unaware of the taste of the object,
and find a satisfactory adaptation to the object. For James the trueness
of my idea would not depend on the existence of the apple but on the
existence of satisfactory mediatory experiences. Ho./ever, Jam.es would
here protest that such a distinction cannot legitimately be made, for
the mediatory experiences would not continue to be sat isfactory unless
the object in question did exist. James says, "The matter of the true
is .. .absolutely identical with the matter of the satisfactory."^ Since
the true by definition leads to reality, the satisfactory must do like-
wise. But for those who still demur, Jamies goes so far as to state:
The pragmatist calls satisfaction indispensable for truth-
building, but I have everywhere called tnem insufficient unless
20 . Jame s
,
MT
, 15^*
21. Ibid, 177*
22. Ibid, 159-160. Also cf. MT, 207-208.
.
reality be also incidentally led to.^5
But this statement of James's proves to be not very helpful or signifi-
cant, when we remember that he defines reality in terms of the "concep-
tual or perceptual experiences with which a given present experience
24
may find itself in point of fact mixed up. If my present experience
of the object in question does not happen to "find itself in point of
fact mixed up" with the experience of taste, what is there to prevent my
calling my apple-idea true? For James the idea _is true 30 long as it
leads to no frustration or contradiction. James's answer to this would
be to ask what we mean when we call a particular object an apple. He
would urge that our conception of an apple is simply and solely our con-
ception of the "effects of a conceivably practical kind which are in-
volved." 0 Now a special taste is one of the effects involved in the con-
ception of an apple. Consequently my apple-idea is untrue if this special
taste be not led to. But supoose I never bite the object? Must we always
eat objects which look like apples, in order to make sure that our idea
of their taste is true? No, says Jam.es, ,7e can possess "virtual" knowl-
edge of the flavor without the actual experience of it. We cannot know
for certain that our idea is truly cognitive of the flavor until its
trueness is established by actual termination in the expected flavor-
25 . James, MT, 195.
24. Ibid, 100. Also cf. MT, 108.
25. James
,
FRA, 207
.
26. Jam.es, Art. 1, 675~674. Referred to by Pratt, WIP, 19*
t -
.
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percept .
^
Nevertheless
,
says James, where potentiality counts for
actuality in so many other cases, one does not see why it may not so
count here".^
It is in this notion of potentiality that we find the key to the
objectivity of knowledge on James's premises, for trueness is something
more than ny private blunderings in the direction of a perceptual ter-
minus. James asserts:
What constitutes the relation known as truth... is just the
xistence in the empirical world of this fundamentum of cir-
cumstance surrounding object and idea and ready to be either
short-circuited or traversed at full length. So long as it
exists, and a satisfactory passage through it between the ob-
ject and the idea i3 possible, that idea will both be_ true,
and will have been true of that object, whether fully deve-
oped verification has taken place or not.
James considers that trueness, the existence of this medium inter-
vening between idea and object, owes its nature equally to the idea and
to the object. He says:
The nature and place and affinities of the object of course
play as vital a part in making the particular passage possible
as do the nature and associative tendencies of the idea... It
is between the idea and the object that the truth-relation is
to be sought and it involves both terms.
^
Thus, for James the correspondence in which trueness consists is an ac-
tive interplay between idea and object.
27* James, kT, 115.
28. Ibid, 164. Also cf. PRA, 220.
29* James, MI, 165.
50. Loc . cit.
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In fine, I conceive realities as existent, as having existed,
or about to exist, in absolute independence of my thought of
them. But I deny that you can express the varied facts of knowl-
edge by the empty term 'conformity'. It is net like a coat that
has to be made to 'fit' a fixed figure. Rather is the fit an
equilibrium between two mutually independent variables. 51
But if trueness is thus objective, how are we to interpret James's
well-known statement, "...The pragmatist always means 'true' for him who
experiences the workings", 52 and the further statement that "There is no
idea which is the true idea of anything" ?55 Here we must consider
James's treatment of truth vs. trueness. For James "Truth" (with a
capital T) does not exist. Only finite truths exist, and these only
while they are being entertained in some particular mind. 5^ Thus a truth
is a truth only for the one who is entertaining it, and any truth may be
realized by any number of people. Or, to put the matter another way, it
must be remembered that the "mediating fundamentum* between idea and ob-
ject is wholly experiential in nature. 5^ Moreover, for Jame3 experience
is made up of finite experiencers .5^ Now, in so far as we are concerned
with trueness as actual rather than a3 potential, there will be as many
51. James in Perry, TCJ, II, 541-542. Also cf. ibid, 476.
52. James, AT, 177*
55. Ibid, 240.
54. Ibid, 296.
55. James, Iv.T, 16^; also cf. MT , lOOj FRA, 69 . Also cf. MT, 269-270,
where James maintains that the "independent something" is experience.
56 . James, FRA, 260; PP, I, 226.
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ideas possessing actual trueness as there are experiencings of mediating
links, but the trueness in each case will obtain only for the particular
experiencer who is realizing it.
It is in the light of this same reference to experience that we can
understand a further statement of James's, viz.,
. . .Although the stubborn fact remains that tnere is a sensible
flux, what is true of it seems from first to last to be largely
a matter of our own creation. 57
In what sense can such trueness be called absolute? That is, would
a wider knower,^ an infinite experiencer, agree that our true ideas are
really true, James feels that this is a question for which the pragmatist
can have no positive answer. He says:
They themselves /finite knov/ers/ play the part of the absolute
knower for the universe of discourse which serves them as mater-
ial for the epistemologizing. They warrant the reality there, and
the subject's true knowledge, there of it. But whether what they
themselves say about that whole universe is objectively true,
i.e., whether the pragmatic theory of truth _^is true really, they
cannot warrant,—they can only believe it.^ ?
Just what type of trueness a wider knower 's knowledge would possess,
James does not say. But it seems fairly evident that it would have to be
a trueness over and above the existence of mediating links of finite ex-
perience, if it were to vest the latter with absoluteness. Fossibly it
would be the trueness of identification with the experience of an infi-
nite knower, or the trueness of correspondence with the latter's exper-
57* James, FRA, 255.
58 . James, Iv?T, 21j?, n. 2.
59. Loc . cit. Also cf. ibid, 265-266 and FRA, 222-22J.
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ience. However, it is idle to speculate on this point, inasmuch as James
did not see fit to develop it. Suffice it to say that once more u James
admits a type of trueness tother than the existence of mediating links of
experience
.
40. Supra, 45

John Dewey
For the most part Dewey and James are at one in their conception of
the nature of trueness. James himself says, "as I myself understand Dewey
...our views absolutely agree, in spite of our different inodes of state-
A] hp
ment... x The letters exchanged by James and Dewey on this subject
further bear out this contention of agreement. Both thinkers endorse the
correspondence theory of truene3s,‘4 5 insisting that theirs is the only
real attempt to explain what such correspondence means.^ For both James
and Dewey the correspondence in question consists in a mutual adaptation
between idea and object which may be described as successful or satis-
factory workings, or the process of verification. Dewey says:
...Truth is a character that defines an idea so far as it is
tested through the action which carries to successful comple-
tion its own intent ... .From this point of view verification
and truth are two names for the same thing. We call it 'veri-
fication* when we regard it as process; when the development
of the idea is strung out and exposed to view in all that
4 1 . Jame s
,
MT, 1 69
•
42. Published in Ferry, TCJ, II, 522-555*
45. Dewey, EEL, 251.
44. James, MT, 254; Dewey, EEL, 24.
45. Dewey, QC, l46; EEL, 24; Art. 2, 500; Art. 1, 557.
. .
.
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makes it true. u
Although both Janes and Dewey maintain that knowledge makes a difference
"in and to things",^ both insist upon the objectivity of knowledge, i.e.,
the existence of things prior to our knowledge of them.
It is therefore somewhat surprising to find Fratt distinguishing be-
tween Dewey's "radical" view of the nature of trueness and James's "modi-
/lO
fied" view, ° mainly on the ground that (1) the modified view "recognizes
an outer reality as relevant and essential" and consequently (2) "can
and does maintain that an idea may be true before it is verified ...
(l) In regard to the recognition of an outer reality, we quote the
following statement of Dewey's:
Of course I have repeated ad nauseam that there are existences
prior to and subsequent to cognitive states and purposes, and
that the whole meaning of the latter is the way they intervene
in the control and revaluation of the independent existences.’"
In view of this statement and other statements of Dewey, we must main-
tain that the differentiation of Dewey's theory of the nature of true-
ness from James's on the ground that Dewey does not recognize an essen-
tial outer reality, cannot legitimately be iLade.
The necessity for Dewey's repeating ad nauseam that he does not
46. Dewey, Art. 1,
47. Ibid, 56; Art. 5* 56-59, 65 ; James, FRA, 255.
48. Fratt, WIP, 98, ff.
49. Ibid, 100.
50. Dewey in Ferry, TCJ, II, 5^2; also cf. Dewey, Art. 5 > 78; Art. 4,
272. James, FRA, 255; also cf. James in Perry, TOJ, II, 476, 541-542.

57
deny the existence of antecedent existences arises, I believe, from his
denial that the objects of knowledge exist prior to their being known.
That is, for Dewey knowledge is creative, but it requires material upon
which to operate, and this material is supplied by the antecedent exis-
tences which, before they can be known, must be so radically transformed
as to be no longer independent existences. Dewey 3ays:
While Mr. Woodbridge says, 'the object exists prior to its
being known 1
,
I say that ' the object' is the eventual product
of reflection, the prior or antecedent existences being sub-
^ject-matter for knowledge, not the objects of knowledge at all.''
(2) What should be said of the contention that for James an idea
may be true before it is verified, while for Dewey it is true only in so
52
far as it is verified? We have seen that Janies recognizes verifiability
as well as verification, or potential trueness as well as actualized
trueness. Pratt's conclusion that Dewey disagrees with James on this
point is based on excerpts from Dewey's articles, "The Experimental
Theory of Knowledge"^ and "Reality and the Criterion for the Truth of
Ideas.' However, I fail to find any statement in these articles which
51. Dewey, Art. 4, 275* Also cf. Dewey, QC, 166-167* In this connection
William Fepperell Montague's assertion that an instrumentalist must be a
realist, is wortfyof note. He explains, "...For to think of thought as
an instrument of adaptation to an environing world, while denying with
the idealist the preexisting reality and independence of that world,
would be either self-contradictory or meaningless." Montague, Art. 5,
490. Regarding the confusion inherent in the pragmatic epistemology in
this connection, cf. Love joy. Art. 2.
52. James, MT, 170.
55* Dewey, Art. 2.
54. Dewey, Art. 1.
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is inconsistent with James's view. The quotation which apparently forms
the climax of Pratt's argument on this point is one to the effect that
trueness and the effective working of an idea are identical, specifi-
cally :
. . .The effective working of an idea and its truth are one and
the same thing—this working being neither the cause nor the
evidence of truth but its nature... 33
But it should be evident from our study of James that he would heartily
endorse such a statement.
If it be urged that Dewey refuses to recognize potential trueness
in addition to actual trueness, we refer to the fact that in one of
these very articles Dewey treats the notion of the eternally true as a
meaningful notion, and certainly he is not here referring to an idea
whose verification requires all eternity, but to an idea which, whenever
acted upon, will generate the requisite verification, i.e., will work
effectively. He says:
Just as to say an idea was true all the time is a .vay of saying
in retrospect that it has come out in a certain fashion, so to
say that an idea is 'eternally true' i3 to indicate prospective
modes of application which are indefinitely anticipated.-o
If we know that an idea will always produce successful workings when we
actualize it, what is to prevent our describing such as idea as poten-
tially true? If Dewey indicates a preference for restricting the appli-
cation of the word "true" to the actually true, i.e., to successful
55. Dewey, Art. 1, 537*
56. Ibid, 559.
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workings,^ this preference seems to reduce to a verbal matter when we
consider that he does regard the eternally true as a meaningful concept.
However, in fairness to Pratt it must be pointed out that although
a potentially true idea is apparently a meaningful conception to Dewey,
he does not seem to take the further step of asserting that its trueness
,
its actual successfulness, can exist apart from its verification, as
does James. ^ Dewey says, "Like knowledge itself, truth is an experienced
relation of characteristic quality of things, and it has no meaning out-
side of such relation..."'"'"' But when we recall that for James the inde-
pendent something involved in such pre-verified trueness is experience,
the difference between James and Dewey on this point seems again reduced
to a merely verbal one.®0
In sum, we find much in Dewey's works that explicitly agree with
James's position regarding the nature of trueness, and nothing in Dewey's
works that definitely contradicts James's position in any respect. Fur-
thermore, so far as the problem of the nature of trueness, as such, is
concerned, James has presented a more extensively developed treatment
than has Dewey. In view of these facts, and in view of the further fact
that we are not here concerned so much with an historical account of a
specific thinker's view as with a distinctive type of systematic approach
57 . Dewey
,
Art . 1 , 7
•
58. Of. supra, 51.
59. Dewey, Art. 2, J05. Also cf. Dewey, RP, 156, 160.
60. The question of just how meaningful a conception this "potential"
trueness is, will be considered below.
,
60
to our problem, we shall confine our criticism for the most part to
Jame s 1 s treatment
.
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Criticism of James’s Theory
Pragmatism’s definition of trueness, I believe, represents a
profoundly significant contribution to philosophic thought. We have seen
the inadequacy of the notion of correspondence as propounded by Pratt,
and the unsatisfactoriness of Russell's ’’negative facts". Yet the notion
of trueness as correspondence has a certain rational cogency that makes
one hesitate to abandon it. The adoption of some kind of correspondence-
theory seems desirable. In what, then, will such correspondence consist?
James offers a concrete, significant theory which has a strong claim to
validity so far as one realm of experience is concerned.
The question is: Does this one realm exhaust the whole of experi-
ence? It can be said to do so only if ideas are conceded to be nothing
but plans of action, motor ideas whose meaning consists in the ter-
minus to which they guide us.^2 or, to pUt -the matter another way, let
us adopt Russell’s terminology and agree that James and Dewey give "a
perfectly rational account of truth and falsehood, if you do accept
their view that belief as an isolated phenomenon does not occur". jf
61. Dewey, RP, 1^6.
62. James, MT, 141.
63. Russell, Art. 3, 51.
_,
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my belief that there is a clock on the wall can be said to consist simply
and solely in rry assenting to the proposition “There is a clock on the
wall", and not in the prediction of forthcoming experiences of visual,
tactual, and auditory confirmation, then pragmatism breaks down. But
James would insist that such a bare, isolated belief as we have suggested
is real only by derivation from the actual motivating beliefs, and that
only a "vicious abstractionism" would give priority to the former.
To put the matter in still another form, we quote Pratt's differen-
tiation of "aspects" of judgment:
A judgment has at least two different aspects. From one point
of view it is indeed a motor idea which influences conduct and
works itself out. From another point of view it is an assertion
about some reality not itself, and between it and that reality
there is a relation which simply is not to be identified with
the results of the judgment.^
I think it must be conceded to pragmatism that when we are asked what we
mean when we assert, "There is a clock on the wall", we can explain our
statement only in terms of mediatory experiences. But does the conclu-
sion necessarily follow that therefore our statement consists in the
reference to such experiences? 3o far as our knowledge of sense objects
is concerned, I think that in so far as we are aware of meaning anything,
we do mean just such verificatory experiences and nothing else. For what
else is there to mean? Eoth secondary and primary qualities have been
explained away from sense objects, with the result that the insistence
that our idea shall describe the sense object as it really is, seems a
64. Pratt, WIF, 115.

mere anachronism. 65
Be that as it may, what is to be said about a belief such as. My
brother is in Moscow? First let us consider Pratt's interpretation of the
trueness of such an idea. For Pratt the belief is true if my brother
really is in Moscow. .Yell and good. But suppose my brother has gone driv-
ing beyond the outskirts of Moscow. Is the belief still true? For most
people who entertained such a belief the belief 'would still be true, in-
dicating the inexact character of so many beliefs. 00 They would-be satis-
fied to have their brother within, let us say, a twenty-five mile radius
of Moscow. Strictly, however, the belief as stated would not be true. Or
suppose my brother is now in an airplane above Moscow; is my belief or
judgment that he is in Moscow a true one? Or suppose the Soviet authori-
ties have decided to decrease the size of the city by moving the city
limits inward a half-mile or so, and that my brother's house is situated
in this half-mile area. Is he still in Moscow? Is my judgment a true
judgment?
It should be evident that our beliefs or judgments are not the
clear-cut, refined propositions they would need to be if trueness depend-
ed on a correspondence such as Pratt's. Y/hat our judgment or belief
really means is that if a magic carpet whisked me to Moscow, I could
find my brother "somewhere around" the place, that some other inhabitant
of Moscow can now see him and talk with him, and that I won't encounter
65. This point is further developed below.
66. Of. Royce's treatment of judgment, infra, 74 ff.
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my brother in Brooklyn, etc. As Paul Weiss expresses the matter.
He have difficulty in understanding the exact meaning of any
proposition because no expression ever completely reveals the
’
' ctive tone and feeling which is in fact integrated with
This frequent vagueness and indefiniteness in meaning indicates the
largely ideal character of Pratt's conception of trueness. For if real-
ity is to be as we say it is in such cases, either reality must take on
this character of vagueness or many of our judgments, while meaningful
for us, will possess neither trueness or falseness as they stand. It
seems to me that James's theory of trueness as successful leading has
the merit of talcing care of many judgments as they actually are, rather
than as they ought to be
.
But let us assume my brother's presence in Moscow cannot be veri-
fied. Is there then no trueness in the judgment, My brother is in Mos-
cow? Of course, James would urge the illegitimacy of such an assumption,
/O
on the ground that trueness and verifiability are identical. ~ But in-
asmuch as we are not yet committed to his position in its entirety, the
assumption seems legitimate. It seems to me that if ny brother is a per-
son, a self capable of reason and ideal value , ^9 he himself will actual-
ize the trueness of the judgment. The judgment will be a true judgment
for him. But here we are leading the pragmatist to a pitfall. Because my
67. Weiss, RSA, 70.
68. James, LT, 170* cf. also Moore, Art. 1, 4o4
69. Brightman, POI, 5.
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belief will possess trueness because of its correspondence with my bro-
ther's experience in Moscow.
Ho my mind it is the fundamental weakness of pragmatism's doctrine
of trueness that it is unable satisfactorily to account for judgments or
beliefs about the experience of other persons. Pratt expounds this same
criticism in his famous discussion of Peter's toothache. 7^ The meaning of
ny judgment that Peter has a toothache does not seem to be exhausted in
ny appropriate responses to Peter and in Peter's appropriate responses to
me.^ That Peter has a real pain in his experience means more than ny
attempt to commiserate or doctor him and his suitable responses. It nay
well be that his specific type of pain is a kind that I have never ex-
perienced, and certainly the "correspondence" of my judgment with his
pain does not involve a corresponding pain in my experience. Eut my judg-
ment does somehow correctly describe a state of affairs in his experience.
As Ellen Eliss Talbot says:
. . .The failure of the pragmatic theory of truth is most obvious
when we try to apply it to a ca3e in which one person makes some
judgment about another person, .. .For when I assert the presence
of another person, I not only imply that if I do certain things
I shall have experiences of a certain sort; I also imply that I
stand in relation to a reality over and above any experience of
mine, past, present, or future: I assert the reality of that
which, so far as I can see, not only is not, but never can be,
ny experience.72
Miss Talbot then goes on to point out that pragmatism, in rejecting the
70. Pratt, WIP, 117-121. Also cf. Lovejoy, Art. 2, 75“74.
71. Of. Moore, Art. 1, 406.
72. Talbot, Art, 1, 242-24J.
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correspondence theory of truness, rejects the reality of other persons.
But to the possible objection by the pragmatist that he denies the "pri-
vate-consciousness-outer-reality view of thought", 75 Miss Talbot replies
that "he has avoided the mistake of ignoring the reality of other persons
only by the device of ignoring the reality of all persons"
I
think
Miss Talbot's point here is valid.
Ralph Barton Perry says that for pragmatism, "Reality, taken as the
counterpart of the culminating knowledge, is as experience perceives and
not as ideas conceive " We maintain that although such a doctrine may
prove true in several important aspects with reference to the reality of
sense objects, it is not true with reference to the reality of selves
other than our own. My private experience as such never perceives your
private experience as such. Consequently, the latter must be as xiy ideas
conceive and not as my experience perceives, if there is to be any true-
ness in my knowledge of your private experience at all.
William James says, "... We believe our 'percepts' are possessed by
us in common ". '6 gut C. I. Lewis has convincingly shown that there is no
necessity and no adequate proof for such a belief. 1^ At any rate, so long
as we adhere to the reality of finite centres of experience, i.e., selves,
so long must we admit that pragmatism's conception of trueness requires
75. Talbot, Art. 1, 259* quoting Moore, PIC, 225f‘f.
7^. Talbot, Art. 1, 24^.
75. Perry, ISJ, 61
.
76. James, MT, J>6.
77* Lewis, MWO, ch. 5 .
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supplementation. Sven if we do not assign them an ultimate reality, hiss
Talbot has correctly pointed out that to ignore their distinctiveness in
every-day experiences "is to give a false account of our experience."'
The partial validity of the identity-theory and of the coherence-
theory of truenes3, which we shall find be low, must also be taken into
consideration in modifying this conception of trueness as the existence
of mediating links of experience. 0 ^'
Russell criticizes James and Dewey on the ground that:
The object of belief in their view is generally, net relations
between things, or things, having qualities, or^what not, but
just single things which may or may not exist,"
For Russell this view is absolutely mistaken. His first objection is to
the effect that "...there are a great many judgments you cannot possibly
Qp
fit into that scheme..."'' We have already considered this point in our
treatment of the so-called two aspects of judgment.
It is true that when James speaks of his idea of Memorial Hall as a
true idea, he dees not formulate his belief in terms of such propositions
as, "Memorial Hall is made of red bricks", or "Memorial Hall is a Har-
vard building". His idea is simply the idea of Memorial Hall.'^ But as
78. Talbot, Art. 1, 244.
79. Infra, 106
,
157 .
80. As we have previously pointed out, James himself at times seems aware
of the inapplicability of his doctrine of trueness to all realms of ex-
perience .
81. Russell, Art. 5, 5J.
82. Loc. cit.
85 . James, MT, 104-106
,
115 .
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the idea culminates in mediatory links of experience, it expands indefi-
nitely, so as to include qualities and relations. Russell urges that
such a conception involves a perverted analysis of falsehood for "...it
cannot be the right analysis of a false belief to regard it as a relation
to what is really nothing". But the pragmatist might answer that such
culminating experiences as fail to fulfill the intent of the original
idea, as fail to lead to the expected terminus or termini, are not "noth-
ing". They are, like all reality, experiences, but experiences that fail
to correspond with the idea in question, so that we have an absence of
trueness. In other words, the false idea does not refer to nothing, but
to future experiences which prove not to be of the expected kind. Russell
seems to forget that when James asserts the existence of Lemorial Hall,
he means nothing but that certain experiences will ensue upon certain
actions. If they do ensue, we have trueness. If they don't ensue, we
have falseness.
Of course, for James, a certain kernel of reality pertains to _.emo-
rial Hall before my actualization of the idea. There is a fundameirtum of
circumstance surrounding idea and object which gives it potential true-
ness, independently of ny verifying it. The notion is an exceedingly
difficult one in view of the fact that this "fundamentum" is wholly ex-
periential in nature; yet James does not make it clear just whose or
what experience it is.
84. Russell, Art. 5^.
85. Gf. Lovejoy, Art. 2, 4l, on this point. Also cf. supra, 52.
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At any rate, even though there be such a kernel of reality to which
a true idea will refer, in view of the creativity of knowledge as con-
ceived b James trueness does not consist in a reference to nothingness,
for Janies. Trueness as the existence of mediating links of experience
does not involve the falseness of reference to nothingness, as Russell's
criticism asserts.
Concerning potential trueness or verifiability as distinguished
from actual trueness or verification, William Pepperell kontague observes
that such potentiality must be M a certain actual relation between the
O/
thing believed and the thing that exists ~
°
If this position be adopt-
ed. however, the value of James's contribution to our study of trueness
would for the most part be vitiated. For the distinctiveness of the prag-
matic treatment consists in its emphasis on the experiential realization
of mediatory links between the idea and the object, and such realization
is supposed to be creative to a very significant extent. But if the re-
lation is already actual before it is verified, then creativity is auto-
matically abolished, and logical priority belongs to the relation and
not to the experiencing of it. That is, the relation in question becomes
something other than successful mediation.
Nevertheless, if "potentiality" is to mean anything mere than actu-
ality in retrospect or groundless prediction, some actual relation must
obtain. The way out of the difficulty here seems to lie in an appeal to
degree of predetermination, that is, in a reference to the antecedent
86. Lontague, Art. 5, 545.
-,
realities which form the material for knowledge. James says:
The truth of an event, past, present, or future, is for me only
another name for the fact that if the event ever does get known,
the nature of the knoweldge is already to some degree predeter-
mination. 87
In view of his ultimate identification of reality and experience. James's
QQ
insistence that "Truth in posse (verifiability ) means only truths in
act..." and that the latter are logically and metaphysically prior ,
^
does
not conflict with this predetermined element in knowledge. But that fur-
ther enlightenment is necessary with regard to the metaphy sical status
of this predetermination, is fairly obvious.
87. Jamies, MT, 29^. Italics mine.
88. Ibid, 205.
89. Ibid, 206.
90. Of. infra. Chapter V.
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CHAPTER III
TRUENESS AS IDENTITY WITH REALITY
Josiah Royce
Of all the views of the nature of trueness which we have teen dis-
cussing, Royce' s view is by far the hardest to classify. In one sense
his doctrine may be classified with the correspondence-theories. However,
we have chosen to classify it as an identity-theory, for two reasons. In
the first place, correspondence, for Royce, seems ultimately to reduce
to identity in the infinite Thought; and although Royce regards this in-
finite Thought as necessarily organic and unified, coherence seems to
accrue to true ideas because they are parts of the infinite Thought,
rather than vice versa. One reason for this interpretation is that Royce
leaves the notion of coherence comparatively undeveloped. In the second
place, as previously stated, the aim of this dissertation is to present
the most distinctive aspects of each man's thought, rather than to pre-
sent an historically adequate portrait.
Royce gives a preliminary definition of trueness as correspondence
between an idea and its object.'*' But for Royce such a definition involves
1. Royce, RAP,
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two fundamental problems, viz.. What is the relation called "correspond-
p
ence"? and. What is the relation called "having an object"?
Regarding the relation of correspondence, Royce says:
Necessary to the relations of correspondence is only this, that
you shall be able to view the two corresponding objects together,
in a one-to-one relation, or in some other definite way, and,
with some single purpose in mind, shall then be able in some one
perhaps very limited aspect to affirm of one of them the same
that you, at the same time and in the same limited sense, affirm
of the other.
5
This is a very significant and different definition of the relation of
correspondence. First of all, it is to be noted that the two correspond-
ing objects must be viewed together . V/e shall consider this point in
connection with the relation of having an object.^ For the present, let
us consider the element of purpose in the relation of correspondence.
Royce says, "The idea is true if it possesses the sort of correspondence
to its object that the idea itself wants to possess".^1 Consequently, it
is not the object "as a finished fact" which predetermines the kind of
correspondence or agreement constituting the trueness of the idea.""
Royce says:
Ideas are like tools. They are there for an end. They are true,
as the tools are good, precisely by reason of their adjustment
2. Royce, WI, I, JOO.
5. Ibid, 502.
4. Infra, 74.
5. Royce, WI, 1, J06.
6. Ibid, 510. Also cf. Royce, Art. 122-125*
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to this end.
7
Purpose must not only be considered with reference to the type of
correspondence to be attained by an idea, but also with reference to the
O
selection of' the object concerned.'" If my statements are intended to
describe Royce, you cannot judge their trueness in terms of their corres-
pondence with James. This seems fairly obvious and rather unimportant.
But Royce proceeds to develop this relation of having an object into a
very significant doctrine regarding the internal and external meanings of
ideas. Consider the antimony presented by Royce. 9 in view of the role
played by purpose in the relation of correspondence (in selecting both
the type of correspondence and the object to be corresponded to).
There seems to be, in the object of an idea, just in so far as
it is the object of that specific idea, no essential character
which is not predetermined by the purpose, the internal meaning,
the conscious intent, of that idea itself. 10
In other words, "...Unless one talks nonsense, it should seem as if one
could mean only what one has in mind". 11 So much for the thesis. The an-
tithesis is:
ho finite idea predetermines, in i£s object, exactly the char-
acter which, when present in the object, gives the idea the
7. Royce, WI,I,50c . Here we notice a remarkable similarity to the doctrine
of James and Dewey. For Royce 1 s relation to pragmatism, cf. Royce, Art. 5 j
especially 117 and 122. Also cf. Royce, RAP, 4lf.
8. Royce, WI, I, 517-518; RAF, 597-
9. Royce, WI, I, 520-524. Also cf. Royce, RAF, 597 > ff.
10. Soyce, WI, I, 520.
11. Royce, RAF, 4ll.
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desired truth. For observe, first, that the object of a true
finite idea, such as our idea of the world or of space, is in
any case something other than the mere idea itself. And the
truth of the idea depends upon a confirmation of the idea
through the presence and the characters of this other,—the
object .12
The common sense view of judgment, according to Royce, is that
judgments have as objects only what they intend to have as objects, and
they cannot intend objects they do not know. But if you must first know
an object before you can make it an object of your judgment, how can you
possibly err about it Royce attempts to resolve this difficulty by an
appeal to the. unfulfilled purpose of an idea. For him there is no purely
voluntary life.l^ "Thought is a mode of action..."!'-" One's intelligent
ideas of things always involve a consciousness of how one intends to act
toward those things.!^ Accordingly, Royce defines an "idea" as any state
of consciousness which, when present, is regarded as "at least the par-
tial expression or embodiment of a single conscious purpose". 1' But it is
this partial, incomplete, unfulfilled character of an idea that permits
reference to an other. Royce says:
In seeking its object, any idea whatever seeks absolutely
lothing but its own explicit, and, in the end, complete deter-
12. Royce, WI, I, 525*
15.
Royce, RAP, 597"598.
14. Royce, WI, I, 21.
15. Royce, Art. 1, 254.
16. Royce, WI, I, 22.
17. Ibid, 22-25. Also, cf. Royce, Art. 1, 254.

mination as this conscious purpose, embodied in this one way .
The complete content of the idea's own purpose i3 the only ob -
ject of which the idea can ever take note. This alone is the
Other that is sought ."^
In other words, the apparently external meaning of an idea, i.e.,
10
its attempted correspondence with an outer fact, is really continuous
with and involved in its internal meaning, 20 i.e., the conscious purpose
partially embodied therein. 2 ^ The only difference between the internal
and external meanings of an idea is one of degree. The former is purpose
relatively fulfilled; the latter is the same purpose completely ful-
filled. 22
...The final meaning of every complete idea, when fully devel-
oped, must be viewed as wholly an internal meaning, and... all
apparently external meanings become consistent with internal
meanings only by virtue of thus coming to be viewed as aspects
of the true internal meaning. 25
Even when our ideas refer to other persons, external meanings must
be viewed as ultimately aspects of internal meanings. Royce says:
However much I may fancy that I am talking of you, I am really
talking about my idea of you, which for me can have no relation
whatever to the real you. And so John and Thomas remain shut
up in their prisons. 2H Each thinks of his phantom of the other.
18. Royce, WI, I, ^29.
19. Ibid, 26.
20. Ibid,
21. Ibid,
22. Ibid,
25. Ibid,
55-
25.
56 . aIso cf. ibid, jb.
5^.
2b. Of. Royce, RAP, 407-4l6.
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Only a third person, who included them both... could compare
the phantoms with the real, and only in him, not in themselves,
would John and Thomas have any ideas of each other at all, true
or false.
^
Royce believes that the possibility of error demands the assertion
of the existence of a world-consciousness. He points cut that the postu-
late that reality corresponds to our ideas is prior to the postulate that
a real world causes our ideas. 26 He says:
Can I conceive of a real cause save by virtue of a postulate
that my conception of a real cause is like the real cause
itself?.. .For surely I do not know the validity of my idea of
a causal relation merely on the ground that I know that this
idea of causal relation must itself have been caused by the
real existence of causal relations in the world. Such an
attempt to justify my idea would mean endless regress. '
Royce feels that once the notion of external reality ceases to be based
solely on the notion of causality, a relation of likeness must be postu-
lated which consists either in a likeness between my present conscious
state and another conscious state (either ny own or someone else's) or
pQ
between my present conscious state and a possible experience. c
Royce attacks the latter alternative on the ground that possible
experience is an exceedingly obscure notion. 29 if possibility is to be
25. Royce, RAF, 4l6.
26. Ibid, 554-555.
27. Ibid, 555.
28. Ibid, 56I. In this connection consider Royce 1 s argument, "Only ideas
are knowable. And nothing absolutely unknowable can exist". Royce, SMP,
566 .
29.
Royce, RAF, 5
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more than mere thinkableness (which obviously must be the
case if it is to provide a basis for validity), something
actually existent must constitute it a possibility. That is,
The conditions of possible error must be actual.
Bare possibility is blank nothingness. If the
nature of error necessarily and with perfect gen-
erality demands certain conditions, then these
conditions are as eternal as the erroneousness of
error itself is eternal. And thus the inclusive
thought, which constitutes the error, must be
postulated as existent.
In this connection he considers Mill's famous definition of
matter as the permanent possibility of sensation. He says:
Matter as a mere possibility of experience is more
than any animal's known actual experience. And yet
this matter is to be real for cons c iousne s s . Nor is
it to be real for consciousness simply in so far as
the possible experience is represented or conceived.
The reality consists not merely in the representa-
tion in present consciousness of a possible exper-
ience, but in the added postulate that this con-
ception is valid beyond the present consciousness.
How is this postulate to be satisfied unless by
assuming an actual world-consciousness?^
In other words, if individual knowledge is to be grounded
on an extra -individual reality, this reality must consist
of sterner stuff than the mere concept of possibility seems
to indicate. My conscious state must correspond to another
actual conscious state, existing in a world -cons c ious ne s s
.
To the objection that error is what a supreme mind
v o ul d judge to be false, Royce reiterates that if a
30.
Royce, RAP, 429-430.
31. Ibid, 362.
32. Ibid, 367-368
..
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single judgment is to have an object which it does npt know, such an ob-
ject must be the complete expression of the partially embodied purpose,
and that such a complete expression would be meaningless to a barely
possible judge, who could hardly be expected to know your full intention
when you don't know it yourself. In order that a judge may know the judg-
ment's object, the incomplete intention must be complete for him, 55 and
he will be able thus to compare the incomplete and complete intentions
only if both are present in his consciousness Consequently, we find
Royce maintaining:
Separate thoughts as such cannot then know or have the dis-
tinction between their own truth and their own falsity in
themselves, and apart from the inclusive thought. There is
then nothing of truth or of error to be found in the world
of separate thoughts as such. All the thoughts are therefore
in the last analysis actually true or false, only for the
all -including Thought, the Infinite. 55
It is but a short step from thi3 view of the nature of judgment to
the position that finite consciousnesses are subordinate parts or ele-
ments in the world-consciousness or infinite thought. If "my mind can be
concerned only with its own ideas", 5*5 or, to put it another way, if one
can "mean only what one has in mind", 5- the possibility of objective
knowledge, and hence the possibility of error (or vice versa), demands
55. Royce, RAF, 428-429.
54. Ibid, 425.
55. Ibid, 452. Also cf. ibid, 595, 405, 577-578.
56 . Ibid, 578 .
57* Ibid, 4ll. Also cf. ibid, 4l5-4l4, 4l6.
t5.
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the inclusion of rry mind in the infinite mind.
A slightly different approach to the same conclusion is given in the
following statement by Royce:
. . .Two judgments cannot have the same object save as they are
both present to one thought. For as separate thoughts they
would have separate subjects
,
predicates, intentions, and ob-
jects... So that every error implies a thought that includes it
and the corresponding truth in the unity of one thought with
the object of both of them. Only as present to an including
thought are they either true or false. Thus then we are driven
to assume an infinite thought, judging truth and error.
Royce goes on to state that such a world-consciousness will not be
59
a mere aggregate of truths but a rational, organic' unity; because, since
error is possible with reference to relations, as well as with reference
to objects, the infinite thought must know all relations, and "to know
all relations at once i3 to know them in absolute rational unity, as
forming in their wholeness one single thought"
The trueness of a finite idea consists in its correspondence, "even
in its vagueness, to its own final and completely individual express ion"?^
That is, my idea must correspond with an idea in the world-consciousness^
But the trueness of the ideas of the world-consciousness will not consist
in correspondence, but in identity. The ideas of the infinite mind do not
^8. Royce, RAP, 425.
29. Ibid, 405.
40. Ibid, 425.
4l e Royce, WI, I, 559*
42. Royee, RAP, 5U8 .
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need to correspond or conform to reality—they are reality.
But for the world-consciousness itself there will be no ques-
tion of its own truth or falsity. It will be for and in itself.
It will not have to create a real world; it will be a real
world. It will not have a Nature as its own Otherness, over
against itself. It will be in its own facts and in their se-
quence a nature.
Or, to put the matter in another way, Royce points out that the two fac-
tors of knowledge, idea and thing, which are divorced in us are joined
in the Absolute. "He simply sees his ideas fulfilled in the facts of his
experience, and beholds his experiences as the fulfillment of his ideas'1^4
In him, there is a "unity of thought and fact...""4-'
Thus, ultimately all external meanings are to be viewed as merely
46
aspects of internal meanings. In the last analysis correspondence dis-
appears into identity.
The thinking process itself is a process whereby at once mean-
ings tend to become determinate, and external objects tend to
become internal meanings. Let my process of determining my own
internal meaning simply proceed to its own limit, and then I
shall face Being. I shall not only imitate my object as another,
and correspond to it from without: I shall become one with it,
and so internally possess it. ^7
Here we see that even the trueness of finite judgments is ultimately a
matter of identity, not of correspondence. Let correspondence become more
4^. Royce, RAP, 348.
44. Royce, CG, 10.
45. Ibid, 12.
46. Royce, WI, I, 34.
47. Ibid, 38 .
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and more adequate, and eventually it loses itself in an identity of
thought and thing.
One who held to the reality of time and duration might well question
the present existence of objects corresponding to our predictions about
the future, yet Royce 1 s doctrine of trueness would seen* to demand such
existence, when we recall that for him merely possible experience is
h O
meaningless. u Eut Royce is ready to meet such an objection with a unique
theory abo$t the nature of time. He proposes that we drop the postulate
that the nature of time is such as to preclude the present existence of
the future, in favor of the postulate that time is now present in its
entirety to the infinite thought. The latter postulate assures the
4o
present existence of real objects for our judgments about the future.
If we adopt such a postualte, the infinite mind will have an infinite
time-span. It grasps all moments of succession in one instantaneous grasp,
but the successive moments are still distinguishable as successive within
50it. According to Royce, we possess a similar ability on a far lesser
scale. For example, we can grasp several successive notes of music in one
moment of consciousness and at the same time be aware of them as success-
ive.'-^ In the same way succession is real in the Absolute, though tranr-
scended in the simultaneity of the infinite awareness.
48. Of. supra, 76.
49. Royce, RAF, 422-423. Also cf. ibid, 419.
50. Royce, ffl, II, 138-142.
51. Ibid, 143-144. Also cf. ibid, 111-151.
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It is this absolute mind which provides us with the absolutely true,
according to Royce. He says:
...In all our empirical constructions, scientific and practi-
cal, v/e express our own individual wills and seek such success
as we can get. But there remains the fact that in all these
constructions we are expressing a will which, as logic and pure
mathematics teach us, has an universal absolute nature,—the
same in all of us.^2
Again,
...While the truth which we acknowledge is indeed relative to
the will which acknowledges that truth, still what one may
call the pure form of willing is an absolute form, a form which
sustains itself in the very effort to violate its own laws. V/e
thus find out absolute truth, but it is absolute truth about
the nature of the creative will in terms of which we conceive
all truths.
52. Royce, Art. 1, 251-252.
55. Royce, Art. 1, 248.

Criticism of Royce’s Theory
A very fundamental point in Royce’s doctrine of trueness concerns
the problem of meaning. Is Rovce correct in maintaining that we can mean
only what we have in mind? "'4 Or can judgments intelligibly refer to ob-
jects other than our present or future experiences? It seems to me that
Royce’s treatment of judgment emphasizes the connotative aspect of mean-
ing at the expense of the denotative aspect. PJhile a judgment may cor-
rectly be described as "an act of a reflective and self-conscious char-
acter, an act whereby one accepts or rejects an idea as a sufficient ex-
pression of the very purpose that is each time in question",
'
,p Royce does
not take sufficient cognizance of the fact that the purpose involved may
be a reference to something essentially outside of the particular exper-
ience concerned. That is, if the "purpose" be to know another self thor-
oughly, it is essentially unrealizable,^ and yet such a state of
affairs does not preclude the making of intelligible judgments about such
a self. As Pratt says:
54. Royce, RAP, 411. Cf. supra, 73.
55. Royce, Art. 1, 235.
56. "...The experiences of another consciousness, external to mine, can-
not themselves be identical with the objects of my experience as mine",
Royce, Art. 2, 542.
.-
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The important point for us to note is that meaning does not
necessarily involve the ascription of quality nor refer to qual-
ity. A symbol may stand for a refe rend without attributing to it
any character. 07
Eventually, I believe, all denotation involves the presence of quality.
But such a state of affairs does not preclude the possibility of a
symbolization which is abstracted from all ascription of quality. The
application of proper names to individuals, when made without reference
to their previous application, is a case in point. If this be granted,
then what is there to preclude the assignment to a referend of qualities
which it may or may not possess? TVhy must such a referend exist in my
mind as ideas before I can make judgments concerning it?
Royce himself solves the dilemma that either there is no error or
we judge concerning the unknown, by adopting the latter alternative.
True, the unknown is known in the Absolute, the unfulfilled purpose is
fulfilled in the Absolute, but any finite mind refers to something be-
yond its present experience. The difficulty presented by Royce, that
"the object is a true Other, and yet it is object only as the meaning
of this idea”, ' ^ is not a difficulty if it be granted that a person
can "mean" something other than an assemblage of qualified ideas, that
he may employ a symbol to refer to another existent and proceed to
judge concerning this existent. On the basis of observation, induction.
57. Pratt, PR, 17.
58. Royce, WI, I, 331
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deduction, and inference, he may formulate .-judgments which are much more
than statements of ideas coexistent in his mind, for he intends them to
refer to an existent, not to a mental concept.
Perhaps Royce is right in reducing the world of things to a purely
experiential status. The real question is. Can our reference to other
persons be similarly reduced to an experiential status in terms of my
experience as it expands into the Absolute’s? ’Then I judge that Peter has
a toothache, do I mean merely that certain ideas -which compose the con-
cept ’’Peter” in my mind are accompanied by the ideas which compose the
concept "toothache”? I think not. And that such a judgment is neither
true nor false apart from an infinite thought which includes and compares
both my state of mind in judging, and Ffeter ’s state of mind in being
judged,^ seems a legitimate assumption only if we are prepared to grant
that trueness can exist only in so far as it is recognized as such. In
other words, there is a confusion involved here between trueness and the
criterion of trueness . 1,lJ
If it be granted that meaning may refer to something more than the
ideational fulfillment of present purpose, then it will probably also be
granted that Royce* s definition of error as frustrated purpose®- is in-
adequate. The presence of some more positive element seems to be indi-
59. Cf. Royce, RAP, 422-425. Also supra, 78.
60. Cf . Royce, ’.71, I, 304-307, where Royce treats the definition and the
test of trueness together. See especially ibid, 306.
61. Royce, RAP, 425.
.,
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cated.
But if error be regarded as something more than incompleteness, its
inclusion in the infinite thought creates a real difficulty. For how a
rational conscious unity which knows all truth.62 can include infinite
error^ is well-nigh impossible to conceive. But even if error be inter-
preted wholly in terms cf fragmentariness, it still seems difficult to
ascribe both completeness and incompleteness at the same time to the
same mind. Royce would probably here appeal to his doctrine of time for
resolution of the difficulty. He says:
...All facts, all thoughts, all fulfilments of thoughts,—in
a word, all truth,—must be present to and in the unity of one
Divine or Absolute Consciousness, precisely as, in one of our
own moments, many data and many aspects are together in the
unity of such a moment. 0 ~
Inasmuch as Royce employs the argument from analogy, 66 ^re are free
to consider the nature of the finite consciousness as throwing light on
the nature of the infinite consciousness. It seems to me that we are
conscious of
,
i.e., aware of, only one or the other aspect at one time.
Either we hear the notes as successive or we hear the phrase as music;
we do not do both at once. True, while we are attending to the one, the
62. Royce, SMP, 380.
63. Royce, RAP, 424.
64. Royce, CG, 185.
65. Ibid, 178.
66.
Royce, m, II, 111-151
'-
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other is in some sense present as a possibility of experience. Eut ex-
perience as merely possible is meaningless for Royce. 0?
However, let us assume that our minds can attend to both at once,
thus providing a basis of analogy for affirming a similar ability in the
absolute consciousness. In so far as our successive experiences are in-
cluded as fragmentary in the absolute consciousness, it would seem that
time-transcendence would be unavailing in organising and supplementing
them into a higher unity unless they approached this unity in the tempo-
ral process, a matter which is by no means certain. That is, the mere
fact that the absolute mind has an infinite time-span would in no way
serve to supplement and organize the successive moments of fragmentary
experience, if these be regarded as necessarily fragmentary, due to the
69limitations of finite minds as such. ' Such would be the case only if it
were time alone that hindered the adequacy of our ideas. But it is our
finitude rather than time which constitutes the impediment to the true-
ness of our ideas. What is necessary here is not time -transcendence but
finite mind-transcendence.
Well, you may say, Royce believes in this so-called finite mind-
transcendence. What then? I answer that such finite mind-transcendence
is an exceedingly obscure notion if it is interpreted both as including
the finite minds within it and as transcending them. If the infinite
67 . Cf. supra, 76.
68. Royce, GG, 178.
69 • The number of finite beings might be indefinitely multiplied, but
this would in no way alter their finitude.
.-
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raind transcends finite minds, well and good. Then we can have an ulti-
mately real, rational unity. But if the infinite mind, in addition to
transcending finite minds, is to include them and constitute their reality
as such, pandemonium results. Royce believes that the infinite mind is to
be interpreted, like ours, in terms of consciousness, as a generalized
form of attention. 70 But how any consciousness, however infinite, can
attend to several distinct centers of attention, as such, is unintell-
igible unless a radically new definition of consciousness and attention
be provided, so new as to demand the use of different terms.
It might be urged that if we grant the power of finite conscious-
ness to attend to both succession and time-span simultaneously
,
there is
no reason to object to the Absolute's power of similarly dividing his
attention. But the cases are not really analogous. For in the case of the
finite time-span, the mere nature of time serves to unify the diverse,
i.e., the possibility of time-transcendence renders the division nearly
phenomenal. But in the case of the infinite consciousness, which we have
just been discussing, there is more than time-transcendence involved, un-
less it be maintained that with the passage of infinite time all finite
minds will lode their identity and together constitute the Absolute, a
view which Royce does not hold. 71
For Royce, the trueness of correspondence obtains in the Absolute as
this infinite mind compares our finite ideas with their objects. Cur
70. Of. Royce, CG, 210.
71. Ibid, 525-524, 526.
tI
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judgments are true in so far as they conform to the ought embodied in
the single, infinite self. Such conformity, however, must be experienced
by a single self which contains all other selves within it as partial
72functions. But for such an infinite self all external meanings are in-
ternal ones; the otherness requisite for correspondence is transcended
in a monism of thought and thing.' ^ Consequently, the trueness of iden-
tity must simultaneously obtain. I confess that this seems to me to be an
irreconcilable contradiction, in spite of the profundity of Royce 's doc-
trine. For it was the need for a mind which compared the internal and
external meanings of ideas, thus actualizing their correspondence, that
led Royce to affirm the existence of an infinite mind in the first place
(in this connection);?^ but once given this infinite mind trueness is no
longer correspondence, but identity.
We have devoted so much time to a criticism of the absolute con-
sciousness because if the existence of an absolute consciousness which
knows all possible as well as actual experience?^ be once admitted, the
trueness of identity seems the only defensible doctrine of the nature of
trueness, but short of such an Absolute, the identity-doctrine of true-
ness is applicable only restrictedly . To what extent the identity-doc-
trine is valid, we shall now consider in connection with the thought of
Henri Bergson.
72. Royce, Art. 5> 1^1.
75. Of. supra, 80.
7b, Of. supra, 77.
75. Royce, OG, 195.

Henri Bergson
While Henri Bergson has made practically no statements regarding the
nature of trueness,'*' his epistemology and noetic evaluations are very
important for our study. Bergson points out that what we ordinarilly call
a fact is not a disclosure of the real but merely an adaptation of the
p
real to our practical and social needs. Such an adaptation, cognitively
speaking, is a distortion of the real and is constructed by intellect.^
If we wish to know the real we must discard this artificial superstruc-
ture created by intellect, and put ourselves in intellectual sympathy
with the real by means of the faculty of intuition. Bergson Says:
3n defaisant ce que ces besoins ont fait, nous retablirions
l
1
intuition dans sa purete premiere et nou3 reprendrions
contact avec le reel.
According to Bergson one of the most profound ideas in Kant's Kritik
der reinen Vernunft is that “si la metaphysique est possible, c'est par
1. L. Susan Stebbing says, "Unlike James and other pragmatists, then, M.
Bergson does not begin with a discussion of the nature of truth—nowhere
indeed does he directly face this question..." Stebbing, PFV, 57*
2. Bergson, MM, 201-205
.
5- Eergson, Art. 1, 7~9*
4. Bergson, MM, 20J. Also cf. Bergson, Art. 1, 9-10; Art. 2, 826.
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une vision, et non par une effort dialectique"
But what is this faculty of intuition that occupies a place of such
high esteem in Bergson's thought? He says:
On appelle intuition cette espece de sympathie intellectuelle
par laquelle on se transporte a l'interieur d'un objet pour
coincider avec ce qu'il a d'unique et par consequent d'inex-
primable.^
Philosophers agree in distinguishing two very different ways of knowing
a thing. 7 The first way involves moving round the object; it is conse-
quently relative and analytical, a reduction of the object to elements
already known. The second way involves entering into the object; it is
consequently a simple act that grasps what is unique and inexpressible
in the object in an epistemological monism^ that provides a non-relative,
i.e., absolute knowledge. The former is the way of intellect; the latter,
the way of intuition. Eergson affirms that all metaphysicians and theolo-
gians will agree that a perfect being is "celui qui connait toutes choses
* / i
intuitivement, sans avoir a passer par 1 1 intermediate du raisonnement
,
de 1 1 abstraction ni de la generalisation. "9
5. Bergson, PO, l4.
6. Bergson, Art. 1, 5 .
7. Bergson, art. 1-4.
8. Of. Bergson, art. 1, 25, "II y a une realite* exterieure et pourtant
donriee immediatement a notre esprit." (italics omitted.) Stebbing says,
"That such an identity of the knower and the known is meant can be the
only interpretation of M. Bergson's description of the true philosophical
method as one in which one 'enters into a thing' and 'coincides with
it*". Stebbing, PFV, 145.
9. Bergson, PC, 5-6.
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The best example of intuitive knowledge is our knowledge of our own
personality in its flowing through time. Bergson says, "Nous pouvons ne
sympathiser intellectuellement avec aucune autre chose. Liais nous sympa-
thisons surement avec nous-memes . " ^ True, our intellects can detect a
frozen surface of psychical states
,
but beneath this surface is a con-
tinuous flux of inner life which "est tout cela a la fois, variete de
qualites, continuite de progres, unite de direction. 1^ For a conscious
being, to exist consists in changing, changing consists in "se murir, se
rnurir a se creer indefiniment soi-reue" . ^5 But each person must get for
himself "1 1 intuition de la duree constitutive de son etre..."* ' Concepts-^
will never give it to him. Eergson says:
D'un cote, en effet, ces concepts mis bout a bout ne nous
donneront jamais qu ’une recomposition artificielle de l'objet
dont ils ne peuvent que symbol iser certains aspects <^rieraux
et en quelque sorte impersonne Is : c'est done en vairr^croirait
,
avec eux, saisir une realite dont ils se bornent^a nous pre-
senter l'ombre. Liais d'autre part, a cote de l'iliusion, il y
a aussi un tres grave danger. Oar le concept generalise en
meme temps qu'il abstrait. Le concept ne peut sygiboliser une
propriete speciale qu'en la rendant commune a une infinite de
choses. II la d^forme done tcujours plus ou moins par l'exten-
10. Eergson, Art. 1, 4.
11. Ibid, 4-5.
12. Ibid, 6.
15. Eergson, SO, 8.
14. Bergson, Art. 1, 6-7 •
15. Eergson defines "concepts" as "des idees abstraites, ou gen^rales,
ou simples". Eergson, Art. 1, 6.
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sion qu'il lui donne .16
Thus, Bergson argues that no mingling of the concepts of unity and
multiplicity will ever give us anything resembling the real self. We must
first get an intuition of the real self, "du moi par le moi", and proceed
from there to an understanding of its unity and mulitplicity .
^
"...De
N \
l 1 intuition on peut passer a l , analyse, rnais non pas de 1* analyse a 1 1 in-
tuition.
"
For Bergson concepts are essentially stationary; ^ the real is
essentially variable. ^0 In this consists the difference between analysis
and intuition, for analysis, being concerned with concepts,^ "opere tou-
jours sur 1 1 immobile ...”, 22 while intuition, being concerned with the
•« / A
real, se place dans la mobilite ou, ce qui revient au meme, dans la
duree.^2 True duration is the indivisible continuity of change. Form
is only ”un instantane pris sur une transition” . Bergson maintains
16. Eergson, Art. 1, 8.
17- Ibid. 15.
18. Ibid, 19.
19. Ibid, 17.
20. Ibid, 19. Bergson, SC, 527*
21. Bergson, Art. 1, 17.
22. Ibid, 19.
25 . Loc . cit.
24. Bergson, PC, 26.
25. Bergson, SO, 527* Italics omitted.
..
t
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that change has no need of a support. That is, there are changes, but
not things that change. ^6 Inasmuch as everything is in flux, the same
concrete reality will never he repeated, and repetition will onl£ be
possible in the abstract. Bergson says,
...Ce qui se repute, c’est tel ou tel aspect que nos sens et
surtout notre intelligence ont detache de la r^alite, pre-
cis^ment parce que notre action, sur laquelle tout 1* effort
de notre intelligence est tendu, ne se peut mouvoir que
parmi des repetitions 7
But this disdain for concepts and this preoccupation with intuition
of self does not mean that Bergson is a solipsist.?^ It is true that he
finds no logical reason for positing multiple and diverse durations
He says
:
\ ^ ^
A. la rigueur il pourrait n’exister d’autre duree que la notre,
comme il pourrait n’y avoir au monde d’autre couleur que 1 ’orange,
par example. Mais du meme qu'une conscience a base de couleur,
qui sympathiserait interieurement avec 1’ orange au lieu de le
percevoir exterieurement
,
se sentirait prise du rouge et du
jaune . . .ainsi 1 ’intuition de notre duree, bien loin de nous
laisser suspendus dans le vide comme ferait la pure analyse,
nous met en contact avec toute une continuity de durees que
nous devons essayer de suivre soit vers le bas, soit vers le
haut...*0
This statement, in spite of the fact that Bergson prefaces it with a
reference to multiple and diverse durations, might easily be interpreted
to involve merely the continuity, and not the essential multiplicity of
26. Bergson, PC, 24. Italics omitted.
27. Bergson, EC, 49-50. Also cf. B ergson, EC, 269-270.
28. For one thing his conception of the self is very different from the
usual solipsistic conception.
29. Bergson, Art. 1, 24.
30.
Ibid, 24-25.

duration. But in another place Bergson, in speaking of the determinate
tension felt when one intuits duration, says that "la determination
mere apparait comme un choix entre une infinite^de durees possibles".
^
The fact seems to be that unity and multiplicity are merely intellectual
concepts for Bergson, and duration can never be grasped by concents. The
deeper states of consciousness have no essential relation to quantity,
but are pure quality. 0- Conceptually considered, duration is both many
and one, in an inexplicable sense. Bergson says that in intuition,
...on apercoit des durees aussi nombreuses qu'on voudra, toutes
tr,es differentes les unes des autres, bien que chacune d 'elles,
reduite en conce ts, c 1 est—a-dire ^envisagee exterieurement des
deux points de vue opposes, se ramene toujours 'a la m&me indefi-
nissable combinaison du multiple et de l'un.22
We really need concepts of a very different kind from the "raides et
tout faits" ones we usually employ; we need "des representations souples,
mobiles, presque fluides, toujours pretes'a se mouler sur les formes
fuyantes de 1 1 intuition" .
^
Bergson admits that intuition can grasp only the individual,^"
and that the essence grasped is unique and indefinable, 36 but he sees
herein no reason for discouragement. He says of intuition:
yi . Bergson, Art. 1, 25.
52. Betgson, DIG, 104.
55. Bergson, Art. 1, 25. Also cf. Bergson, SC, I95.
54. Bergson, Art. 1, 9.
55. Bergson, SC, 192.
56. Bergson, Art. 1, 3.
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...Par la communication sympathique qu'elle etablira entre
nous et la reste des vivants, par la dilatation qu'elle ob-
tiendra de notre conscience, elle nous introduira dans le
domaine propre de la vie, qui est compenetration reciproque,
creation indefinirr.ent continuee.*/
There is some question as to just how rigid a dichotomy Bergson
intends to assert with reference to the faculties of intuition and int-
ellect. Stebbing regards it as significant that whereas in his "Introduc-
tion a la Letaphysique"^ (published 1905) Bergson describes intuition
as a kind of intellectual sympathy, 5? in his L 'Evolution creatrice (pub-
lished 1907) intuition is instinct, "...
1
1 instinct devenu desiateresse,
-i
<"
conscient de lui-meme, capable de reflechir sur son objet et de l'elargir
..
4o
indefiniment"
,
and yet instinct and intellect are diametrically
4l
opposed. out Stebbing seems to forget that Bergson says in L
'
Evolution
x
,
42
creatrice that they are presque (almost) diametrically opposed. more-
over, even when Bergson is defining intuition in terms of instinct, he
modifies instinct in such a way that it could very well be called int-
ellectual. Indeed Eergson says that without intellect instinct would
57* Bergson, EC, 195*
Bergson, Art. 1.
59. Cf. supra, 91.
40. Eergson, EC, 192.
41. Stebbing, FFV, 49.
42. Eergson, SC, 191. Also note the presque in the same connection in
Eergson 's reply to Carr, quoted by Carr in Art. 1, 60. Furthermore Berg-
son describes science and metaphysics as complementary ways of knowing.
Bergson, SC, 572.
t,
.
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never become intuition.^ And he defines instinct as sympathy. 44 So ther
is a very real sense in which intuition is still "intellectual sympathy"
for Bergson, even in L 'Evolution creatrice .
At any rate there can be no reasonable doubt that for Eergson intui
tion represents a superior way of knowing, as compared with pure intell-
ect. He says:
Un processus indetique a d$ tailler en merne temps matiere et
intelligence dans une etoffe qui les contenait toutes deux.
Dans cette re’alite" nous nous replacerons de plus en plus com-
pletement, \ mesure que nous nous efforcerons davantage de
transcender 1 ' intelligence pure. 4 '"
In fact, it is only because of the restricted scope of our faculty of
intuition that we require intellect at all.
3i nos sens et notre conscience avaient une portee illimitee,
si notre faculte de percevcir, exterieure at interieure, etaient
indefinie, nous n'aurions jamais recours Na la faculte"^ de con-
cevoir ni Na celle de raisonner. Ooncevoir est un pis aller dans
les cas ou l'on ne oeut pas percevcir, et raisonner ne s' impose
que dans la mesure cu l'on doit combler les vides
;
de la percep-
tion externe ou interne, et en etendre la portee. 0
In sum, for Bergson trueness is the identity achieved by intuition,
i.e., intellectual sympathy, a replacing of ourselves in duration, which
is possible only to the extent that we transcend purs intellect. 47 V/hile
Bergson, EG, 195*
44. Ibid, 191.
45. Ibid, 217-218.
46. Bergson, PG, 5. Referred to by Stephen. Art. 1, 42.
47. Bergson, EC, 217-218. Also cf. Bergson, Art. 1, 8-9.
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intellect has a certain relative validity for practical purposes, for
action, and for social intercourse, the so-called facts it gives us
are a distortion of the real Only intuition gives us the real, and it
does this to the extent that we place ourselves in duration and know
reality by being it. Nevertheless, it would seen that in so far as matter
is real for Bergson, intellectual judgments possess trueness of some
sort. Consider the following statement:
...Si 1 1 intelligence est accordee sur la matiere et 1' intuition
sur la vie, il faudra les presser 1 'une et 1 'autre pour extraire
d'elles la quintessence de leur objet . . .Mais, d' autre part, si
la conscience s 'est scindee ainsi en intuition et intelligence,
c'est par la necessite de s'appliquer sur la matiere en meme
temps que de suivre le courant de la vie. Le dedoublement d e
la conscience tienarait ainsi Na la double forme du rSel ...”'^
However, not only is the r^lity of patter in Eergson's metaphysics an
ambiguous point, but, in any case, Eergson does not give much thought to
this type of trueness as such, even indirectly. His whole emphasis is on
the veridical quality of intuition.
Considerations of our noetic limitations and of the constitutive
aspects of knowing do not, for Eergson, preclude our cognizing reality.
For he relegates all such handicaps to the realm of matter where they
48. Eergson, MM, 201-20^; Art. 1, 16-17; FC, 5; DIC, 105. Consider the
following statement of Bergson's: nUne vie inter ieure aux moments bien
distincts, aux etats nettement caracterises, repondra mieux aux exigences
de la vie sociale. IviSme, une psychologie superficielle pourra se conten-
ter de la decrire sans tomber pour cela dans Jerreur . . . " Eergson, DIC, 165.
49. Bergson, Art. 1, !-&•
50. Eergson, SC, 194. Italics mine.
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are no longer handicaps but useful devices possessing a certain validity-
in the realm of practise. So far as reality itself is concerned, vre can
grasp that directly. Bergson says.
La vie deborde nos cadres et categories, nos deductions et
nos inductions; c’est par 1st, selon moi, qu’elle transcende
1 1 intelligence . Mais comment alors . . ,est-il possible de la
connaitre? C’est a mon sens, parce que notre intelligence est
entouree d'une frange d’ intuition, qui nous permet de sympa-
thiser avec ce qu’il y a de proprement vital dans la vie. "I
We do not get at reality through the medium of truth. Rather, we get
truth in grasping reality. As H. Wildon Carr says, "Truth is the intel-
lectual apprehension of reality. fje asks.
Have we, in the new theory of life and knowledge of Bergson’s
philosophy, an answer to the question. What is truth? Yes, but
not in the form of a direct solution of the dilemma which con-
fronts us in every theory that accepts the independence of
knowledge and reality—rather in a theory of knowledge in which
the dilemma does not and cannot arise. The theory of Bergson is
that in the intuition of life vre know reality as it is, our
knowledge is one with our knowing • .
.
"
"
We shall now consider in what respect the trueness of the identity
achieved in intuition can throw light on our study.
51. Bergson in Carr, Art. 1, 60
52. Carr, PT, 63.
53. Ibid, 89.

Criticism of Bergson's Theory
An objection which is frequently raised against theories of intui-
tion concerns the individual and inexpressible character of the knowl-
edge reached by intuition.^ Thus, H. Wildon Carr, a sympathetic critic
of Bergson, asks what help such a direct vision of reality is to us from
the standpoint of theory. ^5 p[e says:
It can receive no interpretation nor meaning; it can never, so
to speak, render up its secret. Imagination, representation,
memory form no part of it. If we know life by intuition, from
that knowledge is excluded our remembrance of yesterday, or of
an hour, or a moment ago; it can be known purely and only as
actually present. 33
One might here protest that Bergson says we can effectively proceed from
57
an intuition to concepts, although not from concepts to an intuition. '
But Stebbing points out that such g use of intuition as a starting-point
can benefit theory but little if, as Bergson maintains, 3^ all philoso-
phical systems are agreed in so far as they are derived by means of intu-
54. Cf. supra, 9 5.
55. Carr, Art. 2, 112.
56. Loc. cit.
57. Cf. supra, 93.
58. Bergson, SC, 259.
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ition, their difference depending on divergent conceptual analyses of the
original intuition.
The fact seems to be that the trueness of systems as descriptions
of reality is subordinate in Bergson's mind to the trueness of intellec-
tual sympathy with reality. For our purposes the important point is not
Bergson's success or failure in relating the trueness of intuition to
philosophical systems, but rather the question of whether there really is
such trueness.
Harold Joachim would deny the existence of such trueness on the
ground that trueness can pertain to experience only in so far as it is
raised to the level on mediate thought. He says:
The truth or falsity of an experience depends .. .primarily
upon what the experience is; but what the experience is, it
is as a whole
,
and not in severance from the form under which
its matter is experienced. And what 'the experience as a whole'
is, can be revealed to human subjects only in so far as that ex-
perience is raised to the level of mediate thought. It is in
the attempt to mediate our 'immediate experiences' that their
truth or falsity is revealed; and except in so far as as the
attempt is made, and in being made succeeds or fails, they
possess for us neither truth nor falsity. 0^
This objection seems to me to rest on a confusion of the criterion of
truth with the nature of trueness. That unmediated experience cannot be
tested for trueness in no way affects the possibility of its possessing
it. Of course, in so far as intuition is offered as a criterion of truth,
the objection is relevant. But we are not now considering intuition as a
59. Stebbing, PFV, 150.
60. Joachim, NT, 57. Referred to by Stebbing, FFV, 1^7.
„....
*
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criterion, but rather the question. Is it possible for the human mind to
grasp reality veridically in an identity of thought and thing, as Berg-
son maintains? How individual cases of knowledge are to be classified as
being within or without this charmed circle, is another question. We
have seen that Royce develops an intelligible identity-doctrine of true-
ness in terms of an absolute consciousness. But the question now is: Can
a finite mind put itself in such a cognitive relation to reality that
its knowledge possesses the trueness of identity?
Edgar S. Brightman urges against epistemological monism in general
the objection that knowledge by acquaintance is not oroperly knowledge.
He says
:
...That with which we are most certainly acquainted, our own
self-experience
,
is not, so long as it remains mere experience,
genuine knowledge; and as soon as our awareness becomes genuine
knowledge, the situation ceases to be a monistic relation of
idea and object and becomes dualistic .51
Whether or not we choose to call mere experience "knowledge”, or to con-
fine the term, as does Brightman, to well-grounded true belief, it seems
to me that consciousness of self has a noetic adequacy, a meaningfulness,
which can be said to possess the trueness of identity. In our own self-
experience we do possess reality, and in so far as such experience is
awareness, the awareness possesses trueness, the trueness of identity.
Otherwise, what becomes of Descartes’s famous proof, Cogito ergo
sum? In so far as the I_ is regarded as something more than a unified
thinking, walling, feeling, etc., the so-called proof is an inference
that puts more in the conclusion than the antecedent strictly justifies.
61. Brightman, ITP, 88
• , ->
.
103
It is thereupon deprived of indubitableness and becomes merely another
probability and no longer a firm basis for further inference. But in so
far as the proof consists in the perception. My awareness is, we have a
situation wherein consciousness and reality coincide, and the perception
possesses the trueness of identity. Here we grasp reality, for the
reality consists in that which is grapped. As Arthur Kenyon Rogers ex-
presses it,
...In the act of attention through which we bring into the cen-
ter of the conscious field a present fact of relatively stable
immediate experience, knowledge and being merge; we are what we
know ^attentively realize), and we know what at the moment we
are,
Of course, it cannot be denied that even here, in so far as we are
describing the situation, some other type of trueness, probably corres-
pondence, must obtain. In so far as we employ language, some type of
correspondence seems necessary as obtaining between the proposition made
and that about which it is made. But that consciousness can and does s
sometimes exist without propositions, i.e., the verbal formulations of
judgments, does not seem an unreasonable position. And it is a non- pro-
positional awareness of self that provides the basis for the proposition,
Qogito ergo sum . That is, it is such a non-propositional awareness that
the proposition mast correspond to, in order to be true.
One might argue that all experience is thus self-evident. ' I can
be aware that I am now aware of a sensation of heat. This, too, might
62. Rogers, WIT, 84.
65. As Professor Brightman has suggested.
*t.
*
*
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similarly claim the trueness of identity. As a matter of fact, everything
that is experienced does possess the trueness of identity, a3 experienced .
Eut upon examination we find that everything as experienced has no status
except its entertainment in an experiencer, i.e., in a self.
But the trueness of identity alone would, I believe, never get us
beyond a solipsistic self.^ Bergson's attempts to avoid this difficulty
are at all satisfactory only if one has first allowed intellect to raise
the question of the one and the many. Until the question has been raised,
I do not see how self-consciousness can progress beyond itself. Once the
question has been raised, however, one may reply in monistic vein, and
the difficulty will no longer be so formidable. In so far as the question
is raised, some other type of trueness than that of identity will ob-
viously be requisite. But this does not affect the immediacy of the orig-
onal situation.
Hermann Lotze 's position that the antithesis between the act of
knowing and the thing known is involved in the very meaning of knowl-
edge, seems either to be a purely verbal matter or else to rest on the
distinction between self-experience and self-knowledge. One's self-con-
sciousness can be called noetic in a perfectly intelligible sense. Lotze
says
:
...Her eine Srkenntniss verlangt, welche mehr als ein luckenlos
in sich zusammenhangendes Ganze von Vorstellungen uber dies
Sache ware, welche vielmehr diesse Sache selbst erschopte, der
64. What Brightman calls the "datum-self".
65. Lotze, LOG, 497* Referred to by Stebbing, FFV, 148.
-
verlangt keine Erkenntniss mehr, sondern etwas vollig TTnvers-
tSndliches .^6
But such a knowledge is not unintelligible unless the inexpressible be
unintelligible. Thus the sentence from Plotinus^? prefixed to Frank Pog-
son’s translation of Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience^
is not sheer nonsense but a profound truth which intellectualism is all
too prone to neglect.
If a man were to inquire of Fature the reason of her creative
activity, and if she were willing to give ear and answer she
would say-- ’Ask me not, but understand in silence, even as I
am silent and am not wont to speak*.
'
J 9
Bergson’s greatest contribution to our study consists in the devel-
opment of the view that we can sympathize intellectually with ourselves
in a monism of thought and object, even if with nothing else. (Of course
in so far as we formulate judgments, especially for purposes of communi-
cation, we are usually concerned with more than the immediate datiom-self
But that this is always the case, if true, would still not disprove the
datum-self’s ability to know itself monistically . Indeed, the specious
present even admits of a certain durational aspect in the datum-self.)
As Karin Stephen expresses it,
Bergson. . .believes that is is really possible to satisfy our
speculative curiosity, not simply by increasing our knowledge
66. Lotze, LOG, 497-498. For this reference, also, I am indebted to Miss
Stebbing, PFV, 148.
67. Identified by Stebbing, PFV, 152.
68. Bergson, TFW, viii.
69. Plotinus in "On Nature, Contemplation, and the One". Taylor, FBP,
207-208.
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about existence, but actually by improving and enlarging our
acquaintance with it. 70
However, although the profundity and correctness of Bergson’s doc-
trine of intuition has been argued for, so far as self -consciousness is
concerned, and the existence of a trueness of identity in this connec-
tion has been maintained, I do not believe that all trueness can be re-
duced to this one type. As in the case of James and Royce, the inade-
quacy of Bergson’s doctrine of trueness is most evident with reference
to our knoTirledge of other persons. If, in intuiting ourselves, we could
succeed in intuiting the whole of duration and thus identify ourselves
with an Absolute, our knowledge of other persons would reduce to an
intellectual sympathy possessing the trueness of identity. But that
such is not commonly the case, even Bergson is willing to admit. 71 At
any rate, on the empirical level the distinctiveness of selves is evi-
dent enough. The trueness of identity may be the only type in heaven,
but certainly some other type of trueness is requisite here on earth. 7 ^
Bergson’s indictment of conceptual knowledge casts aspersions on
the correspondence theory of trueness as traditionally held. That is,
if we agree with Bergson that reality is so much like a living organism
that any conceptual representation is bound to distort it, the corre-
spondence theory of trueness whose definition of trueness is: Reality
is as we conceive it, will be forced into a more mediatory experiential
70. Stephen, Art. 1, 54.
71. Cf. supra, 92.
72. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 89.
'.
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position such as James’s.
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William Pepperell Montague
Against the pragmatic position that trueness consists in proving
true, i.e., in verification, Montague argues that a belief could not
lead successfully to the thing believed if it were not in some sort of
avgreement with it beforehand.-*- That is, proving-true depends on a prior
relation of trueness, a relation between the belief and the fact which
is like the relation preexisting between a key and its lock, viz., "a
relation of conformity or correspondence".^ Eut Montague proceeds to de-
fine such conformity or correspondence as identity. He explains the iden-
tification in this manner:
We know that it is possible for one thing to stand in two or
more different relations—to have membership in two or more
relational contexts or systems ... .When one thing is considered
now in one context and again in smother context, we make the
judgment of identity. 'A is identical with B
1
means that there
is something, m, which in the context Ok is called A and which
in the context is called E. Eecause A and B denote one thing
in two contexts they are said to stand to one another in the
relation of identity ...
.
When one context is the object of a be-
l ief and is also a thing that exists, there subsists between
the content as believed and the content as existing that par -
icular form of the relation of identity which is called Truth .
To say that a belief when true 'corresponds* to a reality, means
1. Montague, Art. 5, 54j. Also cf. supra, 69
2. Ibid, 544.
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that the thing believed is identical with a thing that exists.
5
As Arthur 0. Lovejoy expresses it, for Lontague "...The real object
is with no duplication or modification, immediately present in conscious-
ness. . Montague, however, i3 not prepared to state that all belief-
contents are real objects. In fact he ridicules the proponents of such a
view on the ground that they are forced to say that "Peter has a tooth
5
that can ache-in-relation-to-you and not-acbe-in-relation-to-rne 1 " , if
they are to escape the difficulty of getting rid of the objective in their
attempt to get rid of the subjective.^ Direct, unmediated consciousness
of real objects, according to Montague, in no way precludes direct, un-
mediated consciousness of unreal objects.^ He says,
Consciousness does not confer existence upon its real objects
and still less does it confer existence upon its unreal objects.'
Montague is prepared to admit a genuine duality between "the objective
and subjective orders of events", because they "vary independently of
each other"." However, this duality is not to be interpreted epistemo-
logically, but ontological ly , for Montague is unequivocal on the subject
of epistemological monism. He says, "...The thing-in- itself and the
5* Montague, Art. 5, 546.
4. Lovejoy, Art. 1, 4ll. Endorsed by iontague. Art. 7, 46.
5. Montague, Art. 7, 55.
6. Montague, Art. 1, 270.
7* Montague, Art. 7, 49.
8. Loc . cit.
9. Montague, WK, ^>20 . Also cf. Montague, Art. 8, 55, and Art. 1, 270.
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actual percept are 'numerically identical 1 ^
It is not at once obvious how the subjective and objective orders
of events can maintain a genuine duality and yet fuse into identity in
cognition. The answer seems to be that there is a partial identity be-
tween the two orders in so far as the one knows the other. That is.
An experience is termed false, illusory, or erroneous just in
so far as its constituent objects (perceptual or conceptual)
are unreal or non-existent. Thus the one existence-system and
the many experience-systems are only partly identical; objects
may exist without being experienced, and they may be experienced
without existing.
H
When we perceive physical objects such as chairs, stones, animals, etc.,
they are momentary elements in our experience, which belong "at the same
time to other experiences than ours" and are capable "of existing in
their own right apart from any of these experiences". 1 ^ In other words,
the physical can "appear in consciousness without prejudice to its in-
trinsic reality as physical"
Accordingly, cognition is not creation; 14- rather it is selection or
15pointing. When a real object is selected, then we have a true belief
or judgment. Y/hen an unreal object is selected, then we have a false
10. Montague, Art. 7 > 48, endorsing Lovejoy's formulation, Art. 1, 4-11.
Also cf. Montague, Y/K, 520; Art. 5, 546, 548; Art. 7> 60.
11. Montague, WK, 55°
•
12. Montague, Art. 5 > 108-109.
lj. Montague, Art. 1, 280.
14. Montague, Art. 5, 565.
15. Ibid, 565-566.
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belief or judgment. Montague says:
I hold that the true and the false are respectively the real
and the unreal, considered as objects of a possible belief or
judgment .
In order to understand Montague's doctrine of trueness, it is then,
necessary to consider his definition of reality.^ He says, "... The real
universe consists of the space-time system of existents, together with
all that is presupposed by that system" . IQ That is, it is one group of
19
subsistents easily distinguishable from the rest, 7 That is.
The structures of subsistence are the beds and banks of the
river of existence. They furnish no flow of water, but as un-
moved movers they control within limits the flow that i3 fur-
nished.^
A subsistent i3 "any one of the actual and possible objects of
21
thought". Inasmuch as "every subsistent has an inseparable aspect of
its meaning as 'is' relation to some other subsistent .. .every subsistent
2pis or involves a proposition". Consequently, we may differentiate
1 6 . Montague, Art. 1, 252.
17. Montague quite rightly 3ays, "...My definition of the real, if it be
rejected, should not be taken to invalidate ny thesis as to its identity
with the true". Montague, Art. 1, 255- However, while the thesis would
not be invalidated in such a case, it would be rendered so tenuous a3 to
be almost insignificant apart from some supporting doctrine of reality.
18. Montague, Art. 1, 255.
19. Ibid, 255.
20. Montague, Art. 2, 26l
.
21. Montague, Art. 1, 25J. Italics omitted. Also cf. Art. 2, 254.
22. Montague, nrt. 1, 255
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reality and unreality in terms of true propositions and false proposi-
tions. 25 Montague says:
...By real, or true, is meant the totality of propositions com-
prising the spatial and temporal system of interrelated 'events'
or 'elemental particulars', together with all that may be pre-
supposed or implied by this system, and... by unreal, or false,
is meant the totality of propositions, which are contradictories
of the above, and which comprise all the actual or possible ob-
jects of thought that neither have a place in the spatio-tem-
poral system nor are implied by it...
^
OR
In view of the fact that reality has this propositional aspect,
Montague feels that the assertion of unreal objects (the contents of
false judgments) loses its sting when their identity with false propo-
sitions is understood. 26
Montague distinguishes two aspects of a judgment, the judgment-
utterance and the judgment-content
,
or the act of asserting, and the
thing asserted. 27 says:
Any judgment is true when the content asserted by it is a
fact or a reality and, reciprocally, any judgment is false
when the content asserted by it is an unreality or non-fact.
^
25.
Montague, Art. 1, 255. The apparent circle in the argument here, in
proceeding from truth to reality and back again, would be "vicious" only
if we were considering the criterion of truth. As it is, the translation
is unavoidable for a view which indentifies belief with its object.
24. Montague, Art. 1, 262.
25. Montague, Art. 7> 54.
26. Loc . cit.
27. Montague, Art. 2, 247.
28. Ibid, 248. Although trueness consists in identity for Montague, he
does not employ the criterion of immediacy, but rather that of coherence.
Of. Montague, xirt. 6, 2^4; WK, ^0 . But he does seem a bit hesitant in
Montague, Art. 2, 250.
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Montague believes that the objection to identifying the true and the real
is based on a failure to realize that when true and false are
used as adjectives modifying belief, the ’word belief is used in
the physical or objective sense of 'being believed' rather than
in the psychical or subjective sense of 'believing 1 ...
Actually a belief is true only when the thing believed is a fact, is
real. 3® The application of the terms true and false to the act of be-
lieving or the judgment-utterance rather than to the thing believed or
judgment-content, is a fallacy, viz., the verbal fallacy of psychophysi-
cal metonony . "Belief borrows its truth or falsity from its object or
content. "51 To describe the belief as true in itself is to neglect this
point and to borrow without acknowledgement. 52
Not only does this "confused identification of the objective and
subjective senses of such words as belief, thought, idea, experience",
result in the erroneous position that "the true is mental in its nature
and different from the real", 55 but it has also resulted in a widely-
held though fallacious proof of idealism, 5^ and in the false belief that
the so-called laws of thought "relate to our thinking instead of to what
we think about"^ 13
29 • Montague
,
Art . 1
,
262
.
30. Ibid, 256.
51 . Loc . cit.
52. Ibid, 256-257.
55. Ibid, 262.
54. Ibid, 257-260, 262.
35. Ibid, 260-263.

Montague’s point here is valid provided v/e are pre-
pared to accept his ana lj'’ sis of knov/ing into the act of
knowing and the thing known. Consider his treatment of the
idealistic proof:
The argument may be expressed as follows: Ideas
a re_ incapable _of_ex is tin£_a_2art_fr om_a __min d_.
Physical objects in so far as they are perceived
1 ._g:re ce rt ainly ’i deas’ . .All ghys-
in£_a^a rt_f ro m__a_mind
. . .
.The argument appears
irrefutable until we notice that the middle term
’idea' is used in the major premise to denote the
act or process of perceiving, while in the minor
premise it is used to denote the object of that
act, i.e. the thing or content that is perceived. 35
For Montague an idea as a state of consciousness which is
other than the act of perceiving and the thing perceived,
apparently does not exist, and consequently the above proof
is blatantly invalid for him. Similarly, in the case of
trueness, Montague’s analysis of judgment or belief into
o n
the act of asserting and the thing asserted, 0 rather than
into the act of asserting, the thing asserted, and that
£b£iii_£]li£2i the assertion is made, renders the ascription
of trueness to beliefs strictly incorrect. 00 Surely it is
36. Montague, Art. 1, 258. Of course, even idealists would
not accept this proof without the further assumption that
the unknown is non-existent.
37. Gf. supra, 112.
38. Montague defines belief as "...the attitude v/e take
toward any proposition that a^oears to be true or real...' 1
Montague, Art. 1, 255. And it must be remembered that for
Montague the propositions .constitute reality and unreality.
’ '
'
'
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not the act of asserting that is true or false, but the
thing asserted. And for Montague the thing asserted iss the
o qthing, whether it be real or unreal.
39. Gf. supra, 112.

Oriticism of Montague 1 s Theory
The most obvious objection to Montague's theory of the nature of
trueness concerns what he calls "the propositional aspect of reality".
As he himself admits, not only must every true proposition have "its con
4l
tradictory mate", but also there must be an infinite number of false
affirmative propositions corresponding to each true affirmative propo-
42
sition. For example, Mary is at the North Pole, if true, entails such
false propositions as Mary is in Ecuador, Mary is in New York, etc.,
ad infinitum . Furthermore, since trueness is identity, the trueness of
negative propositions demands the existence of negative facts. ,Ve have
45
already considered some of the difficulties in such a position. y
Montague expects his critics to admit that "the term 'unreal object
loses its queerness when its identity with 'false proposition' is once
..
44
understood". I, for one, do not regard the substitution of terms as
much of an improvement. A false proposition which is supposed to have
40. Of. Montague, Art. 1, 262. Also cf. supra,
41 . Montague, Art. 7 , 5^n.
42. Loc. cit.
4j. Supra, 39 ff.
44. ;.*ontague. Art. 7 , 54.
112 .
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being independently of its being asserted or entertained by any mind,
seems equally unintelligible with an unreal object.
Love joy says:
The ontological destitution of the unreal subsistents during
the time they remain unperceived is of a degree painful to
imagine. Surely it must be a significant moment for one of
these when it i3 lifted up into the realm of historical facts,
of actual presentations, and out from among it3 less fortunate
fellows, those merely possible hallucinations and illusions
which nobody has ever had or ever will have. °
Montague replies that:
. . .The only historical fact in the situation is the existence
of believings and imaginings and not at all the existence of
what was believed and imagined. °
Eut two remarks are pertinent here. In the first place, it seems to
me that some difference is made to the ontological status of a proposi-
tion when it is entertained in consciousness. In so far as finite exper-
ience is real, a proposition entertained in it would seem to participate
in that reality to some extent. This is especially true in the case of
false propositions. Quoting Love joy once more:
The difference between these two classes of 'unreal subsistents'
is not fairly comparable to the difference between objects upon
which a search-light falls and objects which, while equally real,
remain in the dark; it is in fact the entire difference between
merely an abstract, timeless, forever unfulfilled potentiality
and concrete, though it may be transitory, existence. If, then,
consciousness can, in the case of error, confer existence upon
the merely subsistent, it can
tion could be supposed to do.
^do more than a bare external rela-
45. Love joy. Art. 1, 419.
46. Montague, Art. 7, 51.
47. Love joy. Art. 1, 419.
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In the second place, Montague's metaphysical treatment of cogni-
tion as the existence of believings and imaginings is unsatisfactory. For
if the latter exist as historical events, then the presence to them of
objects, whether real or unreal, cannot be completely without historical
significance, in so far as cognition is monistic. But if it be objected
that it is only the judgment-content and not the act of judging that
merges with the object, we, in turn, object that the act of judging can-
48
not be separated existentially from its content. In so far as Montague
is merely distinguishing two aspects of judgment, we have no protest to
make. But when he proceeds to separate the two to such an extent that in
some cases the former aspect exists as an historical event while its con-
tent is completely untouched in its absolute unreality^? or status of an
unproposed false proposition, then it seems only fair to demand further
enlightenment on this metaphysical monstrosity, an act of judging which
exists independently of its content.
Montague's whole treatment of consciousness seems unsatisfactory.
He defines consciousness as "...the potential or implicative presence
of a thing at a space or time in which that thing is not actually pres-
ent ".5^ He goes on to say:
48. Sven Montague at times seems to admit this. Of. Montague, Art. 2, 246,
"The content of every judgment is in some sense present in the perspec-
tive, or context, or experience of the one who judges."
49. Montague repudiates degrees of reality; Montague, Art. 2, 250. Also
cf. Montague, Art. 1, 299.
50. Montague, Art. 1, 281. Italics omitted. Montague makes one or two
qualifications of this definition which are, however, irrelevant for our
purposes. Also cf. Montague, BU, 80.
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...What I, from within, would call nji sensations are neither
more nor less than what you, from without, would describe as
the forms of potential energy to which the kinetic energies
of neural stimuli would necessarily give rise in passing
through my brain. 61
If our knowledge of other persons necessarily reduces to a knowledge of
their bodies, there is something radically wrong with the doctrine of
trueness involved. But Montague admits that there are psychical events
and that they are "private and insulated from one another except in so
52far as they participate in the common physical order". He 3ays,
Every existent thing possesses two kinds of being, 'actual' and
'potential '... .Its potential being is private or internal, and
not capable of appearing externally .^5
How, then, with an epistemological monism such as Montague's, can we
make judgments regarding these non-physical aspects of other persons?
54True propositions exemplify them in so far as they are real,'" but in
view of Montague's epistemological monism these cannot be made into
judgment-contents so long as they are private. Such a position is di-
rectly contrary to common experience.
Another point is worth mentioning, viz., that Montague's doctrine
of trueness apparently cannot account for the trueness of judgments or
beliefs regarding unreal objects, such as Alice's adventures in ’,7onder-
51. Montague, Art. 5 > 129. Italics omitted.
52. Ibid, 155 .
55 . Montague, BU, 76-77 • Here it should be recalled that consciousness
is defined as potentiality. Of. supra, 118.
54. Of. suora, 112.
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land. Since trueness consists in identity with reality, and reality con-
sists in the space-time system of existent3 together with its presuppo-
sitions and implications, trueness could hardly pertain to the belief
that Alice met the Mad Hatter, unless this encounter were to be described
as an implication of the space-time system, which is surely too far-
fetched a position. Actually, however, we do ascribe trueness and false-
ness to such beliefs, in a perfectly intelligible sense.

CHAPTER IV
TRUENSSS AS COHERENCE
Francis H. Bradle;
Like Josiah Royce, Francis H. Bradley does not entirely eschew the
notion of correspondence, but attempts to find a place fot it in his doc-
trine of trueness.- He calls attention to four aspects of the truth-situ-
ation which involves a type of corresoondence or conformity. In the first
place that individual must suppress all irrelevant "ideas, wishes and
fancies", and "hence in a sense the individuals can have something in
common, correspondence to which is essential for truth" . ^ In the second
place, the individual must wilfully "turn ideas into existence" but must
subject his ideas to the object, and thus make them conform to it.^ In
the third place, reflection is presented with a datum of sensible quali-
ties and with a course of events which it is powerless to make, that is,
„ h
wxth "more or less brute conjunctions of fact". In the fourth place.
1. Bradley, STR, 76-77, 118-120.
.
-
.
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language must seek "to copy perceived facts, and... to convey them faith-
fully".^ In the above senses, then, trueness may be said to consist in
correspondence, and "it is right and proper as against one-sided theories
to insist on this correspondence". 0
Nevertheless, says, Bradley, "...Such a way of speaking is not per-
missable in the end","'
7
For in the first place, while true ideas must
copy objects, these objects themselves show the work of the mind, and
hence there are no independent objects to which our ideas must corres-
pond. 0 In other words, "the merely given facts are...the imaginary crea-
tures of false theory ".9 Or even if there were a residue which was inde-
pendent of the work of the mind, it would be so small as to be called in-
significant.* 0 In the second place, Bradley says.
Disjunctive, negative, and hypothetical judgements cannot be
taken as all false, and yet cannot fairly be made to conform
to our one type of truth. And in general the moment we leave
perceived facts and seek explanation—which after all is implied
in the desire for truth—we find that we are moving away from
the given....And we are driven to admit that, at least when we
pass from individual truths, our truth no longer represents fact
but merely 'holds' or 'is valid'.H
To sum up:
5. Bradley, ETR, 119*
6. Ibid, 120.
7. Loc. cit.
8. Ibid, 108. That is, as Professor Brightman has suggested, the corres-
pondence is between ideas, not between ideas and objects external to our
ideas
.
9. Loc. cit.
10. Loc. cit.
11. Ibid, 109.
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. . .Since truth goe3 beyond the given, it is impossible to under-
stand how truth can copy reality. For, before the reality has
been reached, there is no original to copy, and, when the reality
has been attained, that attainment already is truth, and you
cannot gain truth by transcribing it.l^
H. Wildon Carr characterizes this position as holding that things-
in-themselves are unknowable, and that consequently trueness cannot con-
sist in a relation between them and our ideas but can only be a quality
of correct ideas as such.^ Bradley believes it is sheer nonsense to a- ~
14
ssert "a reality falling outside knowledge”, i.e., an unknown reality.
But inasmuch as knowledge is creative, trueness cannot be an external
relation pertaining to knowledge as such, but must rather be an internal
property of the whole of knowledge, viz., the property of system.
The notion of system involves the two characteristics of coherence
and comprehensiveness . That is, all possible material must be included^ 0
and it must all fit together. 17 To the objection that a world of fancy
could form an even more perfect system than the world of actuality, Brad-
ley replies.
The idea of system demands the inclusion of all possible mater-
ial.... But this means that you cannot confine yourself within
the limits of this or that fancied world, as suits your pleasure
12. Bradley, 2TR, 109.
15. Carr, FT, 27-
14. Bradley, AR, ll4, l^l
.
15. Bradley, STR, 225
.
16. Ibid, 214.
17* Bradley, AR, 159-1^0.
=.
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or private convenience ... .The fancied arrangement not only has
opposed to it the world of perception. It also has against it
any opposite arrangement and any contrary fact which I can fancy.
And, so far as I can judge, these contrary fancies will balance
the first. Nothing, therefore will be left to outweigh the
world as perceived ... 1°
In speaking of coherence, Bradley intends that it shall always be under-
stood in conjunction with comprehensiveness. That is, it *..ay be defined
as the greatest degree of consistenty possible to the whole of knowl-
edge.^ "Everything which appears must be predicated of Reality, but it
must not be predicated in such a way as to make Reality contradict it-
self'". The apparent conflict between comprehensiveness and non-contra-
diction is to be resolved by an appeal to the doctrine of degree of truth
and reality.^
Bradley says, "An idea is true , theoretically because, and so far as,
PPit takes its place in, and contributes to, the organism of knowledge".
Again,
...To be more or less true, and to be more or less real, i3 to
be separated by an interval, smaller or greater, from all-in-
clusiveness or self-consistency. Of two given appearances the
one more wide, or more harmonious, is more real. It approaches
nearer to a single, all-containing, individuality ... .The truth
and the fact, which, to be converted into the Absolute, would
require less re-arrangement and addition is more real and truer.
18. Eradley, STR, 214-215.
19. Ibid, 202.
20. Ibid, 224.
21. Ibid, 225-226.
22. Ibid, 69.
25. Eradley, AR, J6h.

For Bradley the view that anything is absolutely true or absolutely
false rests on the erroneous position that "separate facts and truths
24
self-contained and possess independent reality. He maintains
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are
The more the conditions of your assertion are included in your
assertion, so much the truer and less erroneous does your judg-
ment become. But can the conditions of the judgment ever be
made complete and comprised within the judgement? In my opinion
this is impossible. And hence with every truth there still re-
mains some truth, however little, in its opposite. In other
words, you never can pass wholly beyond degree.
Thus, the erroneousness of contradiction is really only a case of defic-
iency. That is, the condition which would serve to reconcile the contra-
ries in a higher unity has been suppressed. °
In the same v/ay, error is partial truth. It is "false only because
partial and left incomplete" .-7 The Absolute possesses all the qualities
and all the arrangements of qualities which we choose to confer upon it.
Bradley says:
The only mistake lies in our failure to give also the comple-
ment. The reality owns the discordance and the discrepancy of
false appearance; but it possesses also much else in which this
jarring character is swallowed up and is dissolved in fuller
harmony . 2 c
But Eradley has thought to show in Appearance and Reality that everything
with which we come in contact is appearance. That is, taken as it stands.
24. Bradley, STR, 265.
25. Ibid, 252-255
.
26. Ibid, 272.
27. Bradley, AR, 192.
28. Loc. cit.
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it proves inconsistent with itself and consequently cannot be true of the
real. 29 The reason for this self-discrepancy of phenomena is that quali-
ties taken without relations are unintelligible, but taken with relations
they are equally unintelligible. 5° Similarly, relations are unintellig-
ible when taken either in conjunction with, or not in conjunction with,
qualities. 51 In so far as our experience is relational, it is not true. 52
That is,
a relational way of thought—any one that moves by the machinery
of terms and relations—must give appearance, and not truth. It
is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical compromise, most nec-
essary, but in the end most indefensible .95
Since truth is wthe predication of such content as, when predicated,
is harmonious, and removes inconsistency and with it unrest" ,5^ our cus-
tomary mode of thinking will obviously not achieve ultimate trueness. But
possibly an abandonment of intellect in the interests of an appeal to
experience might have fruitful results. Bradley's answer to this is as
follows
:
It is mere superstition to suppose that an appeal to experience
can prove reality. That I find something in existence in the
29. Bradley, AR, ll4.
50. Ibid, 50.
51. Ibid, 52. This argument, of course, is largely based on the doctrine
of internal relations.
52. Ibid, 54.
55* Ibid, This is strongly suggestive of Eergson.
54. Ibid, 165.
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world or in my self, shows that this something exists, and it
cannot show more.-^
For Bradley everything is experience . Consequently, trueness is not to
be found in any distinctive sense in experience.
The answer to the problem of trueness can only be found, for Brad-
ley, in the notion of degree. Appearances cannot be legislated out of all
claim to reality. Bradley says of appearance,
. . .To deny its existence or to divorce it from reality is out
of the question. Fot it has a positive character which is in-
dubitable fact, and, however much this fact may be pronounced
appearance, it can have no place in which to live except re-
ality. And reality, set on one side and apart from all appear-
ance, would assuredly be nothing. Hence what is certain is that,
in some way, these inseparables are joined. 5/
Since rea lity excludes discord, nthe bewildering mass of phenomenal di-
versity must somehow be at unity and self-consistent ... "58 Just how this
is accomplished, Bradley is not prepared to say. 59 What is certain is
that appearances admit the distinction of more and less . ^8 And since
truth itself is appearance,^ trueness will likewise admit of degrees.
But why does Bradley describe truth as appearance? Because truth is
35. Bradley AR, 206 . Bradley likewise objects to an appeal to intuition.
Bradley, STR, 33O.
56 . Bradley, AR, 457, l44, 190.
57.
58 .
59.
4o.
Ibid, 152 .
Ibid, l4o.
Ibid, 457.
Ibid, 58O. Also cf.
, 560 .
Bradley, aR, 487*
4l . Ibid
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the object of thinking,^ and all thinking is in terms of ideas. 45 That
is, trueness does not obtain in the absence of ideas. But ideas, by
definition, are "any part of the content of a fact so far as that works
out of immediate unity with its existence" Consequently, in truth v/e
have a case of content separated from its existence, "a 'what' loosened
from its 'that'", which, for Bradley consitutes appearance.'0 "...The
aim of truth is to qualify existence ideally". ^7 Yet, if truth ever
fully achieved its aim, we would no longer have truth—we would have re-
ality. In the nature of the case, an absolute degree of trueness can
never be reached. For if truth were to become absolutely complete and
ho
harmonious, it' would be reality, not truth. ° Bradley says:
...There is... in all truth the separation of idea and being,
the loosening of that which an idea itself is from that which
it means and stands for. And in my opinion this breach is at
once essential and fatal to truth. For truth is not perfect
until this sundering of aspects is somehow made good, until
that which in fact is, forms a cosistent whole with that which
it stands for and means. In other words truth demands at once
the essential difference and identity of ideas and reality.
It demands .. .that the idea should in the end be reconstituted
by the subject of the judgement and should in no sense what-
ever fall outside. But the possibility of such an implication
42. Bradley, AR, 165.
4^. Ibid, I65.
44. Ibid, 405.
45. Ibid, I65 .
46. Ibid, 187.
47. Ibid, 165.
48. Bradley, ETR, 251-252. Also cf. ibid, ll4, 551*
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involves... a passage beyond mere truth to actual reality, a
nassage in which truth would have completed itself beyond it-
‘
3elf.?9
Thus we may say that for Bradley trueness consists in system, in
degree of consistency and comprehensiveness, i.e., in degree of coher-
ence.^ But only knowledge possesses trueness and, so long as this in
knowledge, it can never possess absolute trueness but only degrees of it.
Absolute trueness could only be achieved by the transcending of knowl-
edge, but then it would no longer be the trueness of coherence but would
be identity with reality.
Bradley asserts that "thought and fact are not the same".''* Never-
theless, in view of the constitutive nature of mind,52 the thought can-
not be adequate to the fact until they are the same. But if such an iden-
tity is achieved, "thought ends in a reality which swallows up its char-
acter"
For Eradley, what we know and what is real are co-extensive, 0^ but
also "to divide truth from knowledge seems impossible". 00 Consequently
49. Bradley, STR, 251.
50. We shall henceforward employ the term "coherence" as comprising the
two aspects of consistency and comprehensiveness.
51. Bradley, AR, 172.
52. Of. supra, 122.
55 . Bradley, AR, 172-175* Also cf. ibid, 5^5*
54. Ibid, 516.
55. Bradley, STR, H 5 .
t
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truth and reality must be the same. To those who object to this latter
statement, Bradley replies.
Well, if so, I presume that there is a difference between them.
And this difference, I understand, is not to be contained in the
truth. But if this ig^so, then clearly to my mind the truth must
so far be defective.'" 0
He points out that if truth, knowledge, and reality are taken as sepa-
rate, we cannot get them together again. He says,
The moment that truth, knowledge, and reality are taken as sepa-
rate, there is no way in which consistently they can come or be
forced together. And since on the other hand truth implies that
they are somehow united, we have forthwith on our hands a contra-
diction in principle. 5;
Yet how can they be conceived as together, in view of the separative
aspect of knowing, i.e., its loosening of the what from the that? Erad-
ley 1 s answer is that the Absolute overcomes this dichotomy by means of
intuition. He says,
Mature on the one side must be actual, and if so, must be sens-
ible; but, upon the ot er hand, it seems in part to be merely
intelligible. This is the problem, and the solution is that
what for us is intelligible only, is more for the absolute.
There somehow, we do not know how, what we think is perceived.
Everything there is merged and re-absorbed in an experience
intuitive, at once and in itself, of both ideas and facts. 56
Consequently, in the Absolute there is neither mere thought as such nor
mere existence. "Each is merged in a higher and all -containing Reality "v?
56. Bradley, STR, 113.
57. Ibid, 110.
58. Bradley, AR, 278.
59. Ibid, 31 6. However, "everything in the Absolute still is that which
it is for itself. Its private character remains, and is but neutralized
by complement and addition". Bradley, AR, 511.
** . -
,
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We can now understand Bradley's definition of reality as "sentient ex-
perience ",°^ and his statement that "it is only in feeling that I can di-
rectly encounter Reality?.^
In sum, having recognized a certain validity in the correspondence-
notion of trueness, Bradley nevertheless proceeded to point out the need
for going beyond it to the coherence-doctrine of trueness. Eut there he
seemed unable to remain, even though he so desired. For the absolute de-
gree of trueness required by the ultimate identity of knowledge and re-
ality proved to be inherently contradictory in terms of thought. ^ Ulti-
mately it proved to be possible only for intuition in its monistic merg-
ing of thought and thing, the trueness of identity at a different level
from that of discursive thought.
60. Bradley, AR, 127.
61. Ibid, 526.
62. Of. for example Bradley, AR, 5^5* Also cf. supra, 128.
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Harold H. Joachim
Harold H. Joachim begins his study of the nature of trueness with
an analysis of the correspondence-theory .1 He points out that the corres
pondence in question cannot be between ultimately simple elements ful-
pfilling identical functions in the related wholes, for simple entities
"cannot as such
,
and considered as such
,
be related to anything". 5 The
only alternative seems to be to regard the correspondence as identity of
structure between two wholes, the identity consisting in "the explica-
tion of the same idea or purpose" ’and involving a similarity of func-
tion between distinctive parts of each whole. Trueness will be greater
in so far as this correspondence is more exactly achieved.^
For Joachim such trueness can obtain only in so far as it exists
for mind. 7 accordingly, the correspondence in which trueness consists.
1. Joachim, NT, Gh. I.
2. Ibid, 10-11.
5- Ibid, 11.
4. Ibid, 12.
5. Loc
.
cit
.
6. Loc cit
7. Ibid, 15-14.
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must either be between a judgment and its object, or between two factors,
one of which is regarded by a mind as representing the other.
^
Considering the latter alternative first, we find on examination
that one factor will be a more or less accurate representation of the
other according to the interpretation of the spectator.'’’ For example,
even a photograph can fail to be "true” of its original, because such
trueness depends on the insight of the photographer rather than on a
purely objective similarity between the two factors. Correspondence m$.y
be present and trueness absent. Therefore, says Joachim,
the importance of 'correspondence 1
,
as the constitutive con-
dition of truth, sinks more and more into the background.
Another condition emerges as the primary determinant not only
of the degree of truth, but of its very being. For truth is
seen to depend on the nature of the idea expressing itself as
the inner structure of the corresponding wholes, rather than
on the 'correspondence' of the two expressions, And of course
we could not rest here. For we cannot assume that the idea in
question possesses its 'significance' (its fullness of mean-
ing, or its power to constitute truth) alone and in its own
right. It in turn derives its significance from a larger sig-
nificant system to which it contributes.-*-^
But now let us consider the correspondence obtaining between a true
judgment and its object. The correspondence may be between my judgment
and the "facts" or accepted views, or between an accepted judgment and
reality. In the first case, both factors are before ny mind. That is,
the judgment is present as a "distinctively conceived synthesis of
8. Joachim, NT, 12-15
.
9. Ibid, 16.
10. Loc . cit.
11.
Ibid, 22.
.-
,
,
'
-
1 2
Thing and Property, Elements and Relation, Cause and Effect, &c"; and
the other factor is present "in the form perhaps of imperfectly articu-
late, vague, and more or less unmediated feeling—as the common environ
ment which is 'the world' of myself and ny fellows". ^5 For Joachim we
identify ourselves both with our own private judgments and with the uni
versal content which expresses itself in other selves. In judgment we
hold the personal or private nature of the one factor over against the
14impersonal, public nature of the other and compare the two factors. Re
garding the correspondence of these two factors, Joachim says:
Now if there is no difference in the two factors, there clearly
is no 'correspondence'—there is identity. But if there is a
difference, e.g. what we loosely called a 'material' difference,
how can there also be identity of structure? For 'structure' is
a name for scheme of inner relations, and relations which really
relate different elements cannot be identical, i.e. cannot be
identical if the differences of the elements are differences of
them qua related ... .Whatever may be the case with other 'wholes',
at least a felt-whole, or again a thought-whole, are not elements
together with a scheme of relations. -*-5
But if the nature of the structure cannot thus be separated from the
wholes, the qualitative identity of the structures, required by the
correspondence-theory
,
cannot be achieved so long as the wholes differ.
In the second case, that of correspondence between a scientific
12. Joachim, NT, 25.
15. Ibid, 22-25. It is interesting that for Joachim the judgment is the
thought-whole and its object the felt-whole.
14. Ibid, 25.
15. Ibid, 25-26. The argument that the absence of qualitative diversity
involves identity, is Leibniz's principle of the Identity of Indiscer-
nibles
.
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theory, or an accepted judgment, and reality, Joachim asserts that the
reality referred to, reduces either to a system of' judgments (each one of
which is true by virtue of its coherence with the rest) or to "confused
unmediated experience", the articulate expression of which is a system
of judgments." 1^ If the former, the trueness of coherence is prior to the
trueness of correspondence.^ jf the latter, we are back where we were be-
fore, faced with the inadequacy of the notion of correspondence as
applied to felt-wholes and thought-wholes . 10
For Joachim, as for Bradley, the essential nature of trueness con-
sists in "systematic coherence" Joachim defines systematic coherence
as "conceivability
",
but, of course, he is employing the term in a
special sense. He explains:
To 'conceive' means for us to think out clearly and logically,
to hold many elements together in a connexion necessitated by
their several contents. And to be 'conceivable' means to be a
'significant whole', or a whole possessed of meaning for
thought. A 'significant whole' is such that all its constitu-
ent elements reciprocally involve one another, or reciprocally
determine one another's being as contributory features in a
single concrete meaning.
For Joachim a significant whole can only be "an organized individual ex-
PPperience, self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled". Consequently, truth is
16. Joachim, NT,
17. Loc
.
cit
.
18. Ibid, 28-29.
19. Ibid, 66-68
.
20. Ibid, 66.
21. Loc cit .
22. Ibidj 76.
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a living, moving, concrete whole .
^
Naturally, the question arises, Is this trueness the kind that per-
tains to human knowledge in so far as it is knowledge, or is it the true-
24
ness of an ideal knowledge, unattainable by finite minds? ' Joachin admits
that inasmuch as trueness is the essential characteristic of an absolute-
ly self-contained significant whole,^ from the standpoint of human knowl-
edge it is only an ideal, "an Ideal which can never as such , or in its
completeness, be actual as human experience”. ° The failure of the ideal
to be actual in finite experience, however, does not, according to Joa-
chim weaken the solidity, substantiality, and reality of the ideal so
much as of the finite experiences. For the latter are "rooted in the
Ideal. They share its actuality, and draw from it whatever being and con-
ceivability they possess” Since finite beings share in the ideal ex-
perience which alone possesses complete trueness, finite knowledge is
found to exhibit degrees of trueness.
In an effort to refute the view that some judgments are absolutely
true, Joachim selects for analysis the type of judgment which claims to
25. Joachim, NT, 77*
24. Ibid, 78.
25. Log. cit.
26. Ibid, 79.
27. Ibid, 82
28. Ibid, 84. Strictly, then human knowledge should not be said to corres-
pond to the ideal, but to actualize.it.
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be universal and necessary, e.g., that 5^ equals 9» The question is. Do
such judgments, "taken with just the meaning they bear in isolation",
29possess absolute trueness? ^
The answer to the question can be found in the nature of judgment,
according to Joachim. For he repudiates the analysis of judgment into "a
non-mental proposition and a psychical awareness" ,^w and asserts that
judgment involves "the inseparable unity of thinking and the object
thought". 51 But in so far as such a unity obtains, "the precise nature
of its affirmation, its precise meaning" will be "largely determined by
the conditions under which it is made".52 Joachim says:
The judgment occurs in a particular context, it issues from a
special background, it concentrates in itself various kinds and
degrees of knowledge. Its meaning is aoloured by all these de-
termining factors, which together (and with others) constitute
the medium of any piece of concrete thinking. 55
The judgment of the student may be linguistically identical with the
judgment of the master, but the meaning of the former is thin and im-
poverished compared with the richness conferred by as whole background of
relevant, systematized knowledge .5^ Thus, the judgment 5^ equals nine,
possesses much less meaning when made by a child learning the multiplica-
29. Joachim, NT, 90.
50. Ibid, 91.
51. Ibid, 92.
52. Loc. .cit.
55* Loc. cit.
54. Loc. cit.
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tion table than when made by an advanced mathematician. The relevant
background, or lack of it, is to some extent constitutive as well as
regulative of judgment.^
Lest such an argument be condemned as too psychological in charac-
ter. Joachim attempts to strengthen his position with a supplementary
argument of a somewhat different character.36 He points out that the
logical necessity involved in the type of judgment we have been discuss-
ing, viz., universal and necessary judgments of science, requires a
common ground of concrete identity between the two distinct factors which
are to be mutually implicative, 97 for logical necessity cannot operate
between distinct elements except in so far as they are rooted in a common
ground. And such a common basis, in the end, will prove to be the whole
38
system of scientific reasoning. Joachim then draws the following con-
clusion:
Eut if no universal judgment of science can be isolated from
its scientific context without losing its determinate meaning,
neither can it, in that isolation, be 'absolutely true'. For
a judgment which is 'absolutely true' must presumably persist
as such even in the ideally complete system which v/ould ex-
press the whole truth....Yet in such a body of knowledge the
judgment, as isolated and as possessed of indeterminate mean-
ing, no longer finds a place....The truth, which the isolated
judgement conveyed to some extent, but neither wholly nor
purely, is more nearly expressed by it in its context: but 'it
in its context' is not a single judgement, but a system of
35. Joachim, NT, 93*
36 . Ibid, 95.
37. Loc. cit.
38. Ibid, 96
.•-
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59judgments . ^
Thus, although 2 plus 2 equals 4 unalterably, "the significance of this
judgment
—
and therefore its truth ""'0 depends upon the number system,^
and "ultimately upon the character of the Universe within which the uu~
ii 42
merical system ia a necessary subject of human thought".
Having thus disposed of "universal" judgments of science, Joachim's
next concern is judgments of fact, i.e., historical, descriptive, and
perceptive judgments.^ As an instance of an historical judgment he cites
Caesar' s crossing of the Rubicon. Of this he says:
We can be sure, at any rate, that the actual happening contains
no bare crossing of a stream by a man in the abstract as a
solid grain of fact, separable from a complicated setting which
particularizes it. '
If this mere kernel of meaning is all that your judgment affirms, it is
wholly false, of course. (Every judgment has some trueness,) But neither
45is it wholly true. And its trueness is to the trueness of the complete
biography or history as the trueness of the first rough hypothesis is to
46the trueness of the established scientific theory.
59. Joachim, NT, 99.
40. Ibid, 105.
41. As a matter of fact, 2 plus 2 does not equal 4 with some bases. The
adoption of the base 10 is explained as a result of man's having 10 fingers
42. Joachim, NT, IO5 .
45. Ibid, 104.
44. Ibid, 107.
45. Ibid, 108.
46. Loc. cit.

Similarly, judgments of perception and of description possess only
partial trueness. Joachim says of the judgment of perception:
...It is a totally inadequate vehicle for the expression of
knowledge which has any claim to be exact.... The more adequate
knowledge of 'this tree' is not an accumulation of judgements
of perception, but a revolution in which 'this tree' is swept
away and determinate connexions between determinate universal
concepts are substituted. '
Thus Joachim has thought to show that the trueness of any judgment what-
soever "is really the character of a meaning which requires for its ade-
4pquate expression a system of judgements" . "
nevertheless, he confesses that there is an important flaw in his
argument in that finite experiences have been treated in independence of
49
the ideal experience. That is, our systems of judgment are qualifica-
tions "referred to the reality, and not the substantial reality itself in
50its self-fulfilment". Joachim says:
An articulate 'whole of 'meaning' in this sense of the term can-
not be 'true' in the manner demanded by the coherence-notion.
For it refers beyond itself, and cannot, by the very conception
of it, be self-sustaining or self-complete. Its 'coherence'
would be a mere formal consistency, which would leave the solid
reality out.“> ^
So long as a duality is maintained between the knowing mind and the
reality known, "some form of the correspondence-notion is the only
47. Joachim, NT, 110.
48. Ibid, 115.
49. Ibid, 118.
50. Ibid, 117 . This is the same difficulty encountered by Bradley.
51. Loc. cit.
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possible theory of truth”.'"
Joachim holds traditional logic responsible for this flaw in his
argument. He asserts that logic must either be drastically revised or
recognized as being largely false, for
metaphysics cannot acquiesce in the severance of finite think-
ers from one another, nor in the severance of the judging mind
from that about which it judges.
However, since human knowledge is part of absolute knowledge, and conse-
55
quently must possess a degree of trueness, it is up to metaphysics to
show
the relative independence of subject and object as essential
to the very nature of the ideal, thereby furnishing the rela-
tive justification of the correspondence-notion of truth. 00
But before offering this promised relative justification of the
correspondence-theory, Joachim contents himself with indicating the in-
adequacy of the theory with regard to the problem of error. For example,
to what does the judgment, The diagonal of the square is commensurate
with the side, correspond? For the correspondence-theory the judgment is
false because there is nothing to which it corresponds. Error, then is
"thinking the thing which is not”,^ i.e., the thinking of nothing. But,
52. Joachim, NT, 119.
55.
Ibid, 119-120.
54. Ibid, 119.
55. Ibid, 120-121.
56. Ibid, 121.
57.
Ibid, 127.
.£ * „ j
*
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says Joachim, "to 'think of nothing 1 look3 uncomfortably like 'thinking
nothing', i.e. not thinking". However, perhaps it is not quite fair to
fail to distinguish between not thinking and thinking of a reality which
is negative.^ But even if negative realities be allowed, which seems
unduly generous, a true negative judgment and a false affirmative judg-
ment will refer to the same real counterpart. Thus, the judgments. The
diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side, ana. The di-
agonal of the square is commensurate with the side, will both refer to
the negative reality. Diagonal of square incommensurate with side. Their
difference will consist in discordant thinking in the case of the latter.
But what is to be the real counterpart of this discordant thinking in
its entirety? Evidently it can only be nothing.
One way out of the difficulty might be to regard error as a case of
displacement among the elements synthesized in the judgment. That is.
The false judgement would be a one-of-many having a real one-
of-many as its counterpart, but having its 'many' displaced.
The inner detail in the judgment would be arranged in the wrong
order. We should think in the form BADC, where the real counter-
part was
But such a defense is too vague to satisfy Joachim. He points out that
"correspondence" must be more precisely defined if the arrangement of
/p
corresponding elements i3 to affect their correspondence as such. ^ Of
58. Joachim, NT, 127.
59. Loc. cit.
60. Ibid, 128.
61. Ibid, 152
62. Ibid, I52-I55.
--
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course, if the elements on each side were mutually determinative in a
specific order, then the wholes would have to correspond as such rather
than as cut up into elements. In this case BaDC and would each be
genuine, though quite different, wholes. But then, says Joachim,
in what intelligible sense could the judgment possess counter-
parts of its elements in the real? The A in the judgment would
not have the cs. in the real as its counterpart; for the 'real^
o\ is essentially a constituent o f and of this alone. ^3
Although Joachim is not prepared to admit the existence of negative
6b
realities, he points out that in one sense reality is undoubtedly nega-
tive. "For in any genuine whole the constituents cohere in and through
/pr
their differences . And because ideal experience (Joachim's term for
the Absolute^) is a dynamic, moving, living, self-fulfilling process and
not a static, quiescent whole,
a
negative element is even more necess-
ary than it would be in the latter case . 00 Otherwise, says Joachim, the
whole would be bare identity— "an identity which, qua not distinguished
from anything, would itself have no positive character".^
65
.
Joachim, NT, 155* Joachim admits that he is here assuming that a
genuine whole— "a whole of the kind in question—cannot consist of 'in-
dependent' elements combined by 'external' relations". Ibid, ljj-ljbn.
64. Of. ibid, 154-57.
65. Ibid, 157.
66. Ibid, 84n.
67. Ibid, 122.
68. Ibid, 122n.
69 . Ibid, 158.
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Consequently, we are now prepared to offer the desired relative
justification of the correspondence-theory ^ for the otherness of sys-
tematic knowledge and its real counterpart is
as vital a characteristic of 'the reality 1 as their positive
natures; for their distinction from one another, or what they
determinately are not
,
is but one side of what they positively
are
Error, however, cannot be resolved into a mere "contrasting element
within the developing system of knowledge" It is genuinely discordant
for it involves the "blustering self-confident assertion" of its ade-
quacy. 75 it can be resolved, "if at all, only within the self-fulfilment
of the one significant whole*.
Inasmuch as trueness, for Joachim, is "the character of the one
significant whole", 1 ^ he confesses that he is inescapably faced with the
problem of reconciling the trueness of the lesser forms of experience
with the trueness of the ideal whole. 76 He says that an adequate theory
of trueness as coherence must not only give an intelligible account of
ultimate coherence, but must also indicate the place of the coherence of
lesser forms of experience in the self-revelation of the ultimate, co-
70. Of. supra, 141.
71. Joachim, NT, I 58 .
72. Ibid, 147.
75. Ibid, l4j.
74. ibid, 147.
75. Ibid, 169.
76. Ibid, 170.
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herent experience. Joachim says:
It must show e.g. how the complete coherence, which is perfect
truth, involves as a necessary 'moment' in its self-mainte-
nance the self-assertion of the finite modal minds: a self-
assertion, which in its extreme form is Error. It must recon-
cile this self-assertive independence with the modal depend-
ence of the self-asserting minds; and the reconciliation must
be clearly manifest as an essential moment in the coherence,
which is the life of the one significant whole.'"
But Joachim admits that in the nature of the case he cannot do this. For
nothing short of "complete truth manifest to itself" could meet these
demands. 79 Sven the appeal to the need for otherness in ideal experience
as justifying the relative independence of subject and object and con-
qa
sequent ly the tentative use of the correspondence-notion,
0
requires fur
ther explanation. Joachim confesses that he cannot show how this self-
O-i
diremption both emerges and is overcome in the One. Indeed, even the
theory of the nature of truth "must itself be 'about 1 truth as its
Other
Joachim is forced to the conclusion that:
the coherence-notion of truth on its own admission can never
rise above the level of knowledge which at the best attains
to the 'truth' of correspondence. ^5
77* Joachim, NT, 170.
78. Ibid, 170-171.
79. Ibid, 171.
80. Of. supra, 141.
81. Joachim, NT, 172.
82. Ibid, 17^-175.
85. Ibid, 175.
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At best the theory can possess only a degree of trueness, which leads us
to hope that it is " symptomatic " of perfect truth." For perfect truth
involves the creation of "an inner Otherness or duality, which yet is
continuously subdued to unity" . Absolute truth is "the complete self-
revelation" of the one significant whole.86 in ideal truth, knowledge
and reality are not separated, but merge in the one complete meaning.^
Hence we see that the trueness of coherence, when fully realized, re-
quires the trueness of identity, the self-revelation of the Absolute.
84. Joachim, NT, 175.
85. Loc. cit.
86. Ibid, 178.
87. Ibid, 116-117.
-
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Criticism of Coherence as Theory of Trueness
Harold Joachim's own admission of the failings of the coherence-
doctrine of trueness constitutes the most effective criticism both of hi 3
own doctrine and of Eradley'3. Bradley's attempt to overcome the essen-
tial opposition in knowing, and thus get rid of correspondence, does not
seem more successful than Joachim's admittedly unsuccessful ones. More-
over, Joachim's insistence that genuine error involves a stubbornly self-
assertive element th^t cannot be explained as mere ignorance or defic-
iency of knowledge ^ is a strong argument against Bradley's position that
error is false "only because partial and left incomplete"
Joachim's further assertion that the genuinely finite as such must
be contained in the Absolute and yet cannot be contained in the Absolute^
indicates a real difficulty that Bradley has not satisfactorily met. On
a single page of his Appearance and Real ity^ Bradley says, "Everything
in the Absolute still is that which it is for itself. Its private char-
1. Of. supra, 144.
2. Bradley, AR, 192. Of. supra, 125.
5* Of. his treatment of Spinoza's modes and their relation to the infi
nite substance, Joachim, NT, 15^-162.
4. Bradley, AR, 511.
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acter remains, and is but neutralized by complement and addition 11 , and
also, "...So taken together, appearances, as such, cease". To my mind
this is a contradiction. Either appearances as such are contained in the
Absolute or they are not contained in the Absolute. If they are so modi-
fied as no longer to be appearances, in what sense are they contained in
the Absolute? This is a point on which Bradley is very unclear, and he at
times admits that we do not know how this reconciliation of appearances
5
and reality is accomplished.
Bradley's contention that the constitutive action of mind lessens
the value of the correspondence-notion of trueness, is I believe, a valid
point. ^ But, with his habitual disdain for quantitative distinctions,
Bradley does not carefully consider whether the creative aspect of know-
ing is a purely individual matter or not. That is, if each individual
mind creates its own object, the existence of a common world becomes a
problem. But if it is mind as 3uch that creates, then individual ground-
ing that would demand something more dualistic than consistency and com-
prehensiveness; that is, it might be called a coherence among minds.
5. Bradley, AR, 4-57. In this connection cf. Joachim's analysis of the
status of selves in the Ideal Experience, Joachim, ITT, 119, 170-171* and
cf. Bradley's characterization of the Absolute as super-personal, Brad-
ley, AR, 551.
6. Unless, of course, some such doctrine as Royce's be offered.
7 • It is true that Bradley speaks of correspondence as' necessary for the
relation of individual minds to the something they have in com. on. But
this is mere lip-3ervice, for he proceeds to disregard it. Cf. supra,
122
.
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Eradley is far too prone to neglect the trueness of finite knowledge in
the interests of the trueness of more and more perfect knowledge.
Eut the trueness of perfect knowledge is such that it can never be
realized without self-annihilation. Ultimately trueness is identity in
the Absolute. Hence it would seem that for Eradley finite knowledge is
true in so far as it approximates perfect knowledge. Eut perfect knowl-
edge does not exist. It is merely an ideal. In the last analysis true-
ness is intuitive identity. Eut since perfect knowledge is only an ideal
we wonder why Bradley did not call coherence the criterion, only, of
truth, rather than the trueness of an ultimately self-contradictory some-
thing. The answer seems to lie in his identification of truth an knowl-
edge. That trueness cannot be separated from knowledge, actual or poten-
tial, we are prepared to admit. But that truth cannot be 30 separated is
refuted by Bradley's own doctrine, for we find him maintaining that re-
ality is nothing but sentient experience, transcending the merely intell-
igible and discursive, i.e., transcending knowledge, ^nd when we recall
that reality and truth are the same for Bradley (a position which, in it-
self, involves the trueness of identity), we see that even for Bradley
truth does transcend knowledge.
This confusion in Bradley's thought, which I think is largely due
to his failure to distinguish the trueness of knowledge from the trueness
of ideal Truth (for degrees of trueness of knowledge should be satis-
factory for knowledge, and only Truth demand absolute trueness^1 ), is well
8. Of. supra, 129.
-,
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expressed by John Dewey:
In just what sense, common, yet different, truth is (l) that to
which ideas as ideas lay claim and yat is (2) Reality which as
reality is the criterion of truth of ideas, and yet again is
(5) a Reality, which completely annuls and transcends all ref-
ence to ideas, is not in the least clear to me: nor, till
better informed, shall I believe it is clear to any one.^
In sum, what is to be the trueness of truth, for Bradley? If it is
only the coherence of discursive judgments, then reality escapes us. But
if it is to be the identity of the absolute sentient experience, then it
might reasonably be expected to obtain in some degree in finite spheres
in so far as these share in the Absolute. But what then of the trueness
of finite judgments as finite? This would most reasonably consist in
some type of correspondence^ with reality or ideal truth; and coherence,
in view of the organic nature of the absolute experience, would consti-
tute the criterion. However, it is very probable that Bradley would re-
ject such a solution on the ground that it ignores the problem of meaning.
But since this is a problem which is equally relevant to Joachim, we
shall consider it a bit later.
Another controversial issue concerns the trueness of judgments re-
lating to time. Bradley admits that his view of the Absolute is unten-
able if time be real.^ In his Principles of Logic he says.
Our knowledge has, without doubt, always its date in existence,
9. Dewey, Art. 1,
10. Of. Joachim on this point.
11. Bradley, AR, 216.
,
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can come and go, can begin and can cease to exist; but these
expressions, when you pass from knowledge to truth itself,
become really senseless
.
Eut that judgments relating to time must become ’’senseless" constitutes
a weakness in the theory of trueness concerned. For sui}Jey such a judg-
ment must possess some degree of trueness, especially when we recall that
for Bradley all judgments are partially true.
Turning to Joachim, we note that for him finite experience is sec-
ondary to ideal experience.^ 5 Just as Bradley repudiated an appeal to
finite experience as proving the reality of anything,^ so Joachim re-
jects finite experience as an unshakeable datum.^ But an interesting
paradox lies in the fact that it is an emphasis on adequacy in knowledge
that leads Joachim to deny particulars in the interest of universals. He
says
:
The more adequate knowledge of 'this true 1 is not an accumula-
tion of judgements of perception, but a revolution in which
'this true' is swept away and determinate connexions between
determinate universal concepts are substituted. In the science
of botany a judgement of perception like 'this tree is green'
finds, as such, no place. °
12. Eradley, FL, II, 705.
15. Joachim, NT, 82.
14. Of. supra, 126. Here we see what appears to be another contradiction
in Bradley's thought, for ultimate reality is sentient experience, and
trueness is identity; yet a thing is not to be called real in so far
as we find it in experience.
15. Joachim, NT, 82.
16. Ibid, 110.
*
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Just how such abstraction is to be reconciled with Joachim's strong em-
phasis on the concreteness of truth, ^7 is not at all clear.
For Joachim a judgment is "the inseparable unity of thinking and the
object thought ... We have already attempted to disprove such a con-
tention, in connection with Josiah Royce's treatment of meaning. -' v But
there is another aspect of the problem of meaning, where I believe, the
coherence-doctrine rests its case on a confusion, or at least on a con-
troversial issue.
Much is made by the exponents of the coherence-theory of the fact
that the meaning of any judgment involves reference to the whole system
of knowledge. While to a certain extent this is true, I think it re-
quires qualification. For unless isolated judgments possess some signi-
ficance of their own apart from their signifying other things or ideas,
^
that is, unless they are aesthetically, emotionally, perceptually, or no-
etically colored in themselves, I do not see how the whole which is sup-
posed to comprise them can itself possess significance .2- To my mind this
is much too mild a formulation of his position, for, so far as I can see.
17 • Joachim, NT, 75-77*
18. Ibid, 92.
19. Of. supra, 73.
20. Of. for example Joachim, NT, 9^; Bradley, STR, 2p2-2J5*
21. In this same non-referential sense, Joachim defines trueness as
"significance"
.
22.
Joachim, NT, 26.
.-
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he denies all external relations, whether pure or impure.
As James Bissett Pratt expresses it, the question is whether "char-
acter can be given only by relations" .“5 His answer is that we must rec-
ognize
not only relational characters which give us 'knowledge about 1
but also intrinsic qualities which terms possess in and by
themselves, and which we can know by direct awareness or
'acquaintance with'". ^
The ultimate shift from the trueness of coherence as characterizing dis-
cursive knowledge to the trueness of identity as characterizing intuitive
knowledge, which we witnessed in the case of both Bradley and Joachim,
seems to be an admission of the validity of this argument.
Of course, it might be argued that the immediate data are such only
for the infinite mind; but our avowed intention not to sacrifice the re-
ality of finite persons makes this treatment of finite selves as phenom-
enal an unacceptable position. And in so far as finite persons are real,
the trueness of our judgments regarding them will constitute a stumbling-
block for the coherence-theory. For such trueness can be explained neither
as coherence nor as identity.
(Furthermore, the trueness of language as related to fact cannot
satisfactorily be explained as coherence, as Bradley himslef points out,
for some type of correspondence is requisite between the words we use
and what we intend to signify by them.^)
25. Pratt, PR, 29.
24. Ibid, 56.
25. Of. supra, 122
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Another point -which is closely aligned with this question of "mean-
ing" concerns the question of whether or not the trueness of jud^ent
depends on the evidence on the basis of which it is made. That is, the
coherence -doctrine seems to involve the assigning of trueness to judg-
ments only in so far as they are coherent with their evidence. Their co-
herence or incoherence with anything else cannot very well be relevant
if, as Joachim maintains, "truth is. essentially in and for judgment" .??
This statement of Joachim’s would be quite innocuous if it only meant
that the recognition of truth requires a mind which recognizes it.? 7 But
his position demands that trueness, also, be 'fessentially in and for"
judgment, for he describes judgment as the inseparable unity of thinking
and the object thought.?? Bradley is quite explicit on this point. He
says, "The more the conditions of your assertion are included in your
assertion, so much the truer and less erroneous does your judgement
become" .??
It follows, then, that a judgment which is discordant with its evi-
dence or based on insufficient evidence is so far false, even though it
correctly describe an actual situation. G.F. Stout raises the follow-
ing objection on this point:
26. Joachim, NT, 13.
27. The question of the subsistence of unrecognized truth is irrelevant
for our purposes.
28. Cf. supra, 137.
29. Bradley, STR, 252-253.
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I admit that when anyone takes for sufficient what is really
insufficient evidence that A is B, or that A really exists,
he is so far in error. But his belief that A is E need^not
therefore be false. It is true, however,.he came by it.-')w
It seems to me that the coherence-theory is inadequate in so far as it
would have to deny the trueness of the judgment "a is B", the reply is,
Why is "A is B n less true when based on insufficient evidence than when
based on sufficient evidence? Such a theory might logically lead us to
believe that in so far as a philosopher's judgments, e.g. his conclusions
with reference to the realms of mathematics and physics, are based on a
iar from exhaustive or complete body of relevant knowledge, just so far
are his conclusions false. And that identical conclusions by one better
informed are truer in the one case than in the other.
To riy mind the upholders of the coherence-theory are right, here,
only if ideas are logically inseparable from the contexts in which they
occur. It will be recalled that Russell maintained that pragmatism's con-
ception of trueness v/as valid only if belief as an isolated phenomenon
did not occur. But the isolation which pragmatism rejects is that of
separating an idea from its empirical leadings in the temporal flow of
experience. The coherence -theory
,
on the other hand, rejects isolation
of an idea from its contemporaneous psychological associations.
The well-informed scholar sometimes does not actually entertain in
mind all the evidence in his support of his judgment when he is reaffirm-
ing a previously-made judgment. Is his judgment less true in such a case
50. Stout, Art. 1, 509-510*
••
.
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than -when he was consciously aware of the evidence? It seems to me that
while the fuller consciousness doubtless realizes more truth, that A is
B, is equally true in any case. The upholders of the coherence-theory,
I believe, confuse quantity of truth with quality of trueness. The true-
ness of a proposition may depend on a whole system of logical relations,
but these are not created nor destroyed by the individual who attempts to
understand them. Otherwise, in a universe of finite selves, pandemonium
would result.
If we cannot break away from our individual psychological contexts,
community of meaning becomes a real problem for those who believe in the
reality of finite persons. My judgment that Peter has a toothache today
is mostly false if my evidence for the judgment consists solely in my
knowledge that he just took an aspirin and that he had a toothache yes-
terday. Of if Peter has a reputation for failing in veracity and my evi-
dence for judging that he has a toothache consists solely in his having
told me so, then my judgment is largely false, in spite of the fact that
his toothache may be real enough. That Peter has a toothache will be true
for him and false for me. So long as we believe in the reality of finite
persons this view involves either that extra -individual reference is im-
possible, in which case we are faced with solipsism, or that Peter may
have and not have a toothache at the same time.
Joachim says that he is not coiferned with the appercipient charac-
ter of the individual mind qua this or that. Either the universal mind
or the scientific mir.d purified of irrelevancies would suit his purposes
31. Joachim, NT, 93-94
**
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Eut this is to neglect the issue of degrees of trueness in judgments as
actually entertained. The possibility of communication among finite
selves, as such, requires that trueness obtain in some sense to abstrac-
tions from individual concrete experience. That is, propositions must be
true, as well as judgments. In terms of meaning, actual individual em-
bodiments of meaning are to a large extent inseparable from a whole psy-
chological background. Nevertheless, communication requires such isola-
tion to some extent.
The theory fails to give sufficient consideration to the trueness of
specific finite judgments as such, in its concern with the trueness of
truth as a whole . Logical priority is given to the trueness of Truth, the
ideal system of judgments acceptable to omniscience; and the trueness of
truths, of specific correct judgments entertained by finite minds, must
find a place therein or be destroyed . 52 We have tried to show that a cer-
tain amount of destruction has resulted. But that even the trueness of
Truth cannot be satisfactorily interpreted as coherence is shown by Brad-
ley's paradox of the relation of Truth and the Absolute, and By both Brad-
ley's and Joachim's resort to intuition in the end.
Nevertheless, coherence seems to be the only acceptable interpreta-
tion of the trueness of logical concepts as such. In the realm of pure
mathematics, for example, who will deny that several systems of geometry
are recognized as equally valid? And what differentiates them from hap-
hazard, unsuccessful would-be systems? That is, what makes them valid?
52. Of. for example, Joachim, NT, 78 .
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Is it not their coherence? In so far as they are self-coAsi stent and com-
prehensive they are valid. In this consists their trueness. Of course,
when the question arises as to which system is true of the real, other
factors must be taken into consideration. In terms of the distinction
between a priori and empirical truth, we may say that all these self-
consistent systems of geometry possess a priori trueness. Their empiri-
cal trueness, however, must be explained by means of conceptions which
involve more than coherence, i.e., system, alone. But this a priori
trueness is not confined to geometrical concepts. Indeed, it applies to
all our concepts as such. In elaboration and defense of this point, we
now turn to the very able epistemological analysis provided by C. I.
Lewis in Mind and the World-Order.
,
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CHAPTER V
TRUENESS AS CORRELATION OF MIND VJITH MIND
In addition to the difficulties which have emerged in this inves-
tigation as germane to the specific theories, and with their scholastic
value and significance largely confined to their disruptive function in
those theories, the following questions have emerged as being especially
important in the formulation of any theory of trueness: 1. If some type
of correspondence be maintained, exactly what is the nature of that which
is to be corresponded to? And in just what does such correspondence con-
sist? 2. Is the trueness of our judgments regarding the experience of
other persons accounted for? This point has been a pitfall for the co-
herence -the ory, the identity-theories, and the pragmatic version of the
correspondence-theory.^ 3. Is the trueness of all truths whatever account-
ed for? If, for example, mathematical systems are regarded as true, is
such trueness explicitly excluded from membership with the elite by the
differentiative use of the concept ’Validity”, or is it merely ignored?
The theory about to be presented endorses trueness as correspondence
1. Cf. supra, 153, 84, 116, 119, 65.
,„
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only in case of an actual qualitative identity or high degree of quali-
tative similarity between the corresponding factors. The trueness of
judgments relating to the experiences of other persons will be found to
play an important role herein, and the attempt is made to treat all
types of trueness.
The ’’mind’s demand for unity"2 may result in an ignoring of the com-
plexities of experience in an effort to provide an explanation in terns
of a bew basic principles. "While possibly metaphysics can indicate the ul-
timate qualitative identity of apparently diverse phenomena, epistemology
in so far as it is concerned with knowing these phenomena in all their
complexity and diversity is not justified in an attempt to force all
types of knowing into one basic type. That is, in so far as experience
provides us with variegated tjrpes of phenomena to be known, the trueness
of our knowledge of every type of phenomena need not be identical in
quality. For in so far as the object is to play any part in determining
the knowledge of it, admittedly diverse natures of such objects as the
datum-self, non-Euclidean geometry, the category of space, and a red
apple, should be oermitted at least the possibility of requiring differ-
ent types of trueness in the knowledge of them.
Thus we have witnessed a willingness in even the most distinctive
theorists on trueness to admit that in different realms of being from
those with which they are most concerned, some other type of trueness
2. Knuds on, PP, 24.
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than the one they have expounded and developed, obtains. This is expeci-
ally so in the case of James, who admits that the pragmatic type of true-
ness does not hold in the realm of relations among purely mental ideas, 0
in the case of Bergson, who recognizes the validity of a non-intuitional
trueness in the realm of practise,- and in the case of Bradley, who not
only recognizes the presence in the realm of appearance of the trueness
of correspondence, but vdio also insists on the need for the trueness of
identity in the Absolute. 6 Similarly, we found Pratt maintaining that the
difference between the correspondence -theory and the coherence -the ory in
the realm of logical, as contrasted with empirical, truth is merely ver-
bal. 6
In view of our belief in the trueness of identity (in self-con-
sciousness), the dichotomy of a priori truth and empirical truth as these
are set forth by C.I. Lewis in Mind and the "World Order
,
is not exhaus-
tive. ? But if this slight reservation be made, there is much to be gained
from an examination of Lewis’s treatment of the familiar distinction of
the a priori and the emoirical. Lewis describes empirical truth as aris-
ing through "conceptual interpretation of the given", and a priori truth
as being "definitive, or explicative of concepts". 0' An analysis of these
3. Supra, 45.
4. Supra, 98.
5. Supra, 129.
6. Supra, 17-18.
7. Lewis does not subscribe to the trueness of identity, but he speaks
of our being "certain" of the given. Lewis, M TO, 310.
8.
Ibid, 37
.,
-
,
.
• >
,
162
two types of truth should throw some light on the problem of trueness.
In order that knowledge may be objective, there must be some kernel
of reality for it to be true to. Otherwise it would be purely arbitrary.
Such a sine qua non is what Lewis calls the given . c> On the other hand,
if knowledge is not creative to some extent, i.e., if the mind does not
add interpretation and construction,
then thought is rendered superfluous, the possibility of error
becomes inexplicable, and the distinction of true and false is
in danger of becoming meaningless.-^
In other words, if trueness consists in mere presence to the mind, i.e.,
in identity, then "every cognitive experience must be veracious" . For in
so far as interpretation is added, there is more than identity involved;
and in so far as interpretation is not added, significance consists in
mere presence to the mind and cannot possibly be false.
H
Considering first the given, "that element which we are aware that
we do not create by thinking and cannot, in general, displace or alter",
Lewis suggests that we tentatively designate it as "the sensuous". In
the exoerience of a fountain pen in hand, for instance, any attempt to
describe it will convey more than the pure given,-
- and consequently will
9. Lewis, MWO, 39.
10. Loc . cit.
11. Loc. cit. Montague’s attempt to avoid this difficulty has already
been considered.
12. Lewis
,
MVTO, 48.
13. Ibid, 49.
14. Ibid, 50. Also cf. ibid, 52.
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vary as the experiencer is civilized man, savage, or infant. Neverthe-
less, the given does not thus vary with the degree of education of the
experiencer, 1- ' The interpretation or construction attached will be sig-
nificant in two directions, viz., in its relation to "further actual and
possible experience" and in its relation to "my interest and action".^
The former is a relation to "a to-be-given or could-be-given" which the
temporal process of experience may or may not exemplify. The latter has
reference not only to the temporal process of future experience but also
to my own purposes as possibly affecting that process. 1?
Lems admits that our empirical starting-point for philosophizing
is "the thick experience of the world of things, not the thin given of
immediacy...",-'-® and that the given as he is here expounding it, is an
abstraction from this thick experience . But inasmuch as "the condemna-
tion of abstractions is the condemnation of thought itself ",20 does
not regard this as at all prejudicial to the possibility of the given’s
being a genuine element in experience .21
Lewis cautions against defining the given by correlation with ner-
15. Lewis, MWO, 49-50.
16. Ibid, 51.
17. Ibid, 51-52.
18. Ibid, 54. Nevertheless, as Professor Brightman has suggested, Lewis’s
epistemological starting-point, in the sense of a foundation, is really
"thin experience", for the things involved in "thick experience" are
largely inferential constructions.
19. Ibid, 54-55.
20. Ibid, 55.
21. Loc. cit. Also cf. ibid, 66.
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vous processes. He says, "It is the brute-fact element in perception,
illusion and dream (without antecedent distinction) which is intended".-^
Things are not given. Their presence indicates the work of thought. On
the othei* hand, the given is not a smooth undifferentiated flux, for
"attention cannot mark disjunctions in an undifferentiated field" . '
The interruptions and differences which form the boundaries of
events and things are both given and constituted by interpreta-
tion. That the rug is on the floor... is as much given as the
color of the rug... But that I find this disjunction of rug and
floor possessed of a meaning which the wrinkles in the rug do
not have, reflects ny past experience to (sic) taking up and
putting down rugs. The cognitively significant on-t'ne-floorness
of the rug requires both the given break in the fi&ld of vision
and the interpretation of it as the boundary between manipul-
able object and unyielding support.
Employing the term "a presentation" to signify the given element in
any experience of an object,^ Lewis points out that a presentation is
either "a specific quale (such as the immediacy of redness or loudness)
or something analyzable into a complex of such". 0 But such qualia.
though repeatable and recognizable from one experience to another, are
not to be construed as universals. They differ from universals in having
no time-span which extends beyond the specious present, and also in hav-
ing no names . 27
22. Lewis, MWO, 57-
25.
Ibid, 59.
24
. Lee. cit
.
25. Ibid, 59-60.
26. Ibid, 60.
27. Ibid, 60-61.
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Turning from the given to the conceptual element in experience,
Lewis defines the pure concept which it is hie purpose to discuss, as
"that meaning which must be common to two minds when they understand
„ 28
each other, by the use of a substahtive or its equivalent". Differences
of correlative imagery or any idiosyncrasy of sense will make no differ-
ence to the sharing of meaning so long as identical conceptual patterns
are set up by the individuals concerned, in the expression of one concept
29m terms of others. Of course, for each individual the concept must be
correlated with a specific sense-quality or qualities, Eut this i3 a pure-
ly individual matter, and even though two individuals might correlate
identical sense-qualities with the concepts concerned, this is neverthe-
less unnecessary and is in any case unverifiable . Only the concept need
be shared in order to establish common understanding. 5^
Lewis points out that concepts have meaning in two senses:
the logical, shareable meaning of further conceptual relations,
and the direct, non-shareable meaning of reference to some com-
plex of sense-qualities .51
The interdependence of the sharable meanings of concepts is so complete
that all definition is eventually circular. "All the terms in the dic-
tionary, however ideal its definitions, will be themselves defined"
.
;'‘~
28. Lewis, MWO, 70.
29. Ibid, 80.
50. Loc . cit.
51. Ibid, 81.
52. Ibid, 82.
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Consequently, "the nature of a concept as such is its internal (essen-
tial or definitive) relationships with other concepts". 55 The meaning of
any concept will eventually involve all meanings; and no concept is more
privileged than others in this respect.
In answer to the objections that we are unable to have in mind such
an ideal pattern of meaning, and that we frequently seem to possess com-
mon meanings even when we would disagree in our definition of the terms
employed, y Lewis makes the following three points: 1. The concepts we
commonly employ are more restricted than the dictionary definitions of
their terms. A 3 a result, we can often maintain common understanding on
the basis of a sharing of these restricted meanings even though we should
disagree on the fuller definitions of their terms. 55
2. It must be recognized that in some sense we can "have a meaning
56
in mind when we could not state it without further thought". ./here the
denotation of a term rules we can distinguish degrees of clearness in a
meaning. 57 y/e might be able to accept or rejact objects with which we
were familiar, as belonging or not belonging to the class in question,
and still not be able to specify our criteria of selection. Or we might
be able to classify unfamiliar objects correctly and still not be able to
55* Lewis, MWO, 85 .
54. Lov. cit.
55. Ibid, 84-85.
56 . Ibid, 85.
57- Lewis ascribes this differentiation to Royce. Of. Lewis, MV/O, 86 .
*,
.
,
'
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define the class-concept . Furthermore, even when we are able to pro-
vide the definition, "we do not have this definition explicitly in mind
when we use a tern with understanding" . 39
3. Practically, identity of meaning consists in implicit modes of
behavior which involve more than can be explicitly in mind at any one
time .40
The classifying attitude or mode of behavior which the mind
brings to the given experience and which represents its mean-
ing, dictates the explicit concept and implicitly possesses it
already .41
In view of the largely ideal character of our community of meaning,
Lems redefines the concept as "what would verify completely the coinci-
dence of two minds when they understand each other by the use of lang-
uage". 42 That is, the pure concept is the meaning which would be shared
in the case of a complete coincidence of linguistic pattern in the at-
tempt to express the concept. 43
Lems says
:
In the end it can hardly fail to be the case that the possibil-
ity of our having concepts in common is conditioned by two
38. Lewis, MWQ, 86-87.
39. Ibid, 87.
40. Ibid, 84.
41. Ibid, 88.
42. Ibid, 89.
43. In reply to a question on this point. Professor Lems said, "...The
coincidence in question is a coincidence of the linguistic pattern of
analytic statements in which any term used to express the concept in
question would figure." In addition, there is a similarity in the pat-
terns of correlated behavior.
,.
-
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things; first, by the fact that we are creatures fundamentally
alike, having in the large the same needs and interests and.
powers of discrimination and relation; and second, that we are
confronted by a common reality, mediated to us in sense-exper-
ience which is comparable
However, rationalists and empiricists are too prone to seize upon and
exaggerate these conclusions, rationalists, the former and empiricists,
the latter.45 with reference to the assertion of a common world, Lewis
maintains that our common world "is very largely a social achievement"
which triumphs over much diversity in sense -experience, and that there is
really no specific shared element to which we can point as being indis-
pensable . -6
Lewis also objects to the view that there is "an initial community
of categories, as a psychologically identical and miraculous endow-
ment..."^ In the first place, the sense in which the categories "inform"
experience is not the sense in which different kinds of creatures, pos-
sessing different kinds of categories, would have correspondingly differ-
ent experience. Lewis endorses Royce’s position that the categories are
our ways of acting. 48 Consequently, the results of our own acts cannot
very well be attributed to "the content of the immediate exoerience which
is acted on".^ Although every concept has its correlation in the indi-
vidual mind with sense -content, this sense-content can never be conveyed
44. Lewis, MWO, 91.
45. Ibid, 92.
46. Ibid, 93.
47. Ibid, 96.
48. Ibid, 101-102.
49. Ibid, 102.
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from mind to mind. 515
In the second place, the discovery of the meaning of substantive
terms in definitive relations, and the meaning of these in relations of
relations, does not require the postulation of absolute end-terms in
order to avoid an infinite regress
•
5 1 For "relations are not necessarily
defined by relations of relations..." 52 but may be defined by the terms
they connect, just as easily as substantive terms can be defined by other
substantives related to them. 55 For Lewis, "there is no such thing as in-
trinsic simplicity or indefinability. All meaning is relational" . 54 Even
though the undefined ideas in a system might be clear initially, their
significance is enriched and increasingly clarified by the relationships
into ’which they enter. 05 The field of all our concepts is closed, in the
sense that their -whole meaning consists in "the extended order and inter-
relationships of the system itself ", 5(>
Lewis says.
We have a common reality because—or in so far as—we are able
to identify, each in his own experience, those systems of order-
ly relation indicated by behavior, and particularly by that part
of behavior which serves the ends of cooperation. What this
primarily requires is that, in general, we are able to discrim-
inate and relate as others do, when confronted by the same sit-
50. Lems, MWO, 102.
51. Ibid, 99.
52. Ibid, 106. Italics omitted.
53. Loc. cit.
54. Ibid, 107.
55. Ibid, 108. Cf. the coherence -the ory of trueness, supra, Ch. IV.
56. Lewis, MWO, 109.
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uation.^
"Our common reality reflects our common categories
",
58 but even these
may to some extent he "a social achievement of likemindedness". ^ Con-
sequently, we may say that our common reality is partly "the aim and the
result of social cooperation, not an initial social datum, prerequisite
to common knowledge ".60
Real objects are conceptual interpretations of the given and, in
this sense, are never immediate. 0 ! Lewis says:
An object such as an apple is never given; between the real
apple in all its complexity and this fragmentary presenta-
tion, lies that interval which only interpretation can bridge.
The ’objectivity’ of this experience means the verifiability
of a further possible experienc e which is attributed by this
interpretat i on .6"£
Conseq uently, the existence of an objective property is not merely the
presence of a given quale but "an ordered relation of different qualia,
relative to different conditions or behavior".63 pf the predication of
properties did not thus go beyond the given, error would be impossible .64
The predication of a property on the basis of a presentation, i.e., of
5 7 . Lewi s , MWO , 111.
58. Ibid, 114.
59. Ibid, 115.
60. Loc. cit.
61. Ibid, 117, 120.
62. Ibid, 120.
63. Ibid, 130.
64. Ibid, 131.
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"momentarily presented experience ", is "in the nature of an hypctthesis,
which predicts something definitely specifiable in further possible ex-
perience..." that such experience may verify or falsify. The ascrip-
tion of properties to things, i.e., the application of concepts to the
given
,
00 is really a prediction that if I act in certain ways, specific
experience will ensue .
^
It is because of our interpretive and verifying
activity that our world transcends the given. For purely passive beings
the whole of reality would be the actual procession of the given . 00
In order that experience may be intelligible there must be some de-
gree of correlation between concepts and the given. Hot only must speci-
fic concepts be correlated with particular qualia in the individual mind,
but the predicted relations comprised in the conceptual interpretations
must be susceptible of verification or falsification by future experienced
Lewis says.
The intelligibility of experience consists precisely in this;
that between the specific quality of what is given and the
pattern of its context in possible experience there is some
degree of stable correlation. So that the quality is due to the
relations and the relational pattern is due to the quality. Such
stable correlation is not a universally discovered fact, all-
pervasive in experience ... .Experience is completely intelligible
only in the sense that every experience will exhibit some dis-
coverable correlation between presented quality and relational
65. Lewis, IvIWO, 151*
66 . Ibid, I 5O-I 5 I.
67. Ibid, 140.
68. Ibid, l40-l4l.
69.
Ibid, 144.
•*
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context .70
But inasmuch as knowledge does not attempt to copy but to interpret
the given,^ it will not be concerned with the relation between experi-
ence and independent objects (as usually understood) but with the rela-
tion between this experience and other anticipated experiences . 72
Lewis admits that reality is relative to knowledge in that "the
only character which can be attributed to anything real is a character
described in relative terms—relative to some experience ... 11 ,77 but sees
no objection to maintaining that absolute truth can be conveyed in rela-
tive terms. 74 He points out that relativity requires an independent char-
acter in that which is relative. 7^ He says:
Generally speaking, if A had no independent character it would
not be X relative to R or Y relative to 3. These relative (or
relational) characters, X and Y, are nartial but absolutely
valid revelations of the nature of A. 76
We cannot legitimately argue from the fact that we are unable to describe
a thing apart from its relation to mind, to the fact that the thing is
completely determined by its relation to mind. 77 Unless there is an inde-
70. Lewis
,
MWO
71. Ibid, 162.
72. ibid. 165.
75* Ibid, 167.
74. Loc
.
cit
.
75. Ibid, 172.
76. Ibid, 168 .
144-145.
77. Ibid, 188—189
•
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pendent element in knowledge, the significance of knowledge is likely to
be lost. "For the purpose of knowledge is to be true to something which
is beyond it"* But such trueness is not to consist in a qualitative
identity between the perception and the object, for "such identity is
probably meaningless and in any case is unverifiable"
.
7&
The independence of reality from the knowing mind means three
things: 1. The givenness of the given. 7fe do not create it and we cannot,
by thinking, alter it. 2. The trueness of
those ’If-then’ oropositions in which the process of possible
experience, starting from the given, could be expressed. The
•if’ here depends upon our own active nature for its meaning
...but the content of the ’then’ clause, and the truth of the
proposition as a whole, are things with respect to which the
knowing mind is not dictator but dictated to.^1
3. "The transcendence by reality of our present knowledge of it..." 7 ^
Turning from empirical truth to a priori truth, Lewis points out
that the a priori represents the activity of mind itself, ^3 and its ne-
cessity lies in "its character as legislative act". 74 A priori truth de-
pends on the explication or elaboration of the concept itself and not on
78. Lewis, M1TO, 191.
79. Ibid, 192.
80. Ibid, 193.
^ 1 . Loc . cit
.
82. Loc. cit.
83. Ibid, 196.
84. Ibid, 197.
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its relation to the content of' experience .85 Such trueness may be either
that of the elaboration of concepts in the abstract, as in pure mathe-
matics, or the elaboration of predetermined principles of interpretation
of the given, as is most evident in the case of the categories
.
c 6 Lewis
says of the a priori:
Since itis a truth about our own interpretative attitude, it
imposes no limitation upon the future possibilities of exper-
ience; that is a priori which we can maintain in the face of
all experience, come what will. And although it represents the
contribution of the mind itself to knowledge, it does not re-
quire that this mind be universal, absolute, or a reality of
a higher order than the object of its knowledge.
However, the type of a priori truth which concerns the application of
concepts to the given, while uncompelled by the given&8 and analytic in
nature, '^9 is nevertheless subject to pragmatic considerations, for man
has certain needs and interests to be satisfied, and he must satisfy
them in this experience if at all. 90 Lewis says:
Both the general character of the experience and the nature of
the animal will be reflected in the mode of behavior which marks
this attempt to realize his ends. This will be true of the cate-
gories of his thinking as in other things. 91
85. Lewis, MWO, 251.
86. Ibid, 250-251.
87- Ibid, 251.
88. Ibid, 258.
89. Ibid, 251.
90. Ibid, 259.
91.
Loc. cit
,,
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We should not deny that "there is a kind of knowledge of 'empty'
concepts ",^ unless we are prepared to deny the term knowledge to pure
mathematics and logic. The trueness of such purely abstract, a priori
knowledge will be absolute and eternal, answering only to the criteria of
consistency and adequacy. 95 on the other side there is "the absolute
brute-fact of given experience", ineffable yet determining the truths of
nature, once the interpretative system of concepts with their denotations
has been fixed. 94 The pragmatic element in truth lies "in the choice of
conceptual syfetem for application and in the assigning of sensuous deno-
tation %o the abstract concept ... "95
The application of a concept requires a certain order in the sequence
of experience, and since the content of experience is independent of the
mind, that order cannot be dictated by th4 knower.' 0 For empirical knowl-
edge to be valid,
this connection of given qualia with expected sequences, and the
connection between the sequences prescribed by one concept and
that which is essential to some other... 97
must be genuinely probable. Lewis points out that "no sort of experience
which the wildest imagination could conjure up could fail to afford a
92. Lewis, MWO, 245. In this connection consider Alfred J. Ayer's state-
ment, "The power of logic and mathematics to surprise us depends, like
their usefulness, on the limitations of our reason", ayer, LTL, 116.
95* Lewis, MV/O, 272.
94. Ibid, 272.
95. Loc. cit.
96. Ibid, 545.
97. Ibid, 546.
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basis for intelligibility and probable judgment" .98 For, pn the first
place, it is reality and not the given which must be orderly, and we ex-
clude from reality99 what fails to conform to our categories of realityi00
In the second place, if we do not find a certain type of order in the
given, we look for some other type, 101 and at any rate "any set of coord-
inate categories is 3imply a method for exhausting the possibilities". 102
As a matter of fact, all that is necessary in the way of order for
experience to be intelligible and knowledge possible if "that there
should be apprehensible things and objective facts...", and to this the
only alternative is the non-existence of everything. 105 In order to en-
sure the existence of apprehensible things all that is required is that,
given certain presentations, the possibilities of further experience be
not unlimited. 10^ This single requirement is all that is' necessary to
make valid empirical generalizations possible. 105 But in the end this re-
quirement is not a limiting of the possibilities of experience, for "the
98. Lewis, MV/O
,
j?48.
99* The term is here employed eulogistical ly . Cf, supra, 12.
100. Lewis, MV/O, ^49.
101. Ibid, 552.
102. Ibid, p50
.
10p. Ibid, 567.
104. Loc. cit.
105. Ibid, 568.
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coincident actuality of all possibilities is impossible".}*^ In assuming
the existence of things, we assume "the validity, as probable, of empir-
ical generalizations or ’laws’..." for things themselves are only recur-
rent correlations in the sequence of experience, actual or possible .l07
Lewis maintains
:
The mind will always be capable of discovering that order which
is requisite to knowledge, because a mind such as ours, set
down in any chaos that can be conjured up, would proceed to
elicit significance by abstraction, analysis and organization,
to introduce order by conceptual classification and categorical
delimitation of the real, and would, through learning from accu-
mulated experience, anticipate the future in ways which increas-
ingly satisfy its practical intent.
106. Lewis, FTO, 368.
107. Ibid, 373.
108.
Ibid 391.
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While I agree with Lewis that objects can be analyzed into predicted
or actual sequential experience, and while the coupon world, to a large
extent, is the result of men's applying common concepts, and common con-
cepts the result of a similarity of kind among men, there is 3till
lacking an explanation of our agreement with regard to objects apparent-
ly experienced in common. If the qualitative identity of individual
givens be removed, an explanation is required for the fact that you and
I can agree that chairs are present in Robbins Library. In spite of our
sharing identical concepts, in view of our possible qualitatively dis-
tinct givens, that we here agree so completely in conceptual construction
indicates a correlation of presentations between your mind and mine. That
is, the qualia you associate with the particular concepts involved must
be present in your experience, just as the qualia I associate with the
same concepts must be present in rry experience.
Ey "qualia" is not meant merely qualities, but qualities as they
actually appear in the given, that is, in conjunction with any relational
forms that may accrue to them. Actually, I believe that both spatial and
temporal differentiations are found within the given. The quality red-
ness, for example', does not appear there as redness, but as spatially
extended, exhibiting varying degrees of definiteness of configuration.

We may be presented with a square of redness or with a mere red haze, but
in both cases a certain subjective spatiality is involved. Similarly,
since the given occurs as the specious present, differentiations of
succession are possible within it. However ..one may conceive the ultimate
nature of space and time, all that is necessary here is that existence
of such inner patternings among qualities as they occur in the given, be
recognized. Without this minimum of inner structural differentiaion, it
would be exceedingly difficult to escape the charge of sheer arbitrari-
ness in our spatialization and temporalization of objects. As Lewis says,
"attention cannot mark disjunctions in an undifferentiated field".
But such inner patterning must be distinguished from the conceptual
patterning of qualia
,
which constitutes real objects. To return to our
problem, how are we to explain our agreement in conceptual construction,
in the face of possibly diverse givens, i.e., qualitatively different pre-
sentations (and this difference is not merely one of the sensing of diff-
erent qualities, but also of possibly different inner patternings)? Lewis
describes the existence of correlation between the given and "the pattern
of its context in possible experience..." as the miracle that an intelli-
gible world exists.^ ^ But the synchronizing of each individual mind's
given with the given of other minds to the extent that we agree to the
assertion that our logical construct of an object is there for both of us,
indicates an objective grounding that cannot be wholly explained as the
109. Lewis, MWO, 59. Also cf. 3upra, 154,
110. Ibid, 144-145.
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application of identical relational patterns, i.e., the sharing of com-
mon concepts. For, granting common concepts, our similar application of
these in the face of possibly different qualia, is inexplicable without
the help of some kind of metaphysical grounding. The similarity of' con-
ceptual patterns which is to account for the existence of objects held
in common, must itself be accounted for if the diversity of our givens is
regarded as possible.
Whether we renounce the diversity of the various givens or assert
their synchronization in terms of the application of common conceptual
patterns, the result is still the same. We are called upon in the one
case to explain the qualitative identity of the various givens, in the
other case to explain their synchronization, that is, to explain the fact
that we do apply identical concepts with reference to the qualia experi-
enced where the chairs are supposed to be in Robbins Library. Let us say
you go into the Library, experience certain qualia, and your conceptual
interpretation thereof leads you to announce that there are chairs around.
Then I go into the Library and experience different qualia, yet my con-
ceptual interpretation leads me to make the same announcement, viz., that
there are chairs around. Such a state of affairs might perhaps be called
a mere coincidence. But if all sane people who enter the Library reach
the same conclusion, there must be something more than mere coincidence,
or even similarity of mental structure, involved.
In either case, that is, of the assertion of the identity of trie
qualia or of their synchronization, we are faced with the alternatives
of subscribing to a miracle or delving into metaphysics. If we are to
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maintain the reality of persons as finite individuals, our common world
will have to be grounded in an extra-individual factor or entity. I be-
lieve the best explanation of this extra-individual factor is that there
is a supreme person. The assertion of a non-personal entity, in the face
of the reality of finite persons, would create an undesirable dualism.
Borden Farker Bowne says of knowledge,
The mind must have the key in itself, but .there must also be an
objective order and fixed meaning as the presupposition of in-
terpretation. Otherwise we should be seeking to understand mere
noises or random scratches, which would be absurd. When this
thought is carried out it implies an objective rational order
parallel to our subjective thinking. As speech implies a mind at
both ends of the process, so knowledge under our human condi-
tions equally implies a mind at both ends. Noise becomes speech
only as thought is expressed in it, and understood through it.
So the affections of sense become knowledge only as they are
the media for expressing and transmitting thought beyond them.m
But this does not involve the denial of the creativity of knowledge.
Knowledge is not imported ready-made, but constructed by the mind, as is
112
most evident in the case of communication between finite persons.
"Each mind for itself constructs the other's thought, and thus apprehends
and comprehends it".'^
Bowne characterizes as a dogmatic fiction the assertion that there
is "an absolute system of reality to which our thoughts ought to corres-
pond in order to be true".^-^ He maintains that we find no noumena back
111. Bowne, PER, 76.
112. Ibid, 64-65.
115. Ibid, 65.
Il4. , Ibid, 107-108.

182
of experience, but only "a cause which is founding and maintaining the
1 I K
order of experience". ° It will be recalled that Royce argued that the
validity of the concept of causality depended on the prior validity of
the concept of correspondence. 1- 1- 0 Strictly, however, it is not corres-
pondence so much as trueness that we require as characteristic of out
thinking if we are to secure truth. Correspondence is too vague a con-
ception to be very useful as the logical basis for all the rest of our
thinking. It can serve as such only if it be tacitly accepted as equiva-
lent to trueness. But it is just such tacit acceptance that requires
defense
.
In terms of the problem of trueness, our situation is now as foll-
ows. In our apprehension of the given we have the trueness of identity
i
1 ?
In our conceptual systems as such we have the trueness of coherence. In
the application of concepts we have the trueness of success, i.e., prag-
matism's verification links of experience. In our reference to one an-
other's experiences we apparently have the trueness of correspondence.
But just what is meant by such correspondence, if we are to agree that
we have no right ever to assert identical sensuous content and identical
inner patternings in different minds? Or, even if we do not agree to this,
we still cannot deny the existence of a large amount of diversity among
individuals as to temperament, sensuous and aesthetic sensitivity, and
115. Bowne, PER, 108.
116. Suplra, 76
.
1 '7* Sven Lewis admits that in the given we have certainty. Of. supra,
161, n . 7 .

183
mental make-up. Even the subjective spatial apprehension will vary from
individual to individual with his eyesight. In extreme cases of astigma-
tism, x’s appear as y’s and y's as x’s. In what sense, then, can our
judgments about other persons be said to have the trueness of correspon-
dence? And what, in view of the objective grounding of our pragmatic
application of concepts, is to be said of the trueness of our judgments
regarding the common world? Is it sufficient to describe such trueness as
pragmatic successfulness, and ignore the metaphysical basis of objectiv-
ity? I think not. Some supplementary and deeper type of trueness than
any we have yet examined is here requisite, viz., the trueness of corre-
lation of mind with mind.
By '’correlation" is here meant the concomitant occurrence of factors
which, though different, fulfill identical functions with reference to
specific concepts. The correlation of mind with mind involves the shar-
ing of identical concepts. But eventually concepts must have reference
to something besides concepts if we are to realize any sort of empirical
truth. In each individual’s mind concents are associated with specific
data of sense and imagery. For trueness to obtain in our reference to a
common world we need not associate identical data with the common con-
cepts. It is sufficient that each individual experience those qualia he
associates with the concepts. Let us say a table is a common object to
Mary, John, and Peter if they experience givens a, b, and c, respectively.
Then the trueness of their attempts to communicate regarding the table
will consist in a correlation of a, b, and c. If c is not present, it is
not true for Peter that there is a table. But, as a fact, our common ob-
jects are those which actually do call forth those correlated qualia in
..
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all normal people.
As already argued, this indicates an objective grounding, a met-
aphysical basis of objectivity. It is significant that our individual
givens can be thus synchronized. To my mind the only satisfactory expla-
nation here is that the will of a supreme person is operative in the
givens. As Bowne points out, the assumption that the world of things
originates in thought and expresses thought, reduces the problem of knowl-
edge to that of mutual understanding among persons .1 -*-9 But such an assump-
tion in no way renders the world of things illusory. We have already seen
that real objects are merely conceptualized aualia, but in so far as these
real objects are sharable, they have all the independence that is necess-
ary to insure the objectivity of knowledge. And that they are sharable
can best be explained, I believe, as due to the will of a supreme person.
For how otherwise can we account for the synchronization of minds, in
view of the strictly individual nature of the given, the creativity of
mind, and the merely pragmatic validity of empirical concepts? Only the
will of a supreme person seems necessary and sufficient in this connec-
tion.
When my judgments concern the experience of another finite self, it
is possible (thoup;h not probable) for a direct similarity to obtain in
the correlated factors. To the extent that this does obtain, we have the
118. Cf. supra, 180.
119. Bowne, PER, 92-93. Similarly, McTaggart says, "There appear to be
matter and sensa in the universe, but there is really only spirit, and
the selves of which this spirit consists perceive themselves and one
another." McTaggart, HE, II, 338. Unlike Bowne, however, McTaggart does
not affirm the existence of a supreme person. Cf. McTaggart, NE, II, 178-
183.
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trueness of correspondence. I believe that this is the only form in which
the truene3s of correspondence is wholly intelligible, viz., a3 between
one idea or conscious state and another actual idea or conscious statel^O
The supreme mind, in its knowledge of finite minds, might reasonably be
expected to realize the trueness of correspondence in its pure form, i.e.,
with an absolute degree of similarity in the corresponding factors.
But although a finite being's knowledge of another self is probably
not similarly blessed with an absolute degree of correspondence, it is
not unreasonable to expect that, short of an unusual amount of idiosyn-
1 PI
crasy, your state will possess a high degree of qualitative similarity
with the state I should expect to experience in your place. If I do not
indulge in such expectations but merely employ certain common concepts,
or if the amount of idiosyncrasy is overpowering, correspondence will
fade into the background, and trueness will depend on a correlative
application of concepts. That is, the concept I employ must fit into your
conceptual patterning of experience as I expact it to. When the concepts
I wish to employ are general enough and we speak the same language, the
concepts will presumably be identically applied. That is, if I judge you
have a pain, and you think you have a pain, trueness is for most purpo-
ses established. The fact that my pains are always much more violent than
yours would not affect the trueness of ny judgment, provided your pains
—
120. Of. Royce on the question of correspondence with the potential.
Supra, 7 6 f f
.
121. Comprising a similarity of both qualities and inner patternings.
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occupied the' same place in your conceptual patterning (indicated largely
by your modes of behaviour and future application of concepts) as mine
do in my conceptual patterning.
If, however, I judge that you are experiencing a dull ache, and you
judge that you are experiencing a torment of agony, there is a certain
falseness here which, if we agree on our definitions, consists in a dis-
cordance of application of identical concepts to the same given. It is
conceivable that in such a case your so-called "torment" is exactly sim-
ilar in hedonic tone to the state I would describe as a dull ache. Never
theless, my judgment that you have a dull ache, so long as it concerns
the application of a concept and not the sympathetic imagination of an
experiential state, must give way to yours if your pain is the greatest
you have ever experienced or can imagine, for the sharable meaning of a
concept is inseparable from its relational context. Short of my being
able to convince you that there are much deeper types of pain than yours
my judgment must give way to yours, in the sense that I must call your
pain "torment” is we are to understand each other. Otherwise, as Lewis
has shown, communication would be impossible.
Actually, however, clear instances of such a situation cannot arise
for the reason that telepathic communication of experiential states is
neither sufficiently general nor accurate to permit our being even rea-
sonably certain of a divergence of givens in the application of the
same concept. If such direct communication were orevalent the episte-
mological situation would, of course, be vastly different. Furthermore,
in the realm of feeling especially, the delineation of the region to
which a concept applies (both with reference to its application to the
,,
=
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given by the individual and with reference to its inter-conceptual
status) is sufficiently vague and elastic to allow for conceptual agree-
ment even where we have reason to suspect a certain degree of qualita-
tive divergence
.
That there is no one given to which all minds must adjust their
judgments in order to be true,^~^ and that identical concepts may be
applied to qualitatively dissimilar givens with perfect trueness, so long
as the givens occupy correlative places in different persons’ conceptual
patternings, is even more evident in the case of judgments concerning
sense objects. In the light of James's reduction of sense objects to ac-
tual or predicted experiences, and Lewis's more systematic and profound
analysis of them into conceptualized qualia, defense of this point seems
superfluous
.
My judgments regarding a table are true so long as other sane people
apply the same concept. Trueness consists in this correlative application,
for two reasons. In the first place, there is an objective grounding in
the relevant qualia (the supreme person’s will) . There is a sense, of
course, in which such trueness consists in appropriate response to the
supreme person's willing. This is what Lewis calls being true to the
given. But the larger the part played by creativity and the less ultimate
our conceptual systems are considered to be, the less adequate is such a
conception of trueness. It is an indispensable element in our doctrine of
trueness, but it is not sufficient by itself. It must be supplemented.
122. Except in the sympathetic desire to copy another's experiential
state exactly, as pointed out above.
,I 4 '
*
\
,
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In the second place, men employ pretty much the same system of con-
cepts, being very like-minded. In this fact can be found the explanation
of our sharing a priori truth. The trueness here consists in coherence,
i.e., system, but that the dictionary, which is eventually circular in
its definitions, is endorsed by all of us, is evidence of the degree to
which we are like-minded.
If there is a supreme person, he is no doubt aware of the rational
mind’s system of concepts. Indeed he might have had some such type of
classification in mind when he presented the qualia. If so, there is a
sense in which trueness could be described as approximation to and corre-
spondence with the ideal knowledge achieved by the supreme mind. Never-
theless, the more significance we assign to the fact of evolution, and
the less we tend to regard the present human mind as completely devel-
oped, to that extent trueness as correspondence is less likely to obtain.
The trueness of human knowledge will not consist in correspondence with
the knowledge of the supreme person. Rather will the trueness of the
supreme person’s knowledge of finite selves consist in correspondence
with their knowledge.
Trueness is successful communication in a world of selves, i.e.,
correlation of mind with mind. As C. Delisle Burns says:
/
The quality of propositions which is their trut,h (whatever
else it is or however we define truth) is at least that quality
which unites minds to which those propositions are present....
Truth seems to mean that what I must believe, you must believe. 123
123. Burns, CBM, 102.
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Joseph A. Leighton defines independent existence as "continuous perceiv-
ableness" with reference to time, and "public or common perceivableness"
without reference to time. -*-24 Leighton goes on to explain that "the vis-
ual stick as seen in water is really bent". 12,; But practical and social
purposes lead us to treat the tactual stick as the real stick, and to ex-
plain the bentness as due to optical aberrations caused by the water, the
standard medium being air. We could, of course, adopt water as the stand-
ard medium and explain the visual straightness of the stick as due to
aberrations caused by the air. Leighton says:
The ’real’ object of common sense is a conventionalized group-
ing of sense-qualities with reference to cooperative action and
thought. The objective and independent fact is such only in a
relative and special sense determined by social experience and
aims .126
In so far as the conception of a cooperatively developed reality displaces
the conception of an untouched absolute reality, the trueness of our ac-
tual judgments will require absoluteness in their relationships.
The trueness of judgments about the past is also to be exnlained as
correlation among minds. Ideally, my judgment that Caesar crossed the
Rubicon should be correlated with Caesar’s experience. But such correla-
tion is unverifiable, so we practically substitute the correlation of our
judgment with the experience of historians, in order that we may apply a
124. Leighton, Art. 1, 26.
125. Loc. cit
.
126. Loc. cit.
.t
„
.
criterion of truth. Strictly, however, the trueness of my judgment de-
pends on such merely ideal correlation.
In sum, we have the trueness of identity in the datum-self, and the
trueness of coherence in our conceptual systems. (This latter type of
trueness is commonly called validity, but if we agree with Lewis to the
effect that knowledge does obtain in this realm,
I
fail to see any ob-
jection to calling such validity the trueness of coherence. 128) 3^
datum-self would be empty without the given, and our truth confined to
logic and mathematics. The given furnishes the datum-self with content,
and our concepts with something to be true to. But so far we are im-
mersed in solipsism. Our concents themselves are largely a social prod-
uct, and their significance and trueness of application require the
cooperation of other minds. The trueness of our judgments regarding the
sense-world will consist in correlation with other finite minds. That
such correlation is possible is due to the uniform willing of the su-
preme person in presenting each individual with his given. Each indi-
vidual must be true to his given in the sense that he must eschew fanta-
sy and dishonesty in working upon his content, and in so far his judg-
ment is no doubt correlated with the supreme mind, but such supreme-
mind correlation is only one element in the finite-mind correlation
which constitutes trueness. The trueness of our judgments regarding
other persons will also consist in such correlation among minds, al-
127. Lewis, MWO, 24-5.
128. Cf. supra, 151, f
..
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though here correspondence might reasonably be expected to obtain in
so far as we actually feel the other person’s experience. In a universe
of selves, where creativity is permitted, such trueness of correlation
is absolute trueness. That is, correlation of mind with mind is neither
canricious nor illusory

ABSTRACT
I, Introduction . --By "truth" is meant the system of
propositions acceptable to omniscience. By "trueness" is
meant the quality or relation which renders them accept-
able .
II. Trueness as Correspondence
.
--James Bis sett
Pratt's conception of trueness as the correspondence ob-
taining in case the object is as one thinks it, is too
vague to be satisfactory, and the appeal to uniqueness
and ultimacy as precluding further explanation of such
correspondence is unacceptable. Pratt seems faced with
the alternatives of denying that experiencing makes any
difference to the facts, or maintaining that some sig-
nificant judgments are neither true nor false, for lack
of anything to correspond to. His failure to distinguish
between extra-individual and extra-mental objectivity
seems responsible for this dilemma. Another difficulty
is that the trueness of judgments in the fields of logic
and mathematics must consist in correspondence ?;ith
interrelations between objects which are real only as
possible objects of thought.
Bertrand Russell attempts to avoid maintaining an
intrinsic difference between true and false judgments,
but the logic of his position leads him to assert the
--
«
-
'
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existence of negative facts, a conception which creates
more difficulties than it solves. Russell's doctrine of
the pointing of beliefs toward or away from the facts
seems to involve an abandonment of his position that the
mind grasps reality without the intervention of ideas.
At any rate, the explanation of a false judgment as one
that points away from its objective does not seem to be
an advance on the position that a false judgment is one
that fails to correspond.
William James, eschewing the saltatory notion of
correspondence
,
describes the relation as ambulatory
between the idea and the object. While this doctrine ha3
much to re commend it so far as our judgments regarding
sense objects are concerned, its outstanding weakness
lies in its attempt to account for the trueness of my
judgments regarding the experience of other persons
wholly in terms of my experience. Potential trueness,
which is asserted by James and denied by John Dewey,
requires some degree of predetermination by reality, but
the metaphysical status of James's pre det e Training ele-
ment is exceedingly obscure,
III. Trueno s s_as_Ide nt ity , --For Josiah Royce, ideas
approximate their objects more and more closely in the
Absolute until actual identity is achieved. Since it was
the need for actualizing the relation of correspondence
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that led Royce (in this connection) to affirm the exis-
tence of an infinite mind, the abandonment of corres-
pondence in favor of identity once we have this infinite
mind, seems hardly consistent. That we can mean only
what we have in mind constitutes a difficulty for our
judgments regarding the experience of other persons, and
that such judgments can be neither true nor false apart
from the infinite mind comparing both factors seems to
involve a confusion of the criterion of true ness with
trueness itself. Furthermore, the presence of the indi-
vidual consciousnesses, as individual, in the infinite
consciousness requires either that Royce abandon the
definition of consciousness as a generalized form of
attention or that the infinite consciousness be not one
but several.
Henri 3ergson counsels that we cease trying to grasp
the nature of the real from without, and seize it from
within by merging with it in intellectual sympathy. But
in so far as the individual's faculty of intuition is not
unlimited, supplementation by concepts is requisite for
such of duration as is not intuited. Until the question
of the one and the many has been raised, it is not evi-
dent how self-consciousness can progress beyond itself.
Once the question has been raised, some other type of
trueness than that of intuitional identity will be
*'
-
; ' t
-
necessary. But as concerns the datura-self Bergson is
right in maintaining that we have the trueness of iden-
tity.
For William Pepperell Montague, trueness consists in
identity with the real, falseness in identity with the
unreal. Reality consists of the propositions which com-
prise the space-time system of existents, together with
its implications; i. e., it consists of true propositions.
The ontological status of unproposed false propositions is
not satisfactorily explained by Montague, and he is faced
with the dilemma of admitting that being entertained makes
a difference to false propositions or that the act of cog-
nition is existentially separate from its content. In view
of the identity involved, true negative propositions re-
quire the existence of negative facts, a point which has
already been rejected. Judgments regarding the non-physical
aspects of other persons cannot be accounted for by Mon-
tague's epistemological monism, for he admits that these
aspects cannot appear externally.
IV. Truenes s_as_Gohe rence . --For Francis H. Bradley,
the creativity of knowledge requires the abandonment of
the correspondence-notion of trueness in favor of the
co he re n ce -not ion . Ideas are more or less true according
as they are more or less coherent. In the nature of tne
case an absolute degree of trueness can never be reached,
-'
*
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for if truth were to become absolutely complete and har-
monious, it would be reality, not truth. The trueness of
coherence would give way to the trueness of identity. But
so long as truth necessarily involves a separation of con
tent from existence, the trueness of identity is impossi-
ble. Yet the ultimate identity of knowledge and reality
seems to demand the trueness of identity. Bradley con-
ceives the solution of the difficulty to lie in the Ab-
solute's intuition, achieving the trueness of identity at
a different level from that of discursive thought.
Harold H. Joachim maintains that the self-assertive
element in error prevents its being dissolved in the
fuller knowledge of the Absolute. And the s e If -d irempt ion
of the Absolute into subject and object, which results in
even the c ohe re nee -t he o ry * s requiring the trueness of
correspondence, must be overcome somehow in the complete
self-re velation of the One.
The coherence -theory of trueness gives logical pri-
ority to the trueness of Truth, and the trueness of
truths must find a place therein or be destroyed. 7/e have
tried to show that a certain amount of destruction has
resulted, notably with reference to judgments about other
finite selves, concrete particulars, and time. But that
even the trueness of Truth has not been satisfactorily
treated is shown by Bradley's paradox of the relation of
-'
T
;
'
Truth and the Absolute, and by both Bradley's a.nd Joa-
chim's resort to intuition in the end. Nevertheless,
coherence seems to be the only acceptable interpreta-
tion of the trueness of logical concepts as such,
V. True ne£S_a^
—
Go r r e la t io n_o f_Mind__wi t h_Mind . - -Sven
the most distinctive theorists on trueness have admitted
that in different realms of being from those with which
they are most concerned, some different type of trueness
obtains. The need for reducing all types to a single type
is not self-evident. For C. I. Lewis the given is the
brute-fact element in experience, and concepts are the
sharable meanings, with eventually circular definitions,
although they also possess the meaning of correlation in
the individual mind with specific qualia. Since real ob-
jects are conceptual interpretations of the given and
are hence never immediate, we need not experience quali-
tatively identical givens in order to possess a common
world. Identical conceptual patterning is all that is
ne ce s s ary .
Nevertheless, some metaphysical grounding seems
necessary to account for identical conceptual patterning
in the face of possibly diverse givens. The will of a
supreme person seems the best explanation here. In our
apprehension of the given we have the trueness of iden-
tity. In conceptual systems as such we have the trueness
--
,
-
-
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-
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of coherence. The trueness of pragmatic success in our
application of concepts with reference to the common
world, is at bottom the trueness of correlation of mind
with mind. Our judgments must respond appropriately to
the supreme person's will by being honest about, and
concerning themselves with, the given, but over and above
this, our judgments must be correlated with the judgments
of other finite persons--in this correlation consists
their trueness. Such correlation will also be found to
constitute the trueness of our judgments about the ex-
periences of others.
.'
.
"
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